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Abstract 
Traditionally, both academe and practitioners have tended to address safety by focusing 
on technical aspects and looking for the immediate causes of incidents or accidents after 
they have taken place. More recently, organisations have focused on assessing pro- 
actively the consequences of the risk inherent in their operations. However, safety still 
tends to be addressed in isolation, though loss is an emergent property of a system. An 
organisation's emergent properties result from the interrelated activities of people who 
design it, manage it and operate it. Although the concepts in this research are general 
the focus has been on fire safety as an illustration. Because of the need to understand the 
systemic nature of fire safety, this research project has addressed the problem of what 
an organisation needs to do so that fire risk can be maintained within an acceptable 
range throughout the life cycle of the organisation's operations. A fire safety 
management system (FSMS) model has been developed in an attempt to address the 
research problem. It is hoped that this approach will lead not only to more effective 
management of fire safety, but also to more effective management of safety, health and 
the environment for any organisation. The contribution of this research project is not 
only to the existing understanding of fire safety, but also to health, safety and the 
environment. The research process was threefold. First, a thorough review of existing 
literature on health, safety and environment and systems thinking was conducted. This 
process helped to establish the FSMS model. Second, the FSMS model was compared 
with some existing safety management systems, and the case study of Britain's railway 
safety management was assessed to further explore the FSMS model. Finally, 
conclusions and implications of the research project have been drawn. 
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Chai)ter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Background to the Research Project 
Safety, health and the envirom-nent (SH&E) have become important issues for 
organisations over the last few years' 2,3 . Because of several major disasters, such as 
Flixborough (UK, 1974), Three Mile Island (USA, 1979), San Juanico (Mexico City, 
1984), Bhopal (India, 1984), the fire at the Manchester Airport (UK, 1985), the 
Challenger spacecraft explosion (USA, 1986), Chernobyl (Ukraine, 1987), the King's 
Cross fire (UK, 1987), the Piper Alpha fire (UK, 1988) and the more recent world - 
wide railway accidents and aircraft accidents have all highlighted the need to improve 
radically the safety performance of organisations. Several inquiries and studies have 
found that technical failure, human errors and organisational failure were the main 
contributors to these eventS4,5,6,7. Moreover, these events have shown clearly that 
existing SH&E management failed to prevent such incidents. There is a need for 
organisations to maintain risks within acceptable ranges. This will require organisations 
to improve radically their SH&E performance. 
Safety in general and fire safety in particular have become, in both academe and 
industry, subjects of increasing importance in recent years. The need to improve the 
safety perfon-nance of organisations is driven not only by recent accidents or disasters, 
but also by changes in regulation 8,9,10 , the emergence of 
international standards and the 
increasing pressure from social organisations. Traditionally, safety approaches have 
been prescriptive rather than proactive. Safety approaches have focused on performance 
1 
failures that immediately preceded an accident7,11,12 - These kinds of failures may involve 
direct human errors or factors having an immediate impact on the integrity of a 
system' 1,12 , or organisation. 
This way of addressing safety allows the immediate causes 
which led to the failure to be learnt so that they are not repeated in future situations. 
Moreover, these negative outcomes are usually seen as a means to measure the 
organisation's safety and fire safety perfon-nance. 
More recently, researchers have stressed that the human factor is one of the keys to 
13,14 
major disasters Furthermore, an understanding of organisational factors has been a 
12,15,16,17,18 focus to reduce the frequency of major accidents or disasters", 
Organisational failures are frequently committed in design, management, 
communication, and def 
1,12,16,17,19,20 
iciencies in the structure of the organisation' 
Addressing organisational failures is as important as focusing on immediate causes of 
accidents. Despite these significant changes in approaching safety in the oil and gas 
organisations, significant reduction of accident rates is still a far-reaching 
obj ective 21,22,23 . 
Detailed aspects of the traditional way of addressing safety and fire 
safety are given in section 1.3. 
Oil and gas organisations have shifted from a prescriptive approach to a goal-setting 
approach to safety 8,9,24 . 
This new perspective involves assessing the consequences of the 
fire risks inherent in the organisation's operations before they are actually realised. 
Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA) is usually used to identify the main contributors to 
the risk, estimate risk levels and assess their significance, and devise actions to reduce 
or avoid theM25 . 
However, fire safety still tends to be analysed in isolation 26,27,28,29 . 
The 
organisation as a whole, rather than isolated parts, has become a matter for concern. 
Approaches to safety seem to pay very little attention to the overall system or 
organisation' 5,30,31 . 
Very often fire safety approaches address an individual subsystem's 
performance, rather than assessing the interactions among the subsystems, and their 
impact on the system's overall performance. In general, a fire loss does not belong 
exclusively to either technical or human factors, but it is a product of the interactions 
among the parts that constitute the organisation as a whole; it is a systemic failure. Fire 
safety may be difficult to assess, particularly in complex organisations, where 
subsystems' actions and the aggregated activities of the organisation influence each 
other's behaviour. There is a need to adopt a systemic approach to fire safety. Systemic 
means to look upon events as products of systems. System is understood as an 
2 
interaction of a number of entities called parts of the system 
32 or organisation. The 
emphasis is to understand particularly the interactions of the organisation's parts, and 
the impacts of these interactions on the failure propensity of the organisation as a whole. 
Moreover, the structure of the organisation and the relationships amongst the parts 
should be clearly understood, as well as the purpose served by this organisational 
structure. An effective organisation and a structure which may help to make an 
organisation acceptably safe is needed. 
1.2 The Research Problem and Questions 
This research project has addressed the following research problem: 
What does an organisation need to do to anticipatefire risks so thatfire risk can be 
maintained within an acceptable range throughout the organisation's operations life 
cycle? 
This research project contends that a systemic approach has had to be adopted to address 
fire safety in a coherent way. Moreover, this systemic approach is intended to help to 
maintain fire risk within an acceptable range throughout the life cycle of an 
organisation's operations. Detailed aspects of this approach are given in section 1.4 and 
in chapter 5. 
The research problem has been addressed by developing some research questions. The 
research questions below needed to be answered throughout the research project. 
o What is a Fire Safety Management System? 
What defines an effective Fire Safety Management System so that it is capable of 
maintaining the operational safety of an organisation within an acceptable range? 
How can the fire safety performance of the Fire Safety Management System be 
measured? 
The research problem and research questions helped to give focus and direction to the 
research process. The research problem involved decisions on the focus and direction of 
the research process. The research questions also facilitated a focus on specific 
information to solve the research problem satisfactorily. The research questions were 
3 
developed during the literature review of the research process. They are discussed in 
section 2.2 of chapter 2. 
1.3 Motivation for the Research Project 
Motivation for this research project was based first on the importance of fire safety in 
the context of SH&E. Second, the need for an approach that may help to address fire 
safety as a coherent whole was considered. Third, the significance of the research 
methodology in constructing a system so that fire risk can be addressed effectively and 
maintained within an acceptable range was emphasised. Finally, the usefulness of a 
practical and potential application of the Fire Safety Management System to addressing 
not only fire safety, but also SH&E was highlighted. These four criteria which are 
intended to justify this research project are discussed in some detail in the subsequent 
subsections. 
1.3.1 Fire Safety in the Context of SH&E 
Traditionally, risks and environmental impacts have been addressed through complying 
with regulations and relying on 'end-of-pipe' technologies 33. c End-of-pipe' involves 
cleaning up waste after it has been generated. Relatively little has been done previously 
in the SH&E policies of organisations to reduce risks and prevent pollution. Because of 
an increasing pressure on organisations resulting from recent accidents or disasters, 
government legislation, the general public, environmental organisations, commercial 
institutions etc, have apparently developed a growing recognition of their 
responsibilities to address SH&E. 
As a consequence of these driving forces, safety has become important. Fire is probably 
one of the greatest hazards that can be encountered in any industrial plant. This is clearly 
seen in fire disasters, such as the Piper Alpha fire (UK, 1988), and many others world- 
wide. These kinds of events can contribute not only to loss of property, but also human 
life and negative impacts on the environment 34,35 . Furthermore, such accidents have had 
negative economic implications for the organisations concerned 34,36,37,38,39 . 
Thus fire 
safety has become a subject of increasing importance 40,41 over recent years. The need to 
improve the fire safety performance of organisations is driven not only by recent fire 
accidents and their economic implications, but also by legislation, international 
standards, and pressures from social organisations. 
4 
Organisations have been driven to address safety in general and fire safety in particular 
by changes in health, safety, and envirom-nental regulation, which have been initiated 
since the 1970S8,9,33. In the oil and gas industry, for example, major changes were 
emphasised by the Cullen report 24 into the Piper Alpha fire. Examples of recent 
legislation that addresses the recommendations made by the Cullen report include the 
offshore installation Safety Case 42 regulations, and the Prevention of Fire and 
Explosion, and Emergency Response (PFEER)43,44 regulations. The Safety Case 
regulations require organisations to demonstrate that the offshore installation's 
operations are acceptably safe. The PFEER regulations involve the prevention of fires 
and explosions, as well as all aspects of emergency response, including evacuation, 
escape, and rescue. Moreover, oil and gas organisations have to address safety 
throughout the offshore installation's life cycle, as well as safety management systems. 
These safety requirements are described in the Offshore Installations and Wells (Design 
and Construction) (DCR)45 regulations and the Offshore Installations and Pipeline 
Works (Management and Administration) (MAR)46 regulations. The DCR regulations 
emphasise the need for appropriate design, commissioning, operation, maintenance, and 
abandom-nent of the offshore installation. The MAR on the other hand emphasise the 
need for more effective management systems including weather data. 
Existing and emerging health and safety regulations are part of a large legal framework. 
In the United Kingdom, the Health and Safety of Work Act (1974) established the 
Health and Safety Commission (HSC), as well as setting up the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) to propose health and safety regulations, approve codes of practice, 
and enforce these regulations. The Act is the primary legislation in the UK under which 
most subsequent health and safety regulations have been formulated and proposed. For 
example, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, as part of the HSE, is responsible for the 
particular forinulation and application of general safety requirements for the nuclear 
induSt 7. More recently, three new regulations have been brought into force in the 
transport industry. These regulations are the Railways (Safety Case) RegulationS48 , the 
Railways (Safety Critical Work) RegulationS49 , and the Carriage of 
Dangerous Goods by 
Rail RegulationS50. The railway safety case regulation requires organisations to include 
the system boundary and technical description, hazard identification, risk assessment, 
safety management system, and "summing up" statement of safety. The Construction 
5 
(Design and Management) RegulationS5 1 address health and safety management on an 
obligatory basis for planning and design of construction work. 
Similarly, the European Community (EQ legislative framework under the Seveso 
Directive 35,52 establishes objectives and basic principles with which each member state 
must comply. Each member state translates them into its own national legislation and 
the commission and the member's competent authority, such as the HSE, constantly 
monitors the implementation process towards a substantial convergence. In the United 
States of America (USA), there has been a rise in the number of health, safety and 
environmental regulations under the Clean Air Act. Under this law, the Congress 
specifically directed the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)53 and 
Envirom-nental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop regulations to prevent future 
process incidents. The OSHA 1910.119, Process Safety Management of Highly 
Hazardous Chemicals is the first regulation developed and proposed by the OSHA. The 
purpose of the OSHA 1910.119 regulation is to prevent catastrophic events that have 
negative impacts on employees or public health and safety. 
Traditionally, quality assurance is a prerequisite in product development and an integral 
part of production processes. Several international standards have been adopted by 
organisations to comply with quality requirements. Examples of these standards include 
International Standard Organisation (ISO) 900054 series, and the British Standard 
575 055 , and 785 056 . These standards have an increasing influence on health, safety and 
the envirom-nent. Apart from complying with regulations, organisations face the need to 
satisfy international standards concerned with safety, such as the ISO 1400057 series, the 
British Standard 880058 and 775 059 , the European Environmental Management and 
Auditing Schemes (EMAS)60 , and the American Petroleum Institute 
(AP1), 
recommended practice 7506 1 and 75 62 . 
1.3.2 The Need for a Systemic Approach 
Recent fire accidents have not only illustrated that fire risk can contribute to loss of 
property, human life and negative impacts to the environment, but they have 
demonstrated the inadequacy of the existing fire safety approaches. This is because a 
series (chain) of unacceptable circumstances has made potential fire risk actual63. 
Traditionally, fire safety approaches have been reactive rather than proactive. They have 
focused on technical aspects and look for the immediate causes of fire incidents or 
accidents after they have taken place. This has allowed the immediate causes, which led 
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to the failure, to be learnt so that they are not repeated in future situations. Moreover, 
these negative outcomes are usually seen as a means to measure the organisation's fire 
safety perforinance, such as the Lost Time Injury (LTI)64. 
Fire safety has, however, received increased attention over the last few years as a 
consequence of recent fire accidents, and changes in regulation, as well as the 
emergence of international standards. As a result of this, oil and gas organisations have 
8,9,21,24 shifted from a reactive approach to a goal-setting approach to fire safety . This 
new perspective involves assessing the consequences of the fire risks inherent in the 
organisation's operations before an incident or accident takes place. Under the 
prescriptive approach, regulations explain how to achieve safety, whilst the goal-setting 
approach explains what organisations must achieve. A typical goal-setting approach 
recognises that safety is better assessed and managed by addressing in advance the 
hazards of the organisation's operations. This is usually done through three basic 
step S65,66 : first, a systematic identification of hazards; second, Quantified Risk 
Assessment (QRA) is usually used to assess the significance of the identified hazards; 
finally, hazards are managed by prevention, control, and mitigation. 
Safety approaches have emphasised performance failures which immediately preceded 
an accident 7,11,12 . 
These kinds of failures have been termed "active failures", which are 
understood as human errors or violations having an immediate impact on the integrity of 
a SySteM7,12 or organisation. Researchers have found that the human factor is one of the 
keys to major disasters 13,14,67,68,69,70 . 
More recently, however, an understanding of 
organisational errors has been the focus to reduce the frequency of major accidents or 
6,7,12,15,16,17,18,71 57,12,17,18 disasters . Organisational errors 
have been termed 'latent failures 
These failures are frequently committed in design, management, communication, 
deficiencies in structure of the organisation 
7,12,16,17,19,20. It is clear that addressing 
organisational failures is as important as focusing on directly human or technical causes 
of accidents. This is clearly seen in recent incidents as a result of the lack of an adequate 
72,73,74,75 
safety management system 
A fire incident or accident is a result of several interrelated factors in the organisation. 
These fire safety concerns may represent more than a series of individual problems with 
individual and independent solutions. Moreover, these fire safety deficiencies are highly 
interrelated and not isolated human aspects or technical aspects. Therefore, there is a 
need for systemic solutions and not just specific solutions to individual problems. To 
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treat fire safety factors in isolation will ultimately fail to improve fundamentally the 
safety performance of an organisation's operations. 
Very little attention has been given by both academe and practitioners to understanding 
the appropriate degree of interdependence amongst the parts that constitute an 
organisation in order to design an effective safety management system (SMS). Vaughan 5 
emphasises that the relationships amongst the parts of an organisation and the 
interaction of the organisation with other organisations are characterised by "structurally 
engendered weaknesses" that contribute to technical failures. Moreover, the author 
stresses that this is a result of the sophisticated formulae used to estimate risk in 
technical systems which do not consider the possible organisational contribution to 
these failures. According to Vaughan, risks are always underestimated creating 
unwarranted confidence in all risky technological systems. Segan 76 discusses high 
reliability organisations in order to understand the origin of accidents. Segan argues that: 
"High reliability theorists believe that hazardous technologies can be safely controlled 
by complex organisations if wise design and management techniques followed. This 
optimistic conclusion is based on the argument that effective organisations can meet the 
followingfour specific conditions, which are necessary to create and maintain adequate 
s afe ty: 
" political elite and organisation leaders place a high priority on safety and reliability; 
" significant levels of redundancy exist, permitting backup or overlapping units to 
compensateforfailures; 
" error rates are reduced through decentralisation of authority, strong organisational 
culture, and continuous operations and training; and 
" organisational learning takes place through a trial-and-error process, supplemented 
by anticipation and simulation. " 
Perrowl 5 discusses an alternative approach, known as normal accident theory, in order 
to understand the underlying causes of accidents. The normal accident theory contends 
that: 
e organisations and their members or parts are self-interested actors with potentially 
conflicting interests, and the organisations are strongly influenced by the broader 
socio-economic context or environment; 
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interactive complexity within the organisation makes it difficult to understand and so 
makes it prone to failures; 
there exists conflicting interests amongst the organisation's parts and between the 
organisation and its environment; and 
whether the Organisation or system is "tightly coupled" or "loosely coupled" affects 
its ability to recover from small-scale failures before these cascade into larger 
problems. 
It is recognised in the normal accident theory that serious accidents are inevitable if the 
Organisation that controls hazardous technologies displays both high interactive 
complexity and 'tight coupling'. 
Grabowski and Roberts' 2 stress that the structure of an Organisation has a significant 
impact on the Organisation's safety culture, communication, and decision making. 
According to them, the organisational structure of a SMS should allow decisions to be 
made at the local level. This means that decision making should be distributed 
throughout the whole Organisation. These decision makers should be autonomous in 
their own right and act independently based on their own understanding of fire safety 
and their specific tasks. However, it should be recognised that they have 
interdependence with other decision makers from other operations of the Organisation. 
Therefore, each operation should be endowed with a degree of autonomy so that the 
Organisation's fire safety policy can be achieved more effectively. These aspects of 
organisational. structure, which have a role in making organisations more rather than less 
effective, are poorly understood in safety and fire safety literature. 
It has long been known that an Organisation's communication system has a significant 
impact on the Organisation's performance. Also, it has been discussed elsewhere 12 that 
distributed decision making is impossible without communication. Good decision 
making relies on well-designed networks of 'real-time' information systems. Moreover, 
a good communication system may serve as a means to divulge and sustain an 
Organisation's safety culture. A typical problem associated with poor communication is 
lack Of t]rUSt77,78,79 , and trust within organisations 
is a continuous process8o. An 
organisational structure needs to be in place to ensure that this process of trust is 
sustained throughout the Organisation's life cycle. Organisations that require constant 
attention to safety should be characterised by a well-designed organisational structure 
and strong safety culture. There is therefore a need to address the structure of an SMS 
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that may help organisations to reduce problems associated with communication, human 
and organisational factors. 
1.3.3 The Significance of the Research Methodology 
A research methodology that gave direction and consistency to the research project was 
adopted. This research methodology is described in section 1.4. The research activities 
were structured into three phases, namely theory, practice, and reflection. In the theory 
phase, existing literature on SH&E, fire safety, and systemic thinking was studied to 
construct a Fire Safety Management System (FSMS) prototype. A typical oil and gas 
organisation was used to construct a prototypical FSMS, though the approach is 
intended to be general. In the practice phase, the developed FSMS prototype is initially 
tested through a series of mappings to systemic paradigms, such as communication and 
control and human aspects. Experiences learnt from this mapping process were 
integrated into the FSMS prototype to produce an FSMS model. The FSMS model was 
then mapped on to some existing safety management systems. The FSMS model is 
further elucidated through a probabilistic computer simulation. Finally, in the reflection 
phase, the researcher reflected on the research process itself The resulting experience 
from the research process helped to consolidate contributions of the research project and 
outline recommendations for further research. 
1.3.4 Potential Applications of the FSMS Model 
The FSMS model developed and proposed in this research project is a systemic 
approach intended to maintain fire risk within an acceptable range in an organisation's 
operations in a coherent way. It is hoped that this systemic approach will lead not only 
to more effective management of fire safety, but also to more effective management of 
safety, health and the environment for any organisation. This research project also 
established the concept of viability of the FSMS model in quantitative terms. 
1.4 The Research Methodology 
A three phase research methodology was used throughout the research process in order 
to accomplish the research project, as illustrated in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1 The Research Methodology Phases and Activities 
Research Phases Research Activities Research Phases. Output 
--- -------- . .......... Theory 1. literature review on 1. an FSMS prototype 
SH&E, safety, and fire 
safety 
2. literature review on 
systemic thinking 
3. construct a FSMS 
prototype 
Practice 4. map FSMS prototype to 2. synthesis: a FSMS 
some systemic paradigms Model 
of the Failure Paradigm 
Method (FPM) 
5. FSMS mapped on to 
existing Safety 3. lessons from further 
Management Systems testing 
6. Case study: assessing the 
British railway safety 
management 
Reflection 7. reflect upon research 4. conclusions and 
process implications 
1.4.1 Theory Phase of the Research Methodology 
In the theory phase of the research methodology three main activities were conducted. 
Literature Review on SH&E and Fire Safety 
A continuous review of existing literature on SH&E and fire safety was conducted 
throughout the research project. This activity involved analysing published literature 
from both academe and practitioners' perspectives', as well as visiting practitioners to 
discuss fire safety issues. An understanding of the nature of fire safety from different 
perspectives was gained through this activity. Thus, this activity facilitated the 
establishment and formulation of the research problem and questions. Relevant 
literature to this research project is presented in chapter 2. 
Reviewing the Literature on Systemic Thinking 
This second activity of the research process involved studying systemic thinking 
principles, as well as studying systemic approaches. This activity also involved both 
studying existing literature on systemic thinking and existing approaches to systems, and 
gaining practical understanding from practitioners. The Viable System Model 
(VSM)" 82,83,84 and the Failure Paradigm Method (FPM) 85,86 were adopted and studied 
in some detail to address the research problem and questions. These two approaches to 
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systems are described in some detail in chapter 3. The next subsections describe how 
they were used to develop a FSMS model, which is presented in chapter 5. 
Constructing the FSMS Prototype 
This last activity of the theory phase involved constructing an FSMS prototype. The 
approach taken to formulate the prototypical FSMS builds on the Viable System Model 
81,82,83,84 82 (VSM) developed and proposed by Beer .A Viable System is defined by Beer 
as that which is able to maintain a separate existence. Very few, if any, systems would 
fulfil this definition and in this research project a viable system has been regarded as one 
which is able to maintain a relatively separate existence. This has been further 
interpreted as a system which is able to remain stable, or resilient, and continue to be 
able to fulfil its purpose. Beer contends that in any viable system there are five necessary 
and sufficient subsystems interactively involved in any organism or organisation that is 
capable of maintaining its identity independently of other such organisms within a 
shared environment. A FSMS prototype resulted from this activity of the research 
methodology. Detailed aspects of the FSMS prototype are discussed in chapter 4. 
1.4.2 Practice Phase of the Research Methodology 
Three main activities were accomplished in the practice phase of the research 
methodology and are discussed below. 
Testing the Prototypical FSMS 
The purpose of the initial test of the developed FSMS prototype was to identify its 
weaknesses and strengths. To accomplish this objective, the FPM, proposed by Fortune 
and Peters 85,86 , was mapped on to the FSMS prototype. 
The VSM facilitated an 
understanding to formulate the FSMS organisational structure. The FPM, inter alia, 
provided some best practices that helped the understanding of some human aspects. The 
strengths and weaknesses of the FSMS prototype are discussed in chapter 4. This initial 
testing of the FSMS prototype led to a synthesis: that is, an FSMS model. This model is 
presented in chapter five. 
Synthesis: a FSMS Model 
The FSMS model developed in this research project is a systemic set of five inter- 
related subsystems, as shown in Figure 1.1. The FSMS needs to achieve five functions 
associated with systems 1 to 5. System 1, fire safety policy implementation, implements 
the organisation's fire safety policy. System 2, fire safety co-ordination, involves co- 
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ordinating the various operations of system 1. System 3, fire safety functional, involves 
ensuring that the organisation's fire safety policy is implemented, as well as ensuring 
that the fire safety is maintained within an acceptable range. System 3*, fire safety audit, 
conducts sporadic audits into the operations of system 1. System 4, fire safety 
development, is responsible for the future fire safety development for the whole 
organisation. System 4*, fire safety confidential reporting, deals with the organisation's 
employees confidential fire safety concerns. Finally, system 5, fire safety policy, is 
responsible for establishing fire safety policies for the whole organisation. 
The FSMS model developed and presented in this research project integrates both 
internally committed systems (ICS) and externally committed systems (ECS) (to be 
defined later in section 5.3.2, chapter 5), into a systemic model that is also intended to 
quantify an organisation's fire safety performance. This measure of fire safety 
performance provides decision makers with the means to define fire risk levels and 
make fire safety plans. Moreover, a notional fire safety configuration space was devised 
to help to 'diagnose' the fire safety performance of technical and non-technical systems, 
such as organisations and humans individually, in teams, and in organisations. A 
detailed description of the FSMS model is presented in chapter 5. 
Mapping the FSMS Model on to other SMSs. 
This activity involved mapping the FSMS model on to other oil and gas organisation's 
safety management systems. Two North Sea oil and gas operators provided descriptions 
of their safety management in the form of 'safety cases' to complete this mapping 
process. Standard safety management schemes, such as BS 8 80058 , etc., were also used 
to be mapped to the FSMS model. Lessons learnt from this mapping process are 
discussed in chapter 6. 
Further Elucidation of the FSMS Model 
The purpose of this activity was to illustrate how the FSMS model can be used in other 
type of industries in order to assess the existing safety management. This was 
demonstrated for the case study of the British railway safety management. Results from 
this case study have been recorded and are presented in chapter 7. 
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1.4.3 The Reflection Phase of the Research Methodology 
In this last phase of the research methodology, the researcher examined the research 
process itself. The researcher reflected upon the existing fire safety body of knowledge 
and practice. Lessons gained from the development, initial testing and further 
elucidation of the FSMS were also recorded as well as ideas for further research. These 
conclusions and the implications of this research project are presented in chapter 7. 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised according to Table 1.1. The research context, the research 
problem and questions, the research justification, and the research methodology are 
discussed in chapter 1. Relevant existing literature on Safety, Health and the 
Environment, fire safety, and systemic thinking was reviewed and analysed throughout 
the research project. This review is discussed in chapter two. Chapter three describes 
two approaches to systems which were adopted to construct the FSMS model. The 
developed FSMS prototype is described in chapter 4 and the FSMS model is presented 
in chapter 5. The evaluation in relation to the FSMS model is discussed in chapter 6. A 
case study for the assessment of the British railway safety management to further 
elucidate the FSMS model is presented in chapter 7. Finally, conclusions and 
implications of this research project are presented in chapter 8. 
1.6 Definition of Key Terms 
Definitions of key tenns are given to establish positions taken in this research project. 
The tenns adopted in this research are defined as below. 
Safety 
Safety relates to the freedom from risks of harm to people. 
Fire 
Fire is a combustion process releasing heat or smoke 66 
Risk 
Risk is the probability that a specified undesirable event will occur in a specified period 
or as a result of a specified situation 87 
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System 
System is understood as an interaction of a number of entities called parts of the system 
or organisation 
32 
. 
Variety 
Variety is the number of possible states of a system 83 
Viable 
According to Beer, 'viable' means able to maintain a separate existance 83 
In this research , 'viability' has given the specific meaning below. 
Autonomy 
Autonomy is the freedom of a subsystem to act on its own initiative, but only within the 
82 framework of action determined by the purpose of the total system 
Recursion 
Recursion is a level that contains all the levels below it 82 
Systemic 
Sytemic means to looking upon events as products of systems. 
Structure 
The ten'n structure emphasises the relations among the parts as well as the identity of the 
patts which constitute a whole 88 . 
Organisation 
The word organisation emphasises the relations which define a system as a unity with no 
reference to the nature of the components which can be any as long as they satisfy these 
relations 88 . 
Paradigm 
85 
The word paradigm is used to denote a pattern or example of good practice . 
The following tenns are proposed in this research project. A detailed discussion of these 
tenns is given in chapters five and Six. 
Intemally Committed System (ICS) 
An ICS is a system that is committed to a particular purpose or objective based on its 
own reasons or motivation. 
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Externally Committed Systems (ECS) 
An ECS is a system that is committed to a particular purpose, function, or objective 
based on external reasons or motivation. 
83 According to Beer, 'viable' means able to maintain a separate existance . 
In this research, 'viability' has given the specific meaning below. 
Viability 
Viability = Probability that the FSMS has the capacity to maintain the risk within an 
acceptable range, for a stated period of time. 
Maximum Risk Acceptable (MRA) 
MRA is understood here as the level of fire risk above which the risk is definitely 
unacceptable. 
An Acceptable Range of Fire Risk 
An acceptable range of fire risk is one which is below the MRA and5 as a general rule, 
well below the MRA. 
Acceptable Level of Fire Risk 
An acceptable level of fire risk is one which is within an acceptable range. 
Fire Safety Levels 
9 current achievement level (CAL) is the fire risk level an organisation manages with 
existing resources, and under existing constraints. 
* without significant extra investment level of achievement (WEEL) can be defined as 
the fire risk level an organisation could achieve with existing resources and under 
existing constraints, if resources and technology were better organised. 
e minor extra investment level of achievement (MINEEL) can be defined as the fire risk 
level an organisation ought to be achieving, if some minor extra investment is made 
to eliminate some shortcomings in capacity or technology. 
0 major extra investment level of achievement (MAJEEL) can be defined as the fire 
safety performance an organisation would be capable of achieving, if a major 
investment in new equipment, or new technology is made to eliminate current 
constraints. 
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Fire Safety Plans 
Planning is understood here as being a continuous process of decision-taking, whereby 
resource allocations are made, so that the future organisation's fire safety performance 
may be better. 
* Planning fire safety from the CAL is referred to here as operative fire safety 
planning. 
Planning fire safety from the WEIL is called programmatic planning. 
Planning fire safety from the MINEIL is referred to as strategic fire safety planning. 
9 Planning fire safety from the MAJEIL is termed normative planning. 
Fire Safety Indices of Achievement 
9 The short term index of achievement (SIA) is given by the ratio of WEIL to the CAL. 
4o The medium-term index of achievement (MIA) is defined by the ratio of MINEIL to 
the WEIL. 
The long-term index of achievement (LIA) is given by the ratio of the MAJEIL to the 
MINEEL. 
The overall fire safety perfonnance index of an organisation can be obtained either by 
the ratio of the CAL to the MAJEIL, or by the product of SIA, MIA, and LIA indices. 
Fire Safety Configuration Space 
The fire safety configuration space is a notional space on to which technical systems, 
and non-technical systems such as organisations, and humans, individually, in teams, in 
organisations, can be mapped to assess their fire safety performance. 
1.7 Limitations and Assumptions of the Research Project 
This research project emphasises the development of a systemic approach to address fire 
safety in oil and gas offshore operations, though the approach can be easily extended to 
address SH&E and be made applicable to any organisation. To construct the FSMS, it 
was assumed that an oil and gas organisation, apart from producing oil and gas, 
produces an acceptable range of fire risk also. This helped to define the purpose of the 
FSMS; how this was done is described in chapter 4. It should be emphasised that the 
various operations that form part of system 1 of the FSMS were defined according to the 
researcher's own understanding and perception of the situation. However, in a real 
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situation, these operational elements of system I must be defined according to the 
perceptions of the organisation's employees, line management and top management. 
1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the foundations for the whole thesis. It first introduced the 
research problem and research questions. The research project was justified; then the 
research methodology was described and justified; the outline for the thesis was 
presented, and key concepts and definitions were presented. The limitations and 
assumptions of the research project were given. On these foundations, the thesis can 
continue with a detailed description of the research project. 
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Chapter Two 
iterature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter one presented the research context and the research problem, and put forward 
the research questions. The research project was justified. The research methodology, 
and the research limitations and assumptions were also discussed. This chapter reviews 
existing literature on Safety, Health and the Environment (SH&E), and fire safety in the 
context of the research problem. The discussion presented in this chapter is structured 
according to the research problem and questions, as shown in Figure 2.1. Section 2.2 
discusses a definition of a safety and fire safety management system, as well as 
discussing systemic thinking principles. It also formulates some research questions. 
Section 2.3 reviews existing literature on SH&E Management Systems. Existing 
specific tools and methods to address safety and fire safety are discussed in section 2.4. 
Section 2.5 summarises the lessons learnt from the review process. Finally, section 2.6 
concludes chapter two. 
2.2 Safety and Fire Safety Management 
Managing the risks associated with an organisation's operations has been a subject of 
increasing importance over recent years. However, very little emphasis has been given 
in both academe and industry to define what constitutes either a safety management 
system (SMS), or an effective SMS. There are still no well defined and accepted criteria 
that may help to establish an effective SMS. George 89 describes key functions of 
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management, namely planning, organising, commanding, co-ordinating, and controlling 
which are linked to form a closed loop. Similarly, Druker 90 contends that management 
involves setting objectives, organising, communicating, establishing yardsticks, and 
developing people. 
Research Problem 
fire safety management 
Research 
questions 
(2.2,2.3 & 2.5) 
Safety & fire safety 
management (2.2) 
Figure 2.1 The Review Process 
SH&E 
Management 
Systems 
SH&E (2.4) 
Larken 91 , contends that 
(4 management is the intelligent and disciplined application of common sense, advice, 
guidance, judgement and professional knowledge in a properly planned, logical and co- 
ordinated manner to the solution of relevant problems with due priority, allied to the 
resources and communications necessary to resolve them, normally, if not always 
within aframework of objectives set by senior management ". 
In the oil and gas industry, for example, the Offshore Installation (Safety Case) 
regulations 42 emphasise that the term 'management system' means 
"the organisation and arrangements established by the duty holder for managing his 
undertaking". 
Furthermore, the Safety Case Regulations emphasise that those elements concerned with 
safety performance are referred to collectively as the SMS. Roughton 92 integrates the 
principles of total quality management (TQM) with safety. TQM is understood as trying 
to succeed by continually improving a product or service, whilst quality can be defined 
as the conformance to requirements, with requirements being defined by designers. 
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Roughton further stresses that the concept of prevention should be adopted, since 
injuries to workers and to the environment represent an unacceptable waste of resources. 
Pappas 93 stresses that a SMS should ensure that safety requirements of regulatory 
agencies are complied with. He further emphasises that a SMS has two different aspects: 
first, to provide a basis for decisions within the line organisation regarding safety; 
second, to follow up and verify the implementation of the decisions. In a paper 
94 presented by Ming ,a SMS 
is defined as the policies, objectives, organisation, 
management controls and resources which are in place to manage SH&E in all parts of 
the business. Whittingham and Hollywell95 argue that the SMS and the organisation's 
safety culture should be considered together. They also argue that an effective SMS 
needs to be a more formalised version of existing management systems for the control 
of both safety and production. Moreover, effective safety management results from the 
combination of a SMS structure and the organisation's safety culture. 
More recently, Burkhardt 96 defines process safety management (PSM) as: 
"the application of management systems to the identification, understanding, and 
control ofprocess hazards to prevent process-related injuries and incidents". 
Similarly, the British Standard Institute (BSI)58 defines a management system as 
66a composite, at any level of complexity, ofpersonnel, resources, policies &procedures, 
the components of which interact in an organised way to ensure a given task is 
performed, or to achieve or maintain a specified outcome 
The BSI also defines organisation as 
66a company, operation, firms, enterprise, institution, or association, or part thereof, 
whether incorporated or not, public or private, that has its own functions & 
administration. For organisations with more than one operating unit, a single operating 
unit may be defined as an organisation". 
Moreover, the BSI emphasises that the elements of Occupational Health and Safety 
(OH&S), based on the BS EN ISO 14001 management system, are all essential for an 
effective OH&S management system. The key elements of the OH&S management 
system are OHS policy, planning, implementation and operation, checking and 
corrective action, and management review. 
Other authors such as Travers 97 contend that the Successful Health and Safety 
Management (HS(G)65), developed by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), provides 
the basic criteria for an effective management system. The HS(G) 65 management 
system involves policy, organising, planning and implementing, measuring 
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perfon-nance, reviewing performance, and auditing. A study conducted by Kandola 98 
contends that 
44a management system must enable the assessment of risks to be carried out and as a 
result devise and implement adequate risk reduction measures and provide appropriate 
feedback mechanisms forfurther improvement". 
Kandola further contends that such a safety system must be dynamic and proactive, as 
well as protecting people, property and the environment. Other researchers, such as 
Reason 7 contend that 
it an effective safety management means actively navigating the safety space in order to 
reach and then remain within the zone of maximum resistance". 
Reason emphasises that managers should regularly measure and improve those 
processes, such as design, hardware, training, procedures, maintenance, planning, 
budgeting, communication, goal conflicts, and the like. These processes are known to be 
the sources of organisational failure. Moreover, Reason contends that safety 
management should not be an add-on, but an essential part of the organisation's core 
business. 
The European Council Directive 96/82/EC99, known also as SEVESO 11, defines a SMS 
as including 
"the organisational structure, responsibilities, practices, procedures, processes and 
resourcesfor determining and implementing the major-accident prevention policy". 
Finally, Mitchison and Papadakisloo contend that safety management is an aspect of the 
overall management function that deten-nines and implements the organisation's safety 
policy. This involves a series of activities, initiatives and programmes which focus on 
technical, human and organisational aspects and refers to all the individual activities 
within the organisation. Moreover, these activities are associated with the concept of 
continuous improvement through 'control loops', which involve planning, organising 
the work, implementing, evaluating, checking the outcome against the plan, and 
adjusting/taking corrective action. Thus safety management is converted into a formal 
SMS. 
As mentioned above, there remain questions concerning what constitutes and defines an 
SMS and an effective SMS. The following research questions require to be answered. 
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What is a Fire Safety Management System? 
What defines an effective Fire Safety Management System so that it is capable of 
maintaining the operational safety of an organisation within an acceptable range? 
How can the fire safety performance of the Fire Safety Management System be 
measured? 
In order to answer these questions, the subsequent sections review existing literature on 
systemic thinking, as well as reviewing existing practices on safety and fire safety 
management, and safety performance. 
2.3 Understanding Organisations 
This section explores the key aspects of systemic thinking. It discusses what they are 
and why they are useful to understanding organisations. It also discusses a systemic 
approach adopted in this research project to develop an effective FSMS. Systemic 
thinking is a conceptual framework or body of knowledge and tools that has been 
developed over the last fifty years'01. According to Senge'01, systemic thinking is a 
discipline for seeing wholes. It is a framework for seeing relationships rather than 
things; for seeing patterns of change rather than static 'snapshots'. Checkland 102 
emphasises that systemic thinking is a process of reflection about the real world which 
uses systems ideas. Systemic thinking is holistic thinking that addresses things in a 
broader context of the world about them and explores the relationships with this 
external world, as well as emphasising the interactions within the system itself. For 
example, an education system is seen as part of society as a whole and not as something 
to be analysed in isolation from the broader context. The strength of systemic thinking is 
that it forces the practitioner to gather all possible processes and interrelationships 
among parts into an organised structure. Ackofe 03 emphasises 
"the performance of the whole is not the addition of the performance of the parts, but it 
is a consequence of the relationship between the performance of the parts. It is how 
performance relates, not how it occurs independently of the other parts. That is what 
systems thinking is about ". 
The key concepts of systemic thinking in contrast with analytical thinking, the two being 
complementary of scientific thinking, are boundary, emergence, and hierarchy. These 
three key ideas of systems thinking are described before proceeding to discuss a systems 
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approach, which can then be described not only as systematic, but, more importantly, 
systemic. 
Boundary and Emergence 
It is generally recognised in systemic thinking that the notions of scientific method are 
reductionism, repeatability and refutation' 04 . Reductionistic methods of analysis 
consider situations within carefully set boundaries, which are assumed to isolate them 
from external influences or at least to circumscribe such external influences to create a 
set of well-defined inputs and outputs. The distinction between reductionistic and 
systemic methods of analysis is important to the argument behind this research project. 
Reductionistic methods of analysis may seem intrinsically flawed. Simplicity is one 
considerable advantage of reductionistic analysis but isolating events can give an over- 
simple understanding of them. This may be insufficient to understand complex and 
unforeseen situations. The application of reductionistic methods of analysis has rendered 
science unable to explain complex situations. For example, the science of physics and 
chemistry cannot explain complex biological processes. Although biology draws 
extensively on scientific methods to explain biological processes, it demonstrates the 
emergence of behaviour, which is inexplicable in tenns of the processes with which 
physics and chemistry are concerned. As Jacob 105 contends: 
"At each level of organisation novelties appear in both properties and logic. To 
produce is not within the power of any single molecule by itse4f. This faculty appears 
only with the simplest integron deserving to be called a living organism, that is the cell. 
But thereafter the rules of the game change. At the higher level integron, the cell 
population, natural selection imposes new constraints and offers new possibilities. In 
this way and without ceasing to obey the principles that govern inanimate systems, 
living systems become subject to phenomena that have no meaning at the lower level. 
Biology can neither be reduced to physics nor do without it. Every object that biology 
studies is a system of systems. Being part of a higher order system, it itseýf obeys rules 
that cannot be deduced simply by analysing it. This means that each level of 
organisation must be considered with reference to adjacent levels... At every level of 
integration, some new characteristics come to light... Very often, concepts and 
techniques that apply at one level do notfunction either above it or below it. The 
various levels of biological organisations are united by the logic proper to 
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reproduction. They are distinguished by the means of communication, the regulatory 
circuits and internal logic proper to the system ". 
In the above quotation, the author recognises the notions of emergence and boundary 
which relate to levels of organisation, wholes (integrons, molecules, or cellular 
organelles) and the process of communication and control between wholes arranged 
hierarchically. Organisations that have to survive in complex markets will need to learn 
and adapt quickly to changes while satisfying safety and fire safety requirements. Such 
capability is unlikely to be achieved by designing and analysing parts of the organisation 
in isolation. This requires the commitment of the organisation as a whole to be adaptive, 
as well as retaining the cohesion necessary to achieve collective goals. 
Emergence and Hierarchy 
Checkland' 02 expresses the notion of emergence and hierarchy as follows: 
"It is the concept of organised complexity which became the subject of the new 
discipline, 'Systems; and the general model of organised complexity is that there exists a 
hierarchy of levels of organisation, each more complex than the one below, a level 
being characterised by emergent properties which do not exist at the lower level. 
Indeed, more than the fact that they 'do not exist' at the lower level, emergent 
properties are meaningless in the language appropriate to the lower level. 'The shape 
of an apple'. although the result of processes which operate at the level of the cells, 
organelles, and organic molecules which comprise apple trees, and although, we hope 
eventually explicable in terms of these processes, has no meaning at the lower levels of 
description. The processes at these levels result in an outcome which signals the 
existence of a new stable level of complexity-that of the whole apple itse4f-which has 
emergent properties, one of them being the apple's shape ". 
According to the above, hierarchy is concerned with the fundamental differences 
between one level of complexity and another. The idea of hierarchy aims to provide 
both an elucidation of the relationships between different levels and an elucidation of 
how observed hierarchies come to be formed. Furthermore, hierarchy levels are 
characterised by processes of control and communication that operate at the interfaces 
between levels. This elucidates the concept of boundary as discussed below. 
Boundary 
It is stressed in systemic thinking that systems practitioners can define a whole by 
simply constructing a boundary, wherein lies the totality of parts. They are free to 
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choose the precise locus of this boundary in a way and according to a particular view, 
weltanschauung, that takes their interest. Boundary specification is a matter for the 
observer to define. 
Defining System 
Not long ago the term system was hardly used. However, the idea of systems has 
gradually gained more and more importance over recent decades. This is reflected in the 
widespread used of the term 'system'. For example, it is common to hear about the solar 
system, political and social systems, housing systems, transport and communication 
systems, biological systems, mechanical systems, ecological systems, etc. These 
examples are at first sight very different, but they all have one thing in common. They 
are all assemblies of different parts richly interconnected with each other. Although 
everyone knows or thinks they know what system means, it is surprisingly difficult to 
define precisely. The word system is defined below. 
A system may be defined as a whole which is made of parts. According to Beer 32 ,a 
system is exceedingly complex, highly probabilistic, and at least in certain ways, self- 
regulating. Furthermore, Beer stresses that there are three aspects in recognising a 
system. First, particular relationships are acknowledged. This collection of relationships 
turns into an assemblage of relationships. Second, a pattern in the set of relationships 
can be detected. This turns an assemblage into a systematically arranged assemblage of 
relationships. Finally, this arrangement of relationships has a purpose. This is a system. 
However, it is stressed that coherence, pattern, and purpose are all acts of mental 
recognition rather than characteristics of physical things. Moreover, Beer contends that 
knowing the relation correctly is more valuable than knowing correctly which things are 
related. 
The next subsection discusses a systemic approach that has been adopted in this research 
project to address the research problem. A systemic approach is understood as one 
which uses the concepts of cybernetics and systemic thinking as a basis for designing 
systems. 
2.3.1 Management Cybernetics 
Cybernetics is a branch of systemic thinking that deals with systems in a highly complex 
and uncertain environment. Cybernetics originally was defined as 
"the science of communication and control in the animal and the machine , 82,83 
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More recently, Beer 82,83 has defined Cybernetics as 
" the science of effective organisation ". 
Beer 81,82,83,106 developed a systems approach called the Viable System Model (VSM). 
This is a generic model of an organisation that is intended to achieve viability. A viable 
system is defined by Beer as a system which is 
it able to maintain a separate existence ". 
The VSM is a model of a learning organisation. It is based on the idea that management 
is about control of organisations and that the basic difficulty of control is the complexity 
of organisations in a complex and unstable world. The human brain or more precisely 
the nervous system is one of nature's perfect examples of how control of complexity can 
be organised. Beer uses this system as a powerful analogy, or design model, for effective 
organisation of systems. This is the underlying idea of the VSM. Three principles 
derived from that analogy are of relevant significance in the VSM: first, the principle of 
viability, second, the principle of recursion, and third, the principle of autonomy. 
The Principle of Viability 
Viability stands for an ideal cybernetic behaviour of an organismic adaptation to a 
changing envirom-nent through "intrinsic homeostatic control, ' 82 . Homeostasis is 
understood to be equilibrium or balance. Viability or self-adaptation implies the survival 
or homeostatic adaptation of a system according to its purpose. Beer emphasises that in 
order to be viable, any system, artificial, organic or social, must have and perform five 
organisational functions, which constitute the structural prototype of any viable system. 
A detailed description of this model is given in section 3.2 of chapter 3. System 1, 
operations, represents the basic productive sub-units of the system. System 2, 
antioscillatory, co-ordinates the activities of system I operations, as well as providing 
for information aggregation and filtration of upward communication. It also involves 
communicating, translating and amplification, instructions coming down from system 3 
to system 1. System 3, 'inside and now', is concerned with the operations management 
or internal activities of the system on a day-to-day basis. It is also responsible for routine 
reports to the next higher level of recursion, from which it receives routine feedback 
instructions. Systems 4 and 5, finally, represent the levels of strategic and normative 
planning. System 4, 'outside and future', is the development management, or staff 
function. It is responsible for monitoring environmental changes and for preparing the 
future of the system. For example, through market research and marketing, Research 
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and Development (R&D), Operational Research (OR), etc. it develops plans within the 
framework of the overall policy determined by system 5. Finally, System 5, policy, can 
be interpreted as representing the 'portfolio' level of normative planning. It deliberates 
the overall policy and balances the functions of systems 4 and 3. It keeps the ultimate 
decision authority with respect to the goals of the system. 
The distinction between different levels of replication of these five systems of any 
viable system is the subject of the principle of recursion. This is discussed below. 
The Principle of Recursion 
The principle of recursion, in Beer's words 106 
"says that all viable systems contain viable systems, and are contained within viable 
systems. Then if we have a model of any viable system, it must be recursive. That is to 
say, at whatever level of aggregation we start, then the whole model is rewritten in each 
element of the original model, and so on indefinitely ". 
This principle was fortnulated for the organisation of a viable firm in analogy to that of 
the brain. Relying on the assumption that this principle describes a universal law, it has 
been extended to an entire socio-economic system. This is emphasised by Beer 106 : 
"If we model the state, then one element is the economic system; if we model the 
economic system, then one element is an industrial sector; if we model that industrial 
sector, then one element is a firm. The model itseýf is invariant. See what happens if we 
go on with this recursion. An element of the firm is a plant; an element of a plant is a 
particular shop; an element of the shop is a section; an element of the section is a man. 
And the man is assuredly a viable system-as a matter offact, the model startedfrom the 
cybernetic study of man's effective neurophysiological organisation in thefirstplace ". 
The principle of recursion is meant to legitimise the application of the structural 
prototype of the VSM to all socio-economic levels, whether a national government, a 
branch or sector of industry or a firm. Routine reports and policy instructions are passed 
from one level of recursion to another level through the system 5 function. The VSM 
proposes to treat the examination of any organisation, however large, in three levels of 
recursions. In this way, the 'meta-management' or system 2 to 5 of a viable system is 
the management unit of system I of the next lower level of recursion. The whole 
structure of the VSM is replicated in each operation of system 1 at the level of recursion 
next below. This is explained more specifically in section 4.3. 
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The Principle of Autonomy 
According to Beer, the principle of autonomy is a cybernetic answer to the problem of 
centralisation and decentralisation in organisations, and hence to the problem of 
participation. It is clear that an effective control of complex systems requires a certain 
degree of centralisation as well as descentralisation 81,82,83 . Beer stresses that the optimal 
degree of autonomy, given that the management unit has variety to deploy, is in 
principle a computable function of the system's purpose in relation to its environment. 
Variety is a measure of complexity that is defined as the number of possible states of a 
system. Beer measures the autonomy of a subsystem of system I by the possible number 
of states that it can assume (its horizontal variety) minus the actual number of states 
excluded by systems 2 to 5 intervention (vertical intervention). To accomplish this, the 
underlying concept appears to be management by exception, as Beer emphasises: 
"if a system regulates itseýf by subtracting at all times as little horizontal variety as is 
necessary to maintain the cohesion of the total system, then the condition o autonomy f 
prevails 
"Real Time" Communication 
How effective the homeostatic control at each level of recursion is in the VSM depends 
not only on what feedback infon-nation is received, but also on which way and how fast 
information is received. Traditionally, information in the form of statistics and reports 
that reach decision makers takes a considerable amount of time. The VSM has effective 
communication within itself and with its environment. In addition, the VSM suggests 
66real-time" communication and control so that it relies on information that is currently 
valid. Each operation of system 1 has to send a daily report on the state of its critical 
variables to the 'meta-system' and would then receive a daily feedback, which presents 
an analysis of the implications for its situation. The VSM focuses on the communication 
and relationships between different parts of an organisation and its outside world. It 
emphasises that the channels of communication that link its five subsystems, systems I 
to 5, and its environment are capable of coping with the complexity of its environment. 
These channels obey principles called principles of organisation. These organisational 
principles are listed in Appendix A. Unless these principles are complied with, the 
whole organisation will be affected and become ineffective, and this is a threat to its 
viability. 
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According to the above, there is not a generally accepted criterion to define an SMS, nor 
an effective SMS. Systems thinking, on the other hand, suggests that an organisation can 
be regarded as a system, which may help to understand complex situations. Moreover, 
cybernetic principles may facilitate the design of a more effective organisation. Systemic 
ideas can be adopted in designing an effective FSMS, which is described not only as 
systematic, but, more importantly, systemic in chapter 5. Therefore, a FSMS should be 
regarded as a system which has interrelated parts, structure, and purpose served by the 
parts and the structure. Furthen-nore, an effective FSMS should comply with the 
principles of a viable system. 
2.4 SH&E Management Systems 
Because of sophisticated and demanding markets, diverse and rapid technological 
change, new SH&E regulations and standards, increased importance of fire safety in 
organisations, a great effort has been made by academics, regulators and industry to 
research and develop tools and methods to address fire safety, safety and the 
envirom-nent. The following subsections review the most relevant approaches to fire 
safety, safety and the envirom-nent that have been developed and proposed over recent 
years. 
2.4.1 National and International Standards 
Numerous organisations have integrated or are considering integration of their SH&E 
management system into national or international standard-based management systems. 
The American Petroleum Institute (API) 107 recently introduced two recommended 
practices. The first is a recommended practice for development of a safety and 
environmental management programme for outer continental shelf operations and 
facilities (API RP 75)62 . The second is a recommended practice 
document for design 
and hazard analysis for offshore production facilities; this is a generic 'safety case' for 
open platforms in mild climates (API RP 14J). The API RP 75 explains the elements 
that should be considered in a system to manage safety and environmental protection 
during the performance of oil and gas operations. It is intended to provide guidance on 
the necessary policies and procedures and the management systems required to ensure 
that the practice of these procedures is not deficient. The API RP 14J on the other hand 
details guidelines for safe design according to best practice in industry. It explains how 
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to conduct a hazard analysis of a design and provides details of the recommended safety 
information required to ensure safe operations. 
Additionally, some organisations have adopted the API RP 75 061, which details the 
purpose of process hazard management as prevention of catastrophic events and this can 
be accomplished through a management system. It provides guidance to assist in the 
management of process hazards to help prevent the occurrence of, or minimise the 
consequence of, catastrophic releases of toxic or explosive materials. The API RP 750 
details eleven elements for the management of process hazards. These are process safety 
information, process hazards analysis, management of change, operating procedures, 
safe work practices, training, assurance of the quality and mechanical integrity of critical 
equipment, pre-start up safety review, emergency response and control, investigation of 
process related incidents, and audit of process hazards management systems. Mark and 
Peter' 08 report an SMS, which was derived from API RP 750, and other standards and 
regulation requirements. The reported SMS covers a core of fifteen policies, such as 
leadership and administration, training, planned inspection, test and maintenance, 
hazard analysis, accident/incident reporting investigation and analysis, emergency 
planning and response, organisational. rules, personal protective equipment, auditing, 
management of change, communications, contractor safety, purchasing controls, health 
control, and off-the-job safety. 
Some organisations have derived their SMS from envirom-nental standards such as ISO 
14001 EMS. ISO 14001 EMS57 is a formalised method for establishing and meeting 
environmental objectives. The ISO 14001 Environmental Management System (EMS) 
consists of five basic principles: first, environmental policy, which is the organisation's 
commitment to environmental issues and support with the resources necessary for its 
implementation; second, planning includes the identification of the environmental 
aspects of the organisation's products, services, and activities along with a strategy 
outlining the significant aspects in the EMS; this would involve the identification of 
specific measurable goals and objectives; third, implementation and operation which 
contain the means and methods for achieving the policy according to the plan; fourth, 
measurement and evaluation cover the means for monitoring progress to check whether 
the goals and objectives are being met or not, as well as the procedures to be used to 
correct possible deficiencies; finally, review and improvement provide the means for 
periodic review to continually improve the EMS, with the objective of improving the 
overall environmental performance of the organisation. 
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Other studies have focused on harmonising international standards such as the ISO 9000 
series and ISO 14000 Environmental management Systems (EMS) with Occupational 
Health and Safety (OHS) management system, such as the OHS management system 
presented by DAack and Levine' 09 , Levine and DAack110, and DAack et al. 
11 I. It is 
claimed by the authors that this management system can be easily adapted to the ISO 
14001 EMS format. This system is expected to be compatible with current production 
quality and OHS quality systems and standards. Moreover, ISO 9000 series have been 
applied world-wide, the incorporation of harmonised OHS and environmental 
management system components should be acceptable to business units already 
performing self-auditing and external auditing. 
2.4.2 Petrochemical Industry 
Several major disasters, such as Flixborough (UK), Bhopal (India), San Juanico 
(Mexico), Piper Alpha (UK) and many others world-wide have highlighted the need to 
improve radically the safety performance of organisations. It is now recognised that 
managerial and organisational. factors are key contributors to accidents or disasterS7,12,71. 
Several accident investigations have found that 80% correspond to human error and 
7,112 20% correspond to technical failures. This has been termed the 80-20 rule 
Moreover, it is claimed in the literature that the root cause of such disasters was the 
failure of the existing SMS to manage work activities properly. 
The importance of human and organisational factors, particularly of the SMS, was 
highlighted by the Cullen report24 . 
Among the factors that need to be addressed are 
organisational structure, the involvement of the workforce in safety, monitoring and 
auditing of the operation of the system, and re-assessment of the SMS. Offshore 
installation regulations require operators or owners to demonstrate that their SMS is 
adequate to ensure that the statutory provisions will be complied with, and that adequate 
arrangements for audit are in place. Furthermore, all hazards causing a major accident 
should be identified and the risks evaluated, and measures taken to reduce these risks so 
far as is reasonably practicable. This means that any risk must be reduced to a level 
which is 'as low as reasonably practicable' (ALARP) 87 . 
The ALARP principle involves 
determining first whether a given risk is so great or the outcome so unacceptable that it 
must be refused altogether. Second, it determines whether the risk is, or has been made, 
so small that no further precaution is necessary. Finally, if a risk falls between these two 
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states, it must be reduced to the lowest level reasonably practicable, bearing in mind 
benefits flowing from its acceptance and considering the costs of any further reduction. 
Many best safety practices of the chemical industry are built on George's and Druker's 
ideas, as discussed in section 2.2. Planning, organising, implementing and controlling 
should be the basic functions of an SMS as described for the Centre for Chemical 
Process Safety (CCpS)113 guidelines. "Planning" involves policy development and 
company goals and objectives. "Organising" involves establishing the structure and 
delineating roles, responsibilities, authority and accountability to accomplish the 
objectives. "Implementing" provides the mechanisms and executes the policy. Finally, 
the "controlling" function involves measuring, evaluating and correcting performance. 
Moreover, many of the larger chemical and petrochemical companies have adopted 
integrated SH&E management systems'14, which are in some cases further integrated 
with TQM. 
Bentley and Stockley'15 describe a SMS, which integrates a hazard management 
analysis and quality management. The structure of the SMS consists mainly of three 
main aspects. First, it requires an understanding of the hazards of the operation or 
facility. This involves identifying the organisation's processes and activities. Once the 
processes and activities have been identified, a hazard management analysis (HMA) is 
conducted. The HMA consists of identification, assessment, control, and recovery. This 
helps to identify critical activities and processes, which are called 'safety-critical'. 
Second, for each 'safety critical' activity a combination of documents is prepared. This 
combination of documents is called the SMS catalogue, which describes how safety is 
intended to be managed within the organisation. The SMS catalogue closely complies 
with quality principles. Finally, the organisation's commitment and support are reflected 
in a separate document called the SMS manual. This manual reflects the organisation's 
safety objectives and the means by which they can be achieved. These controls include 
incident reporting, performance indicators, audit and review, continuously monitor, 
assess and improve the performance of the operations and activities. 
Other organisations, such as the European Process Safety Centre (EPSC)l 16 have 
developed SMS guidelines, as well as providing an overview of safety management 
practices in industry. The key elements of the EPSC safety management may be 
distinguished as policy, organisation, management practices and procedures, monitoring 
and auditing, and management review. Similarly, guidelines for the development and 
application of health and environmental management systems have been developed and 
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proposed by the Exploration and Production (E&P) Forum"'. These guidelines 
recommend that policies and objectives are set to take account of hazard information, 
including environmental effects. The key elements of the SMS recommended by the 
E&P Forum include leadership and commitment (top-down commitment, etc. ), policy 
and strategic objectives, organisation, resources and documentation, evaluation and risk 
management, planning, implementation and monitoring and auditing and reviewing. 
Ming 94 and Bentley et al., ' 18 describe the development and implementation of a 'quality 
based' SMS, which consists of establishing goals, organising and allocating resources, 
establishing the performance standards, implementing the plan, and auditing and 
reviewing the system for compliance and improvement. Ming 94 emphasises that the 
purpose of the SMS is to provide the necessary assurance that all people affected by the 
organisation's operations have been protected, as well as safeguarding the environment 
from damaging incidents, and the assets have been protected. All these measures are 
applied to the extent that risks are ALARP. Furthermore, Ming contends that the 
integration of the SMS with quality and the business enables it be an effective safety 
management, as well as enhancing quality and improving operations management. 
The United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA)44 guidelines for fire 
and explosion hazard management were introduced in 1995 and prepared to 
complement the Safety Case regulations. Furthermore, they intend to encourage an 
integrated approach to the management of fire and explosions offshore. These 
guidelines include a life cycle approach to fire and explosion hazard management, 
assessment of fire and explosion hazardous events, inherent safety, selection and 
specification of systems for fire and explosion detection, control and mitigation and 
implementation. The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE)119 has developed and 
proposed an approach to safety referred to as Successful Health and Safety Management 
HS(G)65, which has many similarities with George's 89 ideas of a management system. 
The HS(G)65 health and safety management's main functions include policy, 
organising, planning and implementing, measuring and reviewing performance, and 
auditing to benefit from experience. It also shows how to apply principles of TQM for 
successful safety management. Finally, the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association has 
developed a set of guiding principles for managing occupational health and safety 
(OH&S) 120 . These guidelines are used to audit the 
SMS of the association member 
companies. The audit assessed five key components of a SMS for a number of OH&S 
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activities. System ownership, goals and procedures, measures of performance, review of 
measures, and corrective action are the key components of a SMS that must be in place. 
2.4.3 Transport and Maritime Industry 
A number of recent and highly publicised accidents in the transport industry have 
highlighted the need for operators of public transport to address safety hazards. Despite 
this need, there are currently few proactive SMSs, which effectively demonstrate 
improvements in transport safety performance. Bernowsky 12 1 reports on how the 
American Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the aviation industry are ensuring 
the safety of the flying public. The author discusses five major initiatives that are 
intended to address five major causes of air accidents. The first of these is weather- 
related accidents, the FAA has taken steps to improve weather services. This includes 
the development of terminal Doppler weather radar, low level wind shear alert system, 
next generation radar, integrated terminal weather, and weather and radar processor. The 
second is aircraft related accidents; many of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) 
and statutes prescribe the safety and quality standards that organisations and personnel 
in the aviation industry must follow regarding the design, manufacture, and operation of 
aircraft. The third is air traffic related accidents; the FAA has taken several measures to 
reduce operational errors, such as eliminating pilot-controller communication errors, 
and eliminating surface errors. The aim of these measures is to provide a cost-effective 
communications infrastructure to enhance both the safety and effectiveness of air traffic 
management. The fourth is human error related accidents; it is recognised that human 
factors cannot stand alone, but they apply in everything the organisation does. Several 
actions address the vulnerabilities of maintenance, management, regulators, Right crews, 
etc. The fifth is malicious acts-related accidents; measures are taken to ensure aviation 
security against the threat of terrorism. These measures include not only explosive 
detection devices, but also non-technological improvements, representing a shift from 
an adversarial relationship to partnership between government and industry. 
A study conducted by Degani and Wiener 122 identified and integrated an aviation 
organisation's philosophy, policies, and the standard operating procedures (SOP) for 
cockpit operations. The authors argue that in high risk endeavours such as aircraft 
operations, space flight, nuclear power generation, manufacturing process control, and 
military operations, it is essential that procedures be flawless, as the price of operational 
error can be unacceptable. The organisation's philosophy involves determining how the 
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organisation conducts the business of the airline, including flight operations. The 
organisation's philosophy is largely influenced by the organisation's culture. Policies are 
broad specifications of the manner in which management expects things to be done, 
such as training, flight operations, maintenance, exercise of authority, personal conduct, 
etc. To support the organisation's policies, a set of operating procedures is developed 
and provided for the flight crews. A procedure intends to specify unambiguously what 
the task is, when the task is conducted (time and sequence), how the task is done 
(actions), by whom it is conducted, and what type of feedback is provided to other crew 
members. 
Edkins 123 presents a safety programme called Identifying Needed Defences In the Civil 
Aviation Transport Environment (INDICATE) for the Australian airline industry. The 
INDICATE uses five criteria which are used to evaluate an airline's safety performance. 
These criteria include airline safety culture, staff risk perception of aviation safety 
hazards, willingness of staff to report safety hazards, action taken on identified safety 
hazards, and staff comments about safety management within the airline. The author 
contends that the programme can have a positive influence on airline safety 
perfon-nance, specifically on improving staff confidence in how safety is managed. It 
also can increase staff willingness to report safety hazards and incidents, improve 
organisational safety culture and reduce staff perceptions of the severity and likelihood 
of safety hazards occurring within the airline. 
Safety and fire safety have gained importance in the maritime industry also. The 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has adopted a number of initiatives that 
intend to improve fire protection, safety and pollution prevention, particularly on vessels 
and ships 124,125 . 
Rodricks 124 describes a system for managing fire safety on passenger 
vessels. It consists of a number of controllers for monitoring the various safety 
subsystems. The controllers are linked to a local area network (LAN) and managed by a 
computer (Saturn II). Control ten-ninals can be dispersed round the vessel to enable 
operators to monitor events simultaneously. The SMS involves four main aspects, such 
as communication, graphic displays, command and control, and fire fighting procedures. 
More recently the guidelines for the International Safety Management (ISM)125 code 
were also adopted by the IMO. The code and its guidelines involve safeguarding 
maritime safety and protecting the marine envirom-nent. They intend to provide safe 
practices in ship operation and a safe working environment, and to establish safeguards 
against all identified risks. They also aim to improve continuously the safety 
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management skills of personnel ashore and aboard, including preparing for emergencies 
both to safety and environmental protection. 
Research has identified characteristics of high reliability organisations (HRO), which 
have had few accidents while involved in operations where failure would be 
catastrophic 126 . These characteristics 
have important impacts on the safety of marine 
systems, such as offshore platforms, marine tenninals, ships and vessels. Hee 126 et al. , 
report a safety management assessment system (SMAS), which was developed to assess 
human and organisational factors in marine systems. The SMAS is a screening method 
that selects and trains operators of the system to conduct a self-assessment process. The 
assessment process takes five days and has the assessors making comparisons and 
evaluating human and organisational factors by selecting ranges and providing 
comments to capture the uncertainty. A computer program was developed to assist in 
the assessment process. A study conducted by Edkins et al. 127 , applied the REVEEW 
method developed by Reason 7 within an Australian public rail authority. The REVILEW 
method helps to identify latent failures that pose a threat to system safety. It was found 
to be useful, especially from a participative safety management perspective, and for 
targeting safety areas that need current attention. Factor analysis revealed that policy and 
decision making, workplace culture and operating conditions were the most critical. It is 
argued that these findings imply that the most effective way to minimise workplace 
accidents is to devise actions for the most global features of the organisation. 
2.4.4 Power Generation and Other Industries 
Kidd 128 asserts that there are several factors which might make gas turbine plants more 
vulnerable to fire than 'conventional' power stations. The author also discusses some 
aspects of an emerging Code of Practice, which focuses the potential for fire in the 
production of electricity using gas turbines, cogeneration, and combined heat and power. 
Although the size and layout of gas turbines can vary greatly between manufacturers, the 
components which comprise the gas turbine remain the same. It is stressed that some 
components of the gas turbine have a higher fire risk than others, hence the need for fire 
risk management in these components. These components include air inlet systems, 
exhaust systems, the turbine compressor, blade-cleaning equipment, combustion 
chambers and ignition system, the power turbine, turbine gearing, starting equipment, 
turbine integral fuel system, the lubricating oil system, cooling systems and 
transformers. Xiao et al. 129 , on the other hand, discuss how to ensure the quality of a 
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fire safety system in buildings. A fire safety assurance system is described by the authors 
as a combination of a "hardware" subsystem and a "software" subsystem. A "hardware" 
subsystem consists of all the fire protection equipment and facilities. A "software" 
subsystem, on the other hand, involves managerial measures concerned with fire safety, 
such as training of staff, operation and maintenance of equipment, and emergency plans. 
The hardware subsystem is referred to as the fire safety system, which has several 
components, such as a passive fire protection system, fire detection and alarm system, 
fire suppression system, evacuation system, smoke-control system, and emergency 
lighting system. 
Organisations in other kinds of industries, such as the cement industry, are also adopting 
environmental management systems. Adams and Niehofý30 found that the cement 
industry has developed health and safety management, operational management and 
emergency management. They also discuss both the integration of these management 
systems so that they are as streamlined as possible and hence acceptable to employees, 
and reduction in the amount of documentation and auditing. The authors contend that 
the integrated management systems can improve the security of the company not only 
through technical measures but also through a closed and controlled organisation. 
Other writers have taken a quality "systems-wide" approach to gain an understanding of 
the root causes of accidents. Ansari and Modarress' 31 described a systems-wide 
approach to safety adopted by the Boeing Company. They identified five areas that 
contribute to a safe work environment. They further identified a full range of paths to be 
taken and tasks to be accomplished in order to achieve the desired safety goals. The five 
key areas that would make the transition to "world-class safety performance" are 
executive leadership, safety improvement processes, training, alternative work 
programmes and return-to-work, and communication. Executive leadership involves top 
management commitment, promotes a strong safety culture, establishing a top-level 
steering committee, gives the highest organisational priority to the safety improvement 
process, and adopts a new framework to evaluate safety performance accountability. The 
safety improvement process involves developing clear corporate policies and objectives 
which ensure that process standards, guidelines and procedures that improve shopfloor 
safety processes are implemented. Training is seen as a critical factor leading the 
company towards the "ultimate in safety performance". Alternative work 
programme/return-to-work involves reducing lost time injuries (LTI), return to work as 
soon as possible and in a safer and more productive envirom-nent. Finally, 
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communication: it is crucial to communicate effectively with everyone in the 
organisation. A study conducted by Wilkinson and Dale 132 reports the integration of 
quality, environmental and occupational health and safety management systems in 
manufacturing organisations. This study found that manufacturing companies are less 
interested in occupational health and safety management systems. Whilst ISO 14001 
EMS is preferred to Environmental Management and Auditing Schemes (EMAS), it is 
claimed by the authors that those organisations which have embraced the principles of 
TQM are more likely to "pursue integration" than those that have not. 
Wilson and Koehn 133 argue that the process of controlling safety policies, procedures, 
and practices is currently being implemented by many construction companies. This 
limits construction companies' liabilities and costs in order to remain competitive in the 
construction market place. Construction companies face the most difficult obstacles 
during the implementation phase of safety management because very often the workers 
present the greatest opposition. However, they are the same individuals who benefit the 
most by improved safety conditions on the site. The authors contend that safety 
management is a dynamic process operating in a constant state of change. Therefore, the 
process must be constantly monitored and adjusted to achieve the desired goals. 
2.5 Methods and Tools 
Particular interest has been given, by both academe and practitioners, to developing 
methods and tools that may help to measuring the safety performance of organisations. 
Various approaches to measuring an organisation's safety performance have been 
suggested in recent studies, often to define goals for what must be done and to develop 
criteria that are measurable. In general, it is claimed that this goal-setting approach is 
more proactive, but it is still addressing technical aspects. This section discusses how 
organisations address risks and how they measure their safety performance. 
2.5.1 Measuring Safety Performance 
Organisations use a wide variety of indicators both to check the implementation and 
identify strengths and weaknesses of their SMSs. Results of such assessment processes 
are usually checked and compared with the organisation's safety goals. When these 
safety goals are not complied with, it is common to conduct safety audits. An audit 
process of a SMS traditionally verifies the existence and implementation of safety 
objectives, standards, and procedures. The outcome of an audit is used to 'validate' the 
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effectiveness of the SMS. it is common in practice that the assessment and measurement 
of the performance of a SMS are part of an audit system. 
Roughton 92 stresses the need to measure behavioural indicators, look at accident 
frequency less often and look at other upstream behaviour indicators on a day-to-day 
basis. He suggests identifying critical behaviours using the analysis of previous 
accidents and employees' perceptions, and conformance with requirements as well as 
providing feedback on safe behaviour performance. Moreover, the action taken by 
management to affect the safety and health system positively, and a sample of unsafe 
practices, behaviours and conditions are two key indicators that should be measured. 
In the oil and gas industry significant efforts have been made to develop measures of 
safety performance. Hudson et al. 19,134,135 , and Reason 
7 propose a framework, called 
Tripod Delta, that addresses human errors, which can be seen at both individual and 
organisation levels. It is claimed by the authors that this framework provides an 
indication of 'latent errors', which are characterised into eleven factors called general 
failure types (GFT). This approach assesses the "safety health" of an activity or 
operation using the GFT as the key indications. In order to do so, first checklists are 
made up of a number of indicators as questions are derived from each GFT. An 
indicator is an indication that something is not functioning properly. Questions for each 
GFT are drawn from a larger collection in a database. Many unacceptable answers to the 
indicators for a specific GFT strongly indicate underlying problems associated with that 
GFT. Second, a profile score is computed for each GFT by simply adding the number of 
indicators that were answered in an unacceptable way. The worst score would be twenty, 
while the best would be zero. Third, remedial actions are defined in the last step of the 
approach. The authors stress that it is possible to select actions for their feasibility and 
effectiveness rather than being driven by the immediate consequences of an incident or 
accident. Finucane 135 and the UKOOA 44 describe key ideas embodied in the concept of 
safety performance standards. The UKOOA contends that with the goal-setting 
approach it is possible to define overall goals for design and operation, together with a 
method for assessing the extent to which these are accomplished. Moreover, it is 
stressed that for any goal it is possible to identify one or more measures whose 
performance would be an indicator of how successfully the goal is achieved. These 
measures of safety performance are known as performance standards. Finucane suggests 
a hierarchy of high, medium and low performance standards levels, whilst the UKOOA 
discusses high and low levels. High level perfon-nance standards indicate the safety 
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performance of the organisation's installation as a whole. In general, they indicate 
individual risk and fatal accident rate that have to be satisfied by the organisation. Low 
levels of performance standards, on the other hand, are applied to subsystems, and 
components of subsystems. These performance standards are defined by considering 
functional capability, reliability/availability, and survivability. However, these measures 
of safety performance still address safety and fire safety in isolation concerning the 
business and human factors. It is argued elsewhere 136 that what is needed is an 
integrated measure of performance that supports rather than contradicts business 
obj ectives. 
Hurst' 37 reports the findings of a study conducted by the Field Operations Division 
(FOD) of the HSE. The FOD developed a method called Structured Audit Technique for 
the Assessment of Safety Management Systems (STATAS). This audit technique is now 
included within a set of tools and techniques known as 'The FOD Guide to the 
Inspection of Health and Safety Management'. The tools and techniques contained in 
the FOD Guide provide for assessment of management arrangement, assessment of risk 
control systems, and assessment of safety culture. Management arrangements are the 
managerial methods by which an organisation sets out to determine and provide 
adequate controls of hazards. Risk control systems set out the way systems and 
workplace precautions are implemented and maintained. They form a logical structure 
resulting in effective control of risks. Other oil and gas organisations, such as the 
Exploration & Production (E&P) forum, have developed a set of guidelines on 
Quantitative Performance Measure of SH&E Management System Effectiveness' 38 . 
These guidelines have been developed to be applicable to different companies, to 
recognise the role of contractors and to facilitate operation within a statutory framework. 
The documents include means of developing metrics for each of the seven elements of 
the SMS developed by the E&P Forum 117 , as discussed above. For each element there 
are sample questionnaires to be used to survey or assess performance. 
Similarly, Hauptmanns 139 presents a procedure for assessing the quality of safety 
management. This method is based on a set of questions concerning areas of relevance 
which have to be answered with value statements. These value statements are 
represented by fuzzy numbers, since they are vague statements. They are combined 
mathematically to judge the quality of management of the whole as well as that of the 
different areas considered so that weaknesses can be identified. It is claimed by the 
author that this technique has the potential for replacing some of the safety analysis and 
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auditing procedures currently in use. Papazoglou and Aneziris 140 propose to use the 
information of safety management audit and the basic events of a QRA to assess the 
effects of organisational and management factors in chemical installations. An audit 
process establishes the relative position of the organisational and management aspects 
of a particular chemical installation concerning the organisation's safety goals. A QRA 
including detailed system analysis offers a plant-specific decomposition of the plant- 
damage-state frequencies into events like hardware failures, maintenance-related 
failures, operation-related failures and so on. The basic events incorporated in the QRA 
can be categorised into classes similar to those explored by the management audit and 
are quantitatively linked to the audit results. Knowledge of these quantitative links 
would help to identify deficiencies or strengths that might exist in the safety 
management system on the quantitative risk indices. 
Gawande and Wheeler 141 present measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for a maritime 
safety programme. The MOEs are applied into an overall "programme level" and into a 
"component activity level". Poisson models and data on maritime accidents from a real- 
time marine safety management system database are used to construct the MOEs. A 
distinctive characteristic of this approach is the Bayesian estimation of missing data. It 
is emphasised by the authors that the MOEs have four important uses. First, they are 
indicators of efficiency. Second, they can be used as inputs into allocative decisions 
within the organisation. Third, performance evaluation can be conducted for specific 
marine safety activity through the component activity level. Fourth, and possibly the 
most important, MOEs provide the basis for better regulation by the government. 
Mitchison and Papadakisloo stress the need to measure safety performance through the 
use of performance indicators, which consist of output measurements and indirect 
indicators. This will enable practitioners to evaluate the effectiveness of an SMS on site. 
They contend that safety performance is a measure of the completeness and adequacy of 
an SMS operating on site. A SMS can be fully operational only when a number of 
control loops integrate effectively all relevant elements at all levels of operation. Such 
control loops typically include policy, standards and norms, implementation procedures 
and training, operators and equipment reliability, and monitoring and control revision. 
Moreover, they emphasise that approaches based on proactive indicators examine 
weaknesses and malfunctions of the SMS, preventive actions which control the risks, 
the use of output measures to evaluate results and ends, and accident causation factors. 
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Safety management auditing is a common means of assessing the performance of a 
SMS97 
. Reactive 
indicators such as fatal accident rate (FAR), lost time injury (LTI) rate 
and other output indicators have been used extensively in assessing process safety 
performance 64 . 
Other indicators such as loss of contaim-nent rates (LOC) and positive 
indicators such as the ratio of "positive observations" to the "total number of 
142,143 observations" are considered in some approaches 
2.5.2 Hazard Management 
Bentley and Stockley' 15 integrate a hazard management analysis (HMA) into a SMS. 
This HMA has four basic steps that can be applied in any situation. These steps are 
described as identification, assessment, control, and recovery. The identification steps 
involve identifying what can go wrong and what and who will be affected. Assessing 
risks and consequences, and specifying control and recovery methods activities are 
conducted in the assessment step. Control involves applying principles, such as 
eliminate and minimise, control through design, controls through procedures and 
practices, what is permissible given the recognised hazards. Finally, the 'recovery step' 
consists of devising actions to mitigate, contain, deal with contingencies, and recover to 
achieve a 'normal situation'. The authors emphasise that the HMA can be applied to any 
activity from the design of a major offshore platforrn to changing a valve. 
More recently, 'inherently safer design' principles have been integrated into the typical 
HMA. The main elements of this hazard management are quoted as hazard 
identification, hazard assessment, and hazard management by prevention, control, and 
mitigation. The measures used to prevent, control, and mitigate the risks can be inherent 
in the fundamental design. These measures can be specific engineered systems, which 
can be active or passive, or be provided by operator and management actions or by some 
combination of these. The concept of 'inherent safety' has been used to describe those 
aspects of the fundamental design, which can be used to prevent, control or mitigate the 
risks 144,145,146,147 . These principles have the advantage that they address the underlying 
source of risks, and make use of existing equipment and systems thus avoiding the need 
for expensive 'add-on' safety measures, which can fail or be neglected. Srinivasan and 
Venkatasubramanian 148 propose an integrated approach to Process Hazards Analysis 
(PHA) called PHAzer. The researchers contend that this approach takes a more 
comprehensive approach to the entire PHA process. PHAzer uses qualitative 'digraph' 
based models of units and operations to identify hazards, dynamic mathematical models 
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to perform detailed safety evaluation, and digraph and fault tree models to synthesise 
and analyse fault trees. 
2.6 Lessons Learnt from the Review process 
The approaches reviewed in this chapter represent significant changes in addressing 
safety and fire safety in particular. Researchers and practitioners seem to put emphasis 
on some management functions, guidelines, and industry standards, including quality 
principles, to establish a SMS. There is, however, very little attention given to the 
coherence of the different management functions that constitute a SMS. Existing SMSs 
seem to lack adequate organisational. structure that may help organisations to structure 
decision making, communication, and safety culture. Culture and safety culture have 
been a subject of a large amount of research and publication in the literature. Detailed 
aspects of safety and fire safety culture are not dealt with here. However, culture has 
been defined as "a system of shared values (what is important) and beliefs (how things 
work) that interact with a company's people, organisational. structures, and control 
systems to produce behavioural norms (the way we do things around here) 99149 . 
While the individual SMS elements can normally be identified and evaluated, the inter- 
linking of these elements into an organisational structure, including procedures, rules 
and other management tools, are poorly understood in safety and fire safety literature. 
These aspects can have a role in making a SMS more rather than less effective. 
Moreover, very little attention has been given by both academe and practitioners to 
understanding the appropriate degree of interdependence amongst the parts that 
constitute an organisation in order to design an effective SMS. In addition, the impact of 
the organisation and structure on the effectiveness of the SMS, as well as on the 
subsystems of the SMS, is not well understood. Fire safety is still being addressed in 
isolation. It is further contended in this research project that accidents or disasters are 
the result of a systemic failure. Therefore, there is a need for a systemic approach to 
safety and to fire safety in particular that may help organisations to address safety as a 
coherent whole. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed relevant existing literature on safety and fire safety in the 
context of SH&E. It started by discussing concepts of safety management, as well as 
stating some research questions. The chapter proceeded by discussing some key 
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principles of systemic thinking. Existing literature on SH&E management systems 
within different industries was reviewed. Approaches to measuring safety performance 
and hazard management were also reviewed. Finally, the last section of the chapter 
draws some key lessons gained from the review process. The thesis continues by 
presenting two systemic approaches in chapter three. 
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Chapter Three 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter two discussed existing definitions of an SMS and developed some research 
questions, as well as considering some key aspects of systemic thinking. It provided a 
general appreciation of the existing literature on SH&E. This was in the context of the 
research problem and questions. This chapter extends chapter two by describing two 
systemic approaches that were adopted to address the research problem and questions. 
Section 3.2 summarises the Viable System Model (VSM), which was developed to 
design effective organisations and assess existing ones. The Failure Paradigm Method 
(FPM) is presented in section 3.3. Finally, section 3.4 gives a summary of this chapter. 
3.2 The Viable System Model (VSM) 
The VSM was developed and proposed by Stafford Beer 81,82,83 . 
Beer is one of the 
founders of cybernetics, which may be regarded, in essence, as the science of 
communication and control or, more generally, the science of effective organisation. A 
Viable System is defined by Beer as that which is able to maintain a separate existence. 
Moreover, Beer contends that in any viable system there are five necessary and 
sufficient subsystems interactively involved in any organism or organisation that is 
capable of maintaining its identity independently of other such organisms within a 
shared environment. 
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, if a system is to be viable it needs to achieve five functions 
associated with systems I to 5. System 1, operational elements, consists of various 
Approaches to Systems 
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Figure 3.1 The Viable System Model (From Beer 
83) 
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operations of the organisation that are essential to the organisation; that is, the 
operational elements deal directly with the 'business activities' of the organisation. The 
operational elements themselves are viable systems. Beer emphasises that in a recursive 
organisational structure, any viable system contains and is contained in a viable system. 
So, system I is always a viable system in its own right. A complete viable system is 
illustrated in Figure 3.1, where the interacting subsystems are labelled I to 5. It can also 
distinguish two operational elements in system 1; there could be more. Each contains 
five functions, or contains a complete viable system displayed at an angle of 45 degrees. 
Systems 2 to 5, called by Beer the 'meta-system', facilitate the function of system 1, as 
well as attempting to ensure the continuous adaptation of the whole organisation. 
System 2, anti-oscillatory, is concerned with damping 'oscillations' among the 
operational elements of system 1. System 3, inside and now, deals with the internal 
stability of the organisation, the implementation of the organisation policies, and 
resource allocations. System 3*, sporadic audit, is concerned with sporadic audits. 
System 4, outside and future, is responsible for identifying strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats for the whole viable system. Finally, system 5, policy, is 
responsible for determining and establishing policies for the whole viable system. 
3.2.1 Description of the VSM 
System 1: Operational Elements 
System I consists of various operational elements or parts, which are directly concerned 
with the implementation of the organisation'S business activities. Each operational 
element of system I should be autonomous in its own right, so that it can absorb some 
of the massive environmental 'variety' that would otherwise flow in higher management 
levels. Variety is defined as the number of possible states of a system. This means that 
the operational elements themselves must be viable systems and must exhibit the five 
functions. These operational elements comply with the VSM principles, such as the four 
principles of organisation listed in Appendix A. Two operational elements are shown in 
Figure 3.1. Each of them contains a complete viable system displayed at a 45 degree 
angle at a lower level of recursion. The square box at the top right-hand side of Figure 
3.1 is the management unit of system I of the next higher level of recursion. 
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System 2: Anti-Oscillatory 
System 2 deals with damping oscillations amongst the interaction of the operational 
elements of system 1. This is a necessary function to ensure that the various operational 
elements of system I operate in harmony. 
System 3: Inside and Now 
System 3 has a control function responsible for maintaining the internal stability of 
system 1. It must ensure that system 1 implements the whole organisation's policy 
effectively. To ensure this, it allocates resources to the operational elements of system 1, 
and carries out 'sporadic audits' using an auditing channel as shown in Figure 3.1. In 
general, system 3 involves the functional activities that regulate corporate activities in 
the 'inside and now' and the short-term future. 
System 4: Outside and Future 
System 4 involves identifying all relevant information about the system's total 
envirom-nents; that is, 'outside and future'. It identifies all relevant opportunities and 
threats to the system. It is also concerned with obtaining all relevant information about 
the internal strengths and weaknesses of the system. Moreover, system 4 rapidly 
transmits urgent information, 'algedonic signal', from systems 1,2, and 3 to system 5. 
System 4 is that part of the system or organisation where internal and external 
information can be brought together. 
System 5: Policy 
System 5 is responsible for deliberating policy for the whole organisation. It balances 
the sometimes antagonistic internal and external demands placed on the organisation, as 
represented by the requirements of system 3 and system 4 respectively. This is 
illustrated in the homeostatic loop between systems 3 and 4, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
It also represents the whole system to any wider system of which it is part. 
The VSM and its Environment 
The VSM specifies five functional imperatives which are necessary for a system to 
remain viable; also it has to achieve requisite variety in dealing with the complex 
environment with which it is faced. The system, in other words, must be able to respond 
appropriately to the various threats and opportunities identified in its total environment. 
The structure of the VSM represents a system as interacting in a defined way with its 
environment through the operations of system I and through system 4, as shown in 
Figure 3.1. In the same way, the embedded viable systems are shown as interacting in 
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exactly the same way with local environments that are peculiar to each of them, though 
they are subsets of the total envirom-nent. System 4 deals with the total environment of 
the VSM into which the whole system is embedded. It deals also with the 'problematic 
environment', which is also embedded into the total environment of the VSM. The 
4 problematic environment' is concerned with threats and opportunities for future 
adaptation of the whole system. On the other hand, system I operations deal with local 
environments into which they are embedded. These local envirom-nents are subsets of 
the total environment, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
Communication and Control 
Attention is given in the VSM to the information channels linking systems I to 5, and 
the organisation and its envirom-nent. Thus, whenever a line appears that is delimited at 
each end by a dot this represents a homeostatic loop. Each of these lines stands for a pair 
of arrows looking like the pair that connects systems 3 and 4, or the pair connecting the 
two operational circles of system 1. The squiggly lines connecting the operations of 
system 1 indicate an inter-dependency, which may be strong or weak according to the 
purpose of the viable system concerned. These channels of communication, and the 
necessary transducers translating infortnation when it crosses system boundaries, must 
be designed according to the requirements of Ashby's law of requisite variety' 50 which 
states that 'only variety can absorb variety'. It follows therefore that the four principles 
of organisation must apply to each of these channels of communication. The four 
organisational principles are listed in Appendix A. The two directional arrows 
represented in the VSM total envirom-nent indicate also a homeostatic loop, and the 
same organisation principles should be applied to them. A special channel, called an 
' algedonic' filter, represented as a dotted line in Figure 3.1, is employed to communicate 
particularly important signals, which may require the intervention of system 5. 
There is a particular concern in the VSM about the nature of the infon-nation which 
flows in the communication channels. This will often, given the importance of negative 
feedback for controL be information about how the different subsystems of the 
organisation and the organisation as a whole are doing in relation to their respective 
goals. Beer suggests adopting his measures of achievement, which consist of three 
levels of achievement namely, actuality, capability, and potentiality. As can be seen in 
Figure 3.2, these levels can be combined to give three indices, productivity, latency, and 
performance, expressed in ordinary numbers. Moreover, the levels of achievement can 
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be used to develop programmatic, strategicý and normative plans. These levels, plans, 
and indices can be used as comprehensive measures of performance. Moreover, this 
system can include all types of resources throughout an organisation. The levels of 
achievement can be defined as below: 
llýl 111"Ll vý IJIU11111116 
Figure 3.2 Measures Of Achievement (from Beer' 06 ) 
Actuality: This is simply what an organisation is managing to do now, with existing 
resources, and under existing constraints. 
Capability: This is what an organisation could be doing (right now) with existing 
resources, and under existing constraints, if the organisation really worked at it. 
Potentiality: This is what an organisation ought to be doing by developing its resources 
and removing constraints, although still operating within the bounds of what is already 
known to be feasible. 
An organisation may project its future plans according to these levels of achievement. 
Three sets of plans can be derived from the three levels of achievement, as follows: 
Programming (tactical): Planning from the 'actuality level' of achievement is called 
programming or tactical planning. It accepts the shortcomings of the situation, and does 
not admit that anything can be done about them. 
Planning by Objectives (strategic): Planning from the 'capability level' of achievement 
is called planning by objectives or strategic planning. This planning sets new objectives 
and tries to achieve them. This is the strategic planning level. 
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Normative Planning: Planning from the 'potentiality level' of achievement is called 
non-native planning. It sets potentiality as its target. It may incur major risks and 
penalties, but also may offer major benefits. 
The three levels of achievement are combined to derive three different indices, as shown 
in Figure 3.2. They are: 
Productivity: The productivity index is the ratio of actuality to capability. 
Latency: The latency index is the ratio of the capability to potentiality. 
Performance: The performance index is both the ratio of actuality to potentiality, and 
also the product of productivity and latency. 
Recursive Organisational Structure of the VSM 
Beer stresses that the subsystems of the embedded recursions are related to the matching 
subsystems of the parent viable system, as shown in Figure 3.1. Furthermore, the degree 
of autonomy, given that the organisation's management has to deploy variety, is in 
principle a function of the system's purpose in relation to its environment. Moreover, 
the VSM proposes to treat the examination of any organisation, however large, in levels 
of recursions. This is facilitated by the Recursive Systems Theorem. According to this 
theorem, in a recursive organisational structure, any viable system contains, and is 
contained in a viable system. This means that the organisational structure of the VSM as 
a whole is replicated in each operational element of system 1. As can be seen in Figure 
3.1 
, the 
VSM is shown with its pair of recursions, where the square box at the top right- 
hand side is the management unit of system I of the next higher recursion. It also shows 
the level of recursion next below at an angle of 45 degrees. 
3.3 The Failure Paradigm Method 
The Failure Paradigm Method (FPM) was developed by Fortune and Peters 85 . The FPM 
is intended to facilitate a systemic interpretation of a system's failure and its context that 
could lead to some action. This systems approach to understanding failure consists of 
two key stages. First, conceptualisation, and modelling of the failure situation as a 
system should be completed. The conceptualisation is accomplished by considering a 
situation and using diagrammatic techniques to represent it. This could improve the 
understanding and may enable conceptualisation of the system or systems that can be 
said to be the core of the failure. Once the conceptualisation has been completed, the 
system is then modelled; that is, the system is described in a format of an idealised 
system. Second, comparison of the conceptualised system or systems with a model of a 
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purposeful system without failure should be made. The conceptualised system or 
systems are further compared with other models, such as control and communication, 
safety culture, human factors, and structural organisation. A detailed representation of 
the FPM is shown in Figure 3.3. In general, it should be emphasised that the FPM has 
been applied to analyse past failures, such as for example the Boeing 737 fire at 
Manchester Airport (1985), and the Bhopal disaster (1984). However, this research 
project has used the FPM to analyse a system that has not yet failed. This section will 
therefore concentrate on the second stage of the FPM, as described below. 
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Figure 3.3. The FPM (from Fortune and PeterS85) 
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3.3.1 Description of the FPM 
From Situation to System 
The first task in the FPM is to conduct a pre-analysis, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. The 
pre-analysis involves gathering and organisation of information about the failure 
situation. This stage begins by deciding which aspects of the situation can be regarded 
as the failure or failures. The purpose of the analysis and the different viewpoints and 
perspectives that must be considered, infon-nation about the situation and its history 
should be gathered and brought together. Fortune and Peters suggest several techniques 
to accomplish this stage. They include spray diagrams, relationship diagrams, multiple- 
cause diagrams, rich pictures, and non-diagrammatic methods such as lists, databases, 
and charts. It is emphasised by the authors that these tools and techniques help to 
organise and store information about the situation. Furthermore, they provide working 
tools for checking that all relevant aspects of the situation are considered and for 
generating options. Once the pre-analysis has been completed, the next step of the FPM 
is to identify the focus for the analysis and to specify the systems from which the failure 
or failures have emerged. When a situation is complex, the analysis will have to be 
conducted at several levels within any system. Moreover, it will also be necessary to 
select a number of interacting systems and carry them all forward through the 
subsequent comparison process, looking at them individually and as a whole. Next, 
models of the systems used in the analysis process will need to be sufficiently detailed 
to facilitate the switching between levels to be conducted. It also allows structure and 
process fon-nats for the comparison stage. 
Comparison and Synthesis 
Once the first stage of the FPM has been completed, the next task is to conduct a 
comparison process of the conceptualised system or systems with idealised models. The 
conceptualised system is further compared with other paradigms, such as control and 
communication., safety culture, human factors, and structural organisation. A paradigm 
may embody desirable features of a system, such as the control paradigm. Alternatively 
it may serve as an essentially neutral 'template' for examining the features of a system. 
Paradigms may be used to compare with their counter-parts in a failed system. 
The main paradigm of the FPM is 'The Formal System Model' (FSM), as illustrated in 
Figure 3.4. This model may be used to map onto a 'significant failure', identified as part 
of a failed system. The main components of the FSM include the environment which the 
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system interacts with, a 'decision-making subsystem', a 'perfon-nance monitoring 
subsystem' and a set of elements or subsystems which perform the activities of the 
system. The FSM is hierarchical. The wider system may become the system in focus for 
a different level of study. 
Figures 3.4 The Formal System Model (from Fortune and Peters 85) 
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Fortune and Peters describe some paradigms such as the ones embodied in the Control 
and Communication paradigms. The Control paradigm refers to the norms of behaviour 
that a system or subsystem applies to its own activities to maintain a desired state. This 
paradigm employs a classical feedback control, modem feedback control and 
feedforward control. Figure 3.5(a) shows the classical model which attempts to identify 
and remove discrepancies between actual and target outputs. A 'modem' feedback 
control paradigm not only identifies and removes discrepancies between actual and 
target outputs, but also estimates the true current state and possible effects of any 
change. The estimation process is accomplished within the control system itself, using a 
model of the system as shown in Figure 3.5 (b). The internal model of the process of 
Figure 3.5 (b) evaluates the various control actions which could be taken in order to 
examine the trade-off between each action's effectiveness and the cost associated with 
it. Finally, Figure 3.5 (c) shows the feedforward control model; the purpose of this 
control model is to identify and anticipate disturbances so that decisions can be made 
before they affect output. 
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Besides control aspects, communication represents a central role in the FSM. Figure 3.4 
illustrates different links of communications such as that between the system and its 
environment, information flow from the wider system to the subsystem and vice-versa. 
It also includes other communication links within the system and the subsystems. If any 
of these links is missing or inadequate when comparing with the FSM then a more 
specialised communication paradigm is needed. Figure 3.6 shows a dynamic two-way 
process of communication in which the sender's message can be used to modify 
subsequent messages. It should be noted that this model is concerned only with the 
transmission and receipt of infonnation and does not consider other factors such as 
human aspects (values, beliefs) that may be of great importance in the study of failures. 
To deal with this issue a communication model within and amongst teams is integrated 
in the FPM methodology. 
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Fortune and Peters also discuss the human aspects of the FSM and the control and 
communication paradigms. They point out that 'human error' appears in many reports of 
accidents or disasters. Moreover, they argue that people's activities and decisions have 
to be central to any investigation of failures. The authors classified human factors into 
three levels: at organisational level, at group level, and at the individual level. At the 
organisational level, the authors discuss a safety culture paradigm, which can be used to 
assess an organisation's safety culture in place before an accident or disaster. The safety 
culture paradigm suggested by Fortune and Peters contained the below characteristics: 
* an organisation that takes a positive attitude towards criticism and other feedback 
from lower levels within it andfrom outside; 
* an organisation that takes into account the boundaries and patterns of 
communication within it when designing processes, procedures and working 
practices; 
an organisation that promotes concern for the consequences of its activities andfor 
the effects of individual actions; 
an organisation that encourages involvement and commitment and is able to resolve 
conflict without causing alienation. 
Fortune and Peters describe team behaviour paradigms in order to gain an understanding 
of human factors at group level. These paradigms are related to undesirable behaviour of 
teams, which can be new, functioning normally, and well established and have been 
operating for a period of time. Three main paradigms are described by the authors; they 
are the "Anomic Reactive Paradigm", the "Team Cult Paradigm", and the "Team 
Primacy Paradigm". The anomic reactive paradigm expresses a feeling of aimlessness or 
purposelessness within human groups or teams. The team cult paradigm examines the 
relationship of individual members of a team to the team itself. It involves a number of 
aspects such as "Cognitive Dissonance"151 and "Groupthink"151 . Cognitive dissonance 
refers to the contradiction between patterns of behaviour and belief systems. 
Groupthink on the other hand refers to the process in which individual members of a 
team share the team opinion which ignores or distorts reality. Finally, the team primacy 
paradigm examines the relationship of a team to the organisation. It relates to the 
concept of alienation, such as powerlessness, isolation, and self-estrangement which are 
combined with other concepts related to alienation. 
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Human aspects of control and communication are examined by fortune and Peters to 
address human factors at the individual level. This paradigm examines the interaction 
between individuals and highly automated systems whereby an operator may be exposed 
and unable to cope with unexpected events. Fortune and Peters argue that a better way 
of providing operators a better understanding of processes is: 
* to incorporate predictive displays into control panels; 
+ to include models of the processes in the control systems so as to allow operators to 
input sample values of key parameters and see whether the values predicted by the 
models correspond with those measured by the instrumentation; 
to design control systems so that they fit 'models' of the systems held by the 
operators. 
It is emphasised by the authors that there are many other aspects to the individuals' 
factors, such as communication skills and ability to listen and to tell, in communication 
and control. However, they stressed that the three levels of organisation, group and 
individual provide a framework within which possible flaws in communication can be 
understood. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented two systemic approaches which were adopted to construct a 
FSMS model. First, the Viable System Model (VSM) was described. Some key features 
of the structural organisation of the VSM were given, as well as key characteristics of 
the VSM and its envirom-nent, communication and control. Finally, the Failure 
Paradigm Method (FPM) was presented. This description included some paradigms 
such as the Formal System Model, communication and control, and human factors. 
Chapter five describes how these two systems approaches were used to construct first, 
an FSMS prototype, and then a final FSMS model. 
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Chapter Four 
A Fire Safety Management 
System Prototype 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter one highlighted the need for a systemic approach to managing fire safety in a 
coherent way. Chapters two and three have established the theoretical basis for 
constructing an FSMS. A systemic approach has been adopted to construct the FSMS 
prototype. It has been applied to the case of an oil and gas offshore organisation. The 
FSMS is intended to maintain the fire risk within an acceptable range in an oil and gas 
organisation's operations. This chapter presents an exposition of the developed FSMS 
prototype. Fire safety and its context in offshore platfanns are discussed in section 4.2. 
A detailed description of individual subsystems of the FSMS is given in section 4.3. 
Section 4.4 presents some vulnerabilities and strengths of the developed FSMS 
prototype. It also presents some suggestions for further development of the FSMS 
prototype in order to obtain an effective or robust FSMS model. Finally, section 4.5 
summarises this chapter. 
4.2 Offshore Fire Safety and Its Context 
Fire risk is inevitably present in any industrial process involving hydrocarbons, 
including offshore installations. An accident caused by fire may lead to the total loss of 
an offshore installation, as well as human life. Offshore platforms are usually designed 
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in an extremely compact layout, which has a high density of equipment. As a 
consequence of this compact layout, not only the direct effect of fire to human life is 
important, but its impact on the installation itself. An offshore platform has many 
constraints on weight and space. High pressure systems, quantities of potentially 
explosive and flammable materials, large equipment, living quarters for the work force, 
all share the same space. This requires an oil and gas organisation to take measures to 
improve not only its fire safety performance, but also to improve its operations 
performance. Over recent years, several approaches have been developed and 
implemented with the aim of improving the organisation's fire safety performance. For 
example, 'inherent safety' principles have been applied to the conceptual and detailed 
PI tf rM144,145 design of an offshore a0. This approach has the advantage that it addresses 
the source of fire hazards. However, human and organisational factors remain as 
important issues to manage fire safety. An FSMS needs to be considered as part of an 
offshore platform design process, from conceptual design through to commissioning, 
construction, operation, and decommissioning. The FSMS should not be a 'bolt-on'. 
Human factors may be a major source of not only fire accidents, but poor performance 
of an offshore organisation's operation. Safety literature shows that most accidents and 
failures may be attributable to some form of human factor. As discussed in chapters one 
and two, these failures can be characterised as 'apparent' failures and 'latent' failures. 
Apparent failures are those failures which immediately precede an accident, whilst latent 
failures are understood as organisational failures committed in design, management, 
communication, maintenance, etc. From a systemic point of view, addressing technical 
and human factors is clearly as important as focusing on apparent and latent causes of 
accidents. Organisations still tend to address these factors in isolation; thus significant 
reduction of accident rates is still a far reaching objective. If an initial accident should 
occur, human action is of vital importance in mitigating the effects of a given 
occurrence by taking effective remedial measures. However, very often a given situation 
is made worse by taking incorrect actions. Similarly, the likelihood of successful 
evacuation, escape and rescue operations would in many cases be greatly affected by the 
human performance concerned. This suggests that human and organisational factors 
must be adequately considered in fire safety management of offshore operations. 
Offshore production plants are complex systems that are continually changing. This is in 
response to organisations' market requirements, the need to be more competitive, the 
need to respond to competitive organisations, government legislation, social 
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organisations, etc. Some of these changes involve changes in production processes, 
technology and personnel. Managing changes in an offshore production process is of 
critical importance in managing fire safety. In other words, to manage changes is the 
recognition that changes in process technology potentially invalidate prior fire risk 
assessment; all process technology changes require re-assessment. Additionally, 
facilities or process changes invalidate prior fire risk assessment, because they can 
create new hazards. Moreover, foreseen and unforeseen changes should be considered in 
the management of fire safety. Otherwise they can lead, and have led, to catastrophic 
events. This suggests the need for an effective system capable of integrating technical 
and human factors, 'apparent' and 'latent' factors, and foreseen and unforeseen events in 
order to manage fire safety offshore. 
4.2.1 Types of Offshore Installations 
This section summarises different types of offshore installations for a typical oil and gas 
organisation. The type of offshore installation will depend on whether it is used in the 
search for oil or for production, or whether it is required to provide support to these 
operations. Three types of offshore installations can be distinguished: exploration 
platforms, drilling platforms and production platforms. A brief description of these 
platfonns is given below. 
Exploration Platforms 
In general, three types of exploration platforms can be found for oil exploration 
offshore. They are the jackup rig, the semi-submersible, and the self-positioning 
drillship. The jackup rig is a floating platform which can be either self-propelled or 
towed from one location to another. On reaching the location the legs are lowered until 
they reach the sea bed, and the platfon-n jacks itself up clear of the water so that it 
cannot be affected by high seas. This type of installation can be used for shallower 
depths of exploration at around 300 ft. A semi-submersible platform, on the other hand, 
is used for deeper water, up to about 3000 ft. This platform can be self-propelled or 
towed to a location and is maintained on station by anchors or by dynamic positioning 
equipment. When a semi-submersible is moved, water is pumped out of buoyancy 
chambers located in the 'pontoon' feet, which causes the vessel to rise and float on the 
surface as a normal ship. A self-positioning drillship is a more recent development for 
exploration. This unit is used for exploration in depths greater than 3000 ft. They are 
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self-propelled at normal ship speeds and can carry considerable deck load making them 
extremely versatile. 
Production Platforms 
Once the hydrocarbons have been discovered by means of any of the exploration 
platforms, and the field has proved to be commercial, consideration is given to the type 
of platform which will be installed. A production platform traditionally houses both the 
production process facility and the drilling equipment. A production facility is used to 
separate the hydrocarbon product coming from the well, this product is a mixture of oil, 
water and gas. The water and gas are separated from oil. The gas may also be treated 
before it can be exported to shore or used as a fuel on the platform itself. A drilling 
facility, on the other hand, is required to bore the production wells, and house the 
metering and control systems to monitor the flow of oil from the wells. Two types of 
fixed production platform are predominant in the production of oil and gas. They are the 
concrete gravity platform and the steel jacket platform. 
A typical concrete gravity platform consists of a base unit compartment to form a 
storage tank. It has a number of legs, perhaps three or four depending on design but 
sometimes a single column takes the height of the structure above water level. The deck 
and various modules are placed on top of the legs. Drilling is carried out through one or 
more of the hollow legs or the central column and the produced oil can be stored ready 
for export. In order to maintain sufficient weight to keep it in position, the storage tanks 
for the platform must be kept filled with either water or oil. A fixed platform typically 
consists of a substructure and a superstructure. A substructure consists of a steel tubular 
jacket with tubular legs held together by welded tubular bracing, the whole being 
securely piled to the sea bed through tubes attached to the bottom of the legs. There are 
also various vertical tubes required for obtaining sea water for platform utilities, for the 
protection of sub-sea electrical cabling, and as a guide for well risers. The superstructure 
usually consists of a deck assembly, which supports all the prefabricated facilities for 
different processes. It also supports the drilling equipment, a power generation 
equipment, utilities, living accommodation modules, communication facilities, cranes, 
etc. that make up the topsides of the platform. 
A Typical Oil and Gas Offshore Production Platform 
For the purpose of this study a typical fixed production platform has been selected to 
model an FSMS prototype. Fixed production facilities vary from a simple separation and 
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disposal system to a highly complex processing plant utilising interconnected pipe work, 
dozens of process vessels and a great amount of equipment and machinery. Figure 4.1 
shows the typical processes that can be found in most offshore production platforms. 
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As the reservoir fluids flowing up the tubing from the individual wells reach the surface, 
the total oil production must be gathered before processing. In order to achieve this, 
each well is connected to one or more inlet manifolds, which are large diameter 
production header pipes connected to smaller diameter flow lines. Then each header 
carries its share of total production to the first stage of the production process system, 
the separation of the well products. 
Separation Processes 
An oil well produces oil, gas, condensate and water in varying proportions. The main 
function of a production platform is to separate these individual components from the 
mixture of oil and gas and water. Separation is based on the principle that oil, water and 
gas all have different densities, although modem separators contain internal devices 
which consist of natural separation processes. Segregation of the elements takes place 
over a number of phases. In two stage separation the gas only is liberated from the liquid 
and in three stage separation the gas is first liberated from the liquid, then the liquid 
itself separated into oil and water. 
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Oil Treatment Processes 
After separation the oil is free from water and dissolved gas, but may still contain water 
as an emulsion. It is necessary to eliminate the water otherwise it would cause corrosion 
in the pipelines and be unacceptable as feedstock in the refinery. This can be achieved 
by injecting chemicals, or the oil may be passed through a treatment vessel using heat 
or electric current. Once the oil has been separated from water and gas, it is transported 
onshore using an offshore loading unit, a tanker or pipeline. 
Gas Treatment Processes 
Natural gas is usually treated with water vapour. The amount of water it contains 
depends on the pressure and temperature. This water is removed before it can cause 
corrosion in pipelines and equipment. Also, under certain conditions of temperature and 
pressure, natural gas can produce hydrates which, if allowed to form, can completely 
block a pipeline causing process upsets or even line rupture. There are many ways of gas 
dehydration; the most common uses a water-absorbing substance such as triethylene 
glycol through which the gas is passed within an absorption tower. As the gas is bubbled 
through the glycol, water is absorbed and the mixture is passed to a separate 
regeneration unit which is heated to drive off the absorbed water, after which glycol can 
be re-used. It is common practice to bum off natural gas through the flare stack of the 
platform. This waste of energy has now been regulated in many countries as a result of 
an increase in envirom-nental concerns,, though some gas is still flared off for safety 
reasons. 
Water Injection System 
In order to maintain pressure in the well, water is injected into the water zone of the 
reservoir. Sea water is primarily used for this purpose, though it must be tested and 
treated. Oxygen, which occurs naturally in sea water, is very corrosive and must also be 
removed. This can be achieved by using mechanical methods. The de-aeration towers 
used in the mechanical process are usually vacuum-based when the reduction in pressure 
inside the column causes the dissolved oxygen to be liberated. The water is injected 
either into an existing production well which is no longer producing, or into a drilled 
injection well, the bottom of which is in the water zone of the reservoir. 
Thus far in chapter 4 has been discussed fire safety in the context of offshore platforms, 
as well as some relevant aspects of these installations. An FSMS prototype has been 
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constructed for a typical oil and gas production facility. A detailed description of this 
prototype is provided in the following section. 
4.3 Description of the FSMS Prototype 
This section presents the developed FSMS prototype for a typical oil and gas offshore 
production platform. The approach taken to construct this prototype was to use the 
VSM, which was described in chapter three. First, is developed the purpose for a typical 
oil and gas organisation in tenns of fire safety. Second, is described the various 
operations of the offshore platforrn that deal directly with the oil and gas production 
activities. Finally, a detailed description of the prototype is given. 
4.3.1 A typical Oil and Gas Organisation and Its Activities 
Regarding safety of a typical oil and gas organisation, a purpose for the FSMS prototype 
was formulated. The fonnulated FSMS's purpose says as follows: 
To maintain thefire risk within an acceptable range, for an oil and gas organisation. 
The formulated purpose helped to identify those operations that deal directly with the 
activities of an oil and gas organisation within which the organisation's safety and fire 
safety policy must be implemented. In addition to the formulated purpose, the principle 
of recursion of the VSM was used to identify major activities of the organisation and 
construct the organisational structure of the FSMS prototype. According to Stafford 
Beer, 81,82,83 44 in a recursive organisational structure, any viable system contains, and is 
contained in a viable system". It is possible then to depict an organisation as a set of 
viable systems contained within a set of viable systems, and so on, as illustrated in 
Figure 4.2. At the recursion level one, for example, the HSE may contain several 
divisions, such as oil and gas industry (Offshore Safety Division), transport industry, 
power generation industry and so on (only the Offshore Safety Division is shown). At 
the second recursion level, the oil and gas industry may contain various oil and gas 
companies (only one company is shown). At the third level of recursion, a typical oil 
and gas organisation may contain various operations, such as exploration, production, 
and oil and gas treatment operations. Regarding fire safety in a typical oil and gas 
organisation, the viable systems become fire safety in exploration, fire safety in 
production, fire safety in oil and gas treatment, as shown in Figure 4.2. 
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These levels of recursion for a typical oil and gas organisation must satisfy the 
formulated FSMS purpose. Figure 4.3 shows the organisational structure of the FSMS 
prototype for a typical oil and gas organisation. Detailed aspects of the FSMS prototype 
for the production operations are given below. 
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Fire Safety in Production 
Similarly, a purpose was defined for the production operations in order to identify 
operations that deal directly with the production of oil and gas activities and within 
which the fire safety policy must be implemented. This purpose must be meaningful 
while maintaining an identity with the upper level of recursion, recursion 1, as shown in 
Figure 4.2. It can be described as follows: 
To ensure that all the activities involved in extracting, separating and processing a 
reservoir of a mixture of oil, gas and water are present, and the performance monitored 
in order to maintainfire risk within an acceptable range. 
Furthennore, a descriptive process flow chart was used to identify the operations that 
contribute to achieve the fire safety production's purpose, as illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
Production manifolds and hydrocarbon processing are the major operations that 
contribute directly to produce oil and gas in an offshore platform. Regarding fire safety 
as a product of the production operation, they become fire safety in 'production 
manifolds' and fire safety in 'hydrocarbon processing', as illustrated in Figure 4.4. This 
consideration satisfies the purpose of fire safety in production, which aims to produce 
oil and gas, as well as maintaining fire risk within an acceptable range in all activities 
involved in the whole offshore production platform. 
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It should be emphasised that all activities, such as engineering, maintenance, loss 
prevention, etc., not included in the process flow chart are regarded as supportive 
activities. They will all form part of the FSMS prototype as described below. 
4.3.2 A FSMS Prototype for an Offshore Production Platform 
The FSMS prototype developed in this research project and described here is a 
conceptual approach for addressing fire safety in a coherent way. This systemic 
approach to fire safety is intended to be an effective system to maintain fire risk within 
an acceptable range in oil and gas offshore installations. In essence, it is a systemic set 
of five inter-related subsystems associated with systems I to 5, as shown in Figure 4.5. 
First, system 5 deals with the organisation's fire safety policy. Second, system 4 
involves fire safety development, which identifies strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, 
and threats regarding fire safety. Third, system 3 involves maintaining fire risk within an 
acceptable range in the whole oil and gas production offshore operation. System three 
also deals with sporadic fire safety audit through system 3*. Four, system 2 co-ordinates 
the activities achieved by the operations of system 1. Finally, system I deals with the 
implementation of fire safety policy received from system 3 and system 2. The FSMS 
prototype interacts with its local and wider environment through system I operations 
and system 4. Environment is understood as being the socio-economic and physical 
infrastructure into which an oil and gas organisation is embedded. The broken line 
elliptic symbol represents the wider environment of the FSMS prototype and the small 
elliptic symbols represent the local environment of system I operations, as illustrated in 
Figure 4.5. A socio-economic and physical environment can be segregated into several 
characteristics, such as geographical location, weather conditions and public utilities, oil 
and gas market, level of employment, regulators, other oil and gas operators, and social 
organisations. On the other hand, system 1 operations deal with local environments or 
institutionalised environments with which the oil and gas organisation's operations must 
deal. For example, other operations could be part of the local environment. The local 
environments are embedded into the total environment of the FSMS as illustrated in 
Figure 4.5. Detailed descrIption of each system is given in the subsequent paragraphs. 
System 1: Fire Safety Policy Implementation 
System 1, fire safety implementation, involves implementing the oil and gas 
organisation's fire safety policy. As can be seen in Figure 4.5, system I has two 
operations, namely fire safety in 'production manifolds' and fire safety in 'hydrocarbon 
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processing'. A common purpose that is consistent with the purpose of the fire safety in 
production was defined for these two operations as follows: 
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Figure 4.5 shows the fire safety in 'hydrocarbon processing', which is a viable system in 
its own right. This means that the whole FSMS prototype for the oil and gas offshore 
production platform is replicated in each operation of system 1. The square box 
represents the management, which embodies the systems 2 to 5, the circle is the 
'hydrocarbon processing' operations itself and the elliptic symbol represents the local 
environment or local socio-economic and physical environment. The same can be said 
about fire safety in 'production manifolds'. 
System 2: Fire Safety Co-ordination 
System 2, fire safety co-ordination, involves co-ordinating the activities of the various 
operations of system 1 so that they operate in agreement. System 2 transmits all fire 
safety plans, received from system 3, to fire safety in 'hydrocarbon processing', and fire 
safety in 'production manifolds'. These plans are intended to facilitate maintaining fire 
risk within an acceptable region in the operations of system 1. The activities of system 2 
may include, for example, scheduling training programmes, transmitting procedures for 
implementing changes, maintenance schedules, inspection schedules, and audit 
schedules. In general, system 2 co-ordinates different activities, which are intended to 
maintain an acceptable fire risk when fire safety in 'hydrocarbon processing' and fire 
safety in 'production manifolds' interact with each other. 
Maintenance in separation processes may be an example of such interaction that can 
lead to a fire incident. As can be seen in Figure 4.5, fire safety in 'hydrocarbon 
processing' and fire safety in 'production manifolds' have a strong relationship, as 
represented by the zigzag line connecting the two operations that form part of system 1. 
Production manifolds operations supply a mixture of oil, gas and water to 'hydrocarbon 
processing' operations. Maintenance in 'hydrocarbon processing' operations, for 
example, involves repairing or replacing a piece of equipment or several pieces of 
equipment. This may require the isolation and dismantling of part of the installation. All 
these activities will require to plan and develop maintenance procedures and schedules. 
Otherwise, this may cause serious fire safety problems, such as over-pressure in 
equipment in 'hydrocarbon processing' operations, because of the continuous supply of 
a mixture of oil and gas-water from 'production manifolds' operations. This may also 
cause fire safety problems in 'production manifolds' operations. Maintenance schedules 
have to be agreed by both fire safety in 'production manifolds' and fire safety in 
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'hydrocarbon processing' managers in order to prevent such possible fire safety 
problems. 
In summary, system 2 involves co-ordinating all activities conducted by the operations 
of system 1. The main purpose of System 2 is to prevent possible fire safety problems 
arising from the interaction of systems I operations. It accomplishes its function in a 
continuous never-ending loop. 
System 3: Fire Safety Functional 
System 3, fire safety functional, involves ensuring that system I implements the oil and 
gas offshore organisation's fire safety policy, as well as ensuring that fire risk is 
maintained within an acceptable range. The activities in system 3 are achieved by the oil 
and gas organisations' functional areas, referred to here as the fire safety operations 
directorate. The fire safety operations directorate may consist, in part, of the Offshore 
Installation Manager (OIM), Production Support Manager, Project Manager, 
Engineering, Loss Prevention, Planning and Programming, Maintenance and Technical 
Support, and Inspectors. There are three kinds of information that system 3 has to 
handle in order to accomplish its function. First, it deals with fire safety information 
which flows through the vertical command channel down from systems 5 and 4. Second, 
it deals with fire safety information which flows from system 2 to system 3. Finally, it 
deals with fire safety information that flows through the audit channel from system 1 to 
3. Additionally, it communicates the organisation's strengths and weaknesses to system 
4 to achieve the objective of maintaining an acceptable level of fire risk in system 1 
operations. 
System 3 transmits the organisation's fire safety policy and any special instructions, 
which are developed by system 4 and deliberated by system 5, to system 1 through the 
vertical channel. It also allocates the necessary resources required to implement the 
organisation's fire safety policy. System I reports whether the organisation's fire safety 
policy is being accomplished or not to system 3 through the same vertical channel. This 
information flow is also a continuous process that should be conducted on a day-to-day 
basis with system 1. System 3 transmits its short-term fire safety plans to system I 
through system 2. It also requires system 2 to report all conflicting aspects arising from 
system I operations in order to develop new action plans. This information flow is also 
conducted on a daily basis. Finally, system 3 provides an essential channel for the 
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sporadic audit of the system 1 operations. The audit process is achieved in agreement 
with system 1, and conducted by system 3 
System3*: FireSafetyAudit 
System 3 *, fire safety audit, is part of system 3 and its function is to conduct sporadic 
audits into the operations of system 1. The audit process must cover a thorough 
examination of the safety performance of humans, equipment, processes and 
installations, as well as human injuries caused by fire incidents. System 3* intervenes in 
system 1 operations in agreement with system 1. It should be noted that auditing is 
distinct from monitoring as used by some existing SMSs. Unannounced auditing, 
although at agreed frequencies, should be conducted to verify whether the established 
fire safety plans are being met or not. Furthermore, auditing fire safety must be 
conducted additionally by an external auditor, such as HSE. Reports from external 
audits may provide important feedback, which would enable system 3 to maintain and 
develop its capability to manage and maintain an acceptable fire risk. 
System 4: Fire Safety Development 
System 4, fire safety development, is responsible for fire safety development for the 
whole organisation. Considering strengths, weaknesses, threats, and opportunities from 
the organisation's wider and local environment, system 4 can suggest changes to the 
organisation's fire safety policies. This means that system 4 deals with internal needs 
received from system 3, as well as dealing with external requirements, which are 
reflected in the organisation's wider environment. Internal requirements may include, 
for example, developing new training techniques, developing new maintenance 
procedures, developing new operations procedures, and other difficulties experienced by 
system I in its operations in order to accomplish fire safety plans. External requirements 
may include, for example, compliance with existing regulations and standards, and 
lessons learnt from fire accidents in other industries. There are several important factors 
that system 4 needs to consider for the future development of fire safety. These factors 
may include, for example, the offshore platform design, technological development, 
human factors, new regulations and standards. 
Fire risk involved in an offshore platfonn life cycle must be considered at the design or 
redesign stage. It is generally recognised that decisions made at an early design stage 
have the most significant impact on the platform life cycle. Inherently safer design 
principles, for example, should be further developed and applied to both new offshore 
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design or integrated into fire safety design for existing offshore platforms. Moreover, the 
design process of the offshore platform must be an integral part of the FSMS. System 4 
should continuously identify potential problems of fire safety throughout the life cycle 
of the offshore production platform in order to devise and implement the necessary 
modifications to system I operations. Other kinds of developments may relate, for 
example, to increasing and verifying the reliability of fire safety models. System 4 
should deal with all fire safety issues related to human aspects. An oil and gas 
organisation needs, for example, to establish a strong fire safety culture and to promote 
fire safety commitment, which should include employees, top and line management. It 
should also design a comprehensive fire safety training process for all employees at all 
levels, but particularly focusing on site training, for example, in relation to emergency 
response. Finally, system 4 should pay attention to new and emerging regulations and 
international standards that may have a significant impact on the system I operations. 
New or future fire safety regulations should be adopted and implemented in advance. 
System 5: Fire Safety Policy 
System 5, fire safety policy, is responsible for establishing fire safety policies for the 
whole oil and gas organisation, as well as monitoring the internal and external 
requirements, as represented by the needs of system 3 and system 4 respectively. This 
monitoring process is represented by the lines that connect the loop between systems 3 
and 4 as shown in Figure 4.5. System 4 develops choices, such as those associated with 
the key factors discussed above; system 5 should deliberate and make feasible decisions 
to deploy strategic fire safety plans. It should elucidate responsibilities and roles of the 
main players and bodies for managing fire safety. The duties of line managers in 
particular must be identified, and those of employees also made clear. This should create 
the basis for a strong safety culture. 
The FSMS prototype described in this section is a conceptual model, which was built on 
a systemic approach called VSM. This systemic approach to fire safety offshore is 
intended to maintain fire risk within an acceptable region in an oil and gas organisation. 
It was modelled for the case of an oil and gas production offshore installation, though it 
could be easily extended to incorporate other offshore platforms, or even to consider a 
whole oil and gas corporation. The FSMS prototype described in this section was 
mapped to the paradigms of the Failure Paradigm Method (FPM) in order to detect 
76 
vulnerabilities, and a synthesis developed. The results of this mapping process are 
discussed below. 
4.4 Constructing a FSMS Model 
This section presents the results of the mapping process, which highlights some 
vulnerabilities of the FSMS prototype. The FPM and some of its paradigms were 
described in section 3.3 of chapter three. It also provides a description of a comparison 
process used to conduct the mapping. As discussed in chapter one, the aim of the 
comparison process was to identify vulnerabilities and inconsistencies of the FSMS 
prototype using systems paradigms, such as the Formal System Model (FSM), 
communication and control, and human factors. Detailed aspects of the comparison 
process and discrepancies between the FSMS prototype and the FPM paradigms are 
given below. 
4.4.1 An Inquiry Process 
Figure 4.6 shows an adapted methodology that was used to investigate possible 
deficiencies of the developed FSMS prototype. This inquiry process consists of four 
complementary stages. The first stage, 'systems set out and assembly', involves 
selecting appropriate paradigms to be compared with their counterparts of the FSMS 
prototype. As can be seen in Figure 4.6, four paradigms, i. e., the Formal System Model 
(FSM), control, communication, and 'human factors', were selected to complete this 
stage. 
The FSMS prototype was described in section 4.3, whilst the FSM, control and 
communication, and human factors paradigms were described in section 3.3 of chapter 
three. The second, comparison, stage involves comparing the selected paradigms with 
their counterpart in the FSMS prototype. In order to complete this stage, the FSM was 
compared with the structural organisation of the FSMS prototype. Upon the completion 
of this comparison, the selected paradigms were compared with the control and 
communication, and 'human factors' aspects embedded in the FSMS prototype. The 
results of this comparison process are given below. In the third, interpretation, stage of 
the inquiry process, the discrepancies resulting from the comparison process are 
analysed in order to determine the strengths and vulnerabilities of the FSMS prototype. 
The fourth stage, synthesis, draws lessons learnt from the first three stages. 
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A Fire Safety Management System (FSMS) Model has resulted from this inquiry 
process. The FSMS model is presented in chapter five. 
4.4.2 Strengths and Vulnerabilities 
This section describes some discrepancies found in the comparison stage of the inquiry 
process. It first discusses the discrepancies found in the mapping process of the FSM to 
the FSMS prototype. It continues by presenting the results found in the comparison of 
the control and communication paradigms with the communication and control aspects 
of the FSMS prototype. This section concludes by presenting the discrepancies between 
the human factors paradigms and the human aspects of the FSMS prototype. 
The FSM and the Structural Organisation of the FSMS Prototype 
Table 4.1 maps the FSM to the structural organisation of the FSMS prototype. Figures 
4.71,4.8 and 4.9 show the structural organisation of the FSMS prototype according to the 
FSM fort-nat. Figure 4.7 shows a higher recursion; Figure 4.8, on the other hand, shows 
the next recursion below, that is, the structural organisation of the FSMS prototype for 
an oil and gas production operation. Figure 4.9 shows a lower recursion level of the 
FSMS prototype. 
Table 4.1 The FSM And the FSMS Prototype 
The Formal System Model (FSM) I The FSMS Prototype 
decision making subsystem 
subsystems or components that carry out 
transformations 
performance monitoring subsystem 
hierarchical structure and its environment 
system 3 and system 5 
system I 
9 system 
recursive structure and its 
environment 
According to Table 4.1, the FSM suggests that the FSMS prototype must have a 
"decision making subsystem", "subsystems that carry out transformations", and a 
"performance monitoring subsystem". These subsystems should be arranged in a 
hierarchical structure which interacts with a wider environment. It does not suggest 
explicitly the need for a fire safety development subsystem and a fire safety co- 
ordination subsystem. The FSMS prototype on the other hand has two subsystems, 
system 3 and system 5, that deal with "decision making". System I deals explicitly with 
implementing the organisation's fire safety policy and system 3* involves auditing the 
operations of system 1 sporadically. Moreover, the FSMS prototype contains a specific 
subsystem called fire safety development, which involves identifying threats and 
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opportunities in the oil and gas organisation's environment; it also deals with the 
organisation's strengths and weaknesses. Considering the organisation's threats and 
opportunities, weaknesses and strengths, system four, fire safety development, involves 
planning fire safety for the whole organisation. It should be noted that fire safety 
development is not part of safety decision making, though it facilitates decision making. 
The FSM suggests that there are not interactions among the various subsystems or 
components that "carry out transformations". This means that the FSM suggests there is 
no need for taking into consideration the interaction among the various operations that 
form part of system I of the FSMS prototype. For example, as can be seen in Figure 4.9, 
the FSM suggests that there are no interactions between the fire safety in 'production 
manifolds' and fire safety in 'hydrocarbon processing'. Because of this, the FSM does 
not suggest that the FSMS prototype must have a subsystem which can deal with the 
interaction of the various operations of system 1. The structural organisation of the 
FSMS prototype, on the other hand, suggests that the interaction among the various 
operations of system I is vital to satisfy and maintain the purpose of the whole 
organisation regarding fire safety. The FSMS has a function called fire safety co- 
ordination, system 2, that co-ordinates the internal activities of the various operations 
that forin part of system 1. It should be emphasised that dealing with such interactions is 
of vital importance in order to maintain fire risk within an acceptable region in the 
offshore platform operations. Unless these interactions are considered, conflicting 
aspects may arise from such interactions and these conflicting aspects may lead to 
incidents or even catastrophic events, such as for example, the Piper Alpha fire. The 
"Tartan" and the "Claymore" production platforms were still sending oil and gas to the 
Piper Alpha platform whilst it was on fire. This is a clear evidence of the lack of co- 
ordination amongst the operations of such installations. 
Finally, the FSM suggests that the structural organisation of the FSMS prototype must 
have a specific "performance monitoring" subsystem. It should be emphasised that the 
structural organisation of the FSMS prototype does not contain a specific subsystem that 
monitors the organisation's fire safety performance. It should be also emphasised that 
the system 3* of the FSMS prototype deals with auditing the fire safety performance of 
the various operations of system 1. Changes to the structural organisation of the FSMS 
prototype are discussed in section 4.4.3. 
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Figure 4.10 The FSM and the FSMS Prototype 
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Figure 4.9 The FSM and the FSMS Prototype 
The Control Paradigm and the Regulatory System of the FSMS Prototype 
The control paradigm, which was described in chapter three, was compared with its 
counterpart in the FSMS prototype. The "classical feedback", the "modem feedback", 
and "feedforward" control models were selected to be compared with the FSMS 
prototype regulatory system. Table 4.2 maps these control models to the regulatory 
system of the FSMS prototype. 
Table 4.2 The Control Paradigm and the Regulatory System of the FSMS 
The Control Paradigm The FSMS Prototype Regulatory System 
" classical feedback multiple feedback control 
" modem feedback 
" feedforward 
The control paradigm of the FPM suggests three types of control models in order to 
maintain a desired state of a system or subsystem. These control models are the classical 
feedback, modem feedback, and the feedforward control models, as shown in Table 4.2. 
It seems that there is no significant discrepancy between the control paradigm and the 
regulatory system of the FSMS prototype. The regulatory system of the FSMS 
prototype, derived from Beer 82 , combines the three control models of the control 
paradigm of the FPM into a single control model, called multiple feedback control, as 
shown in Figure 4.10. This multiple feedback control is based on the principle of 
"intrinsic homeostatic control". Intrinsic homeostatic control is understood here as the 
capability of the FSMS prototype, independently of an external management, to 
maintain fire risk within an acceptable region. The management or controller and the 
system or organisation under control are inseparable in the FSMS prototype. The 
sources of control are spread through the whole structure of the FSMS prototype rather 
than localised within a separate system. 
As shown in Figure 4.10, the multiple feedback control model of the FSMS prototype 
consists of various elements, such as the "management", "operations", "comparators", 
"feedback adjuster" and an "organiser adjuster" (Note that Beer uses the phrase "Muddy 
Box" instead of "Operations". The latter is considered to be more appropriate here). The 
management plans or sets fire safety objectives. These fire safety objectives are 
represented in the comparator A. The function of this comparator is to compare the 
gactual output' with the planned fire safety objectives. Thus this control model can 
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detect any deviation of the planned fire safety objectives through the comparator A. The 
"feedback adjuster" involves adjusting the input of the "operations" for the time lags. 
Otherwise, the purpose of the FSMS will not be accomplished so the entire organisation 
will be unstable. It is understood here as being a stable FSMS when its "feedback 
adjuster" can predict and classify factors that can go wrong, examine the consequences 
and likelihood of those failures, and attempt to stop those most likely to occur. It should 
also be able to predict and categorise threats and opportunities from the FSMS 
environment. 
The adjuster organiser, on the other hand, is intended to manage fire safety in the face of 
potential unclassified factors, as well as uncategorised threats and opportunities. In other 
words, the adjuster organiser involves anticipating any deviation of the organisation's 
fire safety objectives due to unforeseen factors as well as predictable factors. In order to 
do so, the adjuster organiser involves modifying the design of the feedback adjuster and 
checking the process whereby the feedback adjuster copes with the time lags through the 
comparator B. This process can be accomplished through modelling fire safety for the 
whole system which the feedback adjuster is trying to deal with. If the FSMS is able to 
do so, then it can be said that the FSMS is an adaptive system. Thus, an adaptive FSMS 
should be capable of maintaining an acceptable level of fire risk in the face of 
unforeseen factors. 
input unexpected 
r-------------- 10, disturbances 
A 
jus 
Adjuster-C Feedback Operations Management 
organiser adjuster 
output 
A 
l< ------------ 
B 
------------------------ 
Figure 4.10 Multiple Feedback Control (from Beer)82 
That is , the 
feedback adjuster is essentially 'reactive', whereas the adjuster organiser is 
cpro-active'. A simple example on how to control a system through this multiple 
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feedback control model could be a truck carrying hazardous materials. The truck and its 
route represent the "operation", and the dispatcher as the "management". The dispatcher 
schedules the journey of the truck and this schedule is being represented in A, as shown 
in Figure 4.10. The dispatcher monitors the schedule of the truck and detects any 
deviation of the actual truck schedule from the planned schedule. If a deviation is 
detected, the dispatcher may elaborate a new plan, feedback adjuster, in order to achieve 
the planned schedule of the truck. Considering that the truck is scheduled to drive 
through a region where a snow storm is expected or already in progress; the dispatcher 
could "anticipate" by assessing the impact of such an event on the planned route and 
evaluate alternative routes. This process of changing plans is the function of the adjuster 
organiser. 
The Communication Paradigm and the FSMS Prototype 
In comparing the communication paradigm with the communication model of the FSMS 
prototype, there appear to be no discrepancies. In essence, both the communication 
paradigm suggested by Fortune and Peters 85 and the communication model of the FSMS 
are based on the same communication theorem developed and proposed by 
Shannon 82,83,85 
. 
Fortune and Peters' communication model is a dynamic model in which 
the sender and the receiver can adapt to changes. Also, the receiver's response to the 
sender's message can be used to modify subsequent messages. The communication 
model of the FSMS prototype, on the other hand, is also a dynamic process. The FSMS 
prototype communication model is governed by the four organisational principles, 
81,82,83 which are listed in Appendix A, as suggested by Beer 
The distinction between the syntactic and the semantic levels of communication within 
the framework of the communication paradigm and the FSMS prototype should, 
however, be emphasised. It seems that within the framework of the communication 
paradigm, infort-nation is defined at a purely syntactic level. According to the 
communication paradigm, a series of signs constituting a message is syntactically well 
defined if it follows a certain code known to both the sender and the receiver, so that the 
receiver can read the message. On the other hand, a message is semantically meaningful 
if the receiver cannot only read it, but also understand its significance. A message is 
meaningful to the receiver only if it has practical meaning to him or her. The 
information content of the message is competent to effect change to the receiver's 
purposeful orientation. Infonnation is understood as the set of facts that changes 
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systems. The syntactic aspect of the communication paradigm can be handled by 
information processing systems. The semantic aspects of information, on the other hand, 
can be handled only by humans. 
It should also be emphasised that the syntactic and the semantic aspects of 
communication are dealt with in the FSMS prototype, though they are not explained 
explicitly. There is therefore a need to make them explicit in the FSMS model. In the 
communication model of the FSMS prototype, fire safety information is a set of facts 
that is competent to effect change in both technical and human factors. The channels of 
communication of the FSMS prototype rely on the four organisational principles as 
discussed in Appendix A. A special attention is given to the "Tenth Theorem" of 
Shannon as discussed elsewhere 81,82 . This theorem emphasises that the channel capacity 
must exceed its notional adequate bit-handling ability, to resolve ambiguities that may 
arise in passing the message because of 'noise' in the system. Noise is understood as 
mistaken information or data "in disguise" This has become the second principle of 
organisation of Beer (see appendix A). Data may be understood as a statement of fact. 
The channels of communication of the FSMS prototype are concerned with both the 
syntactic and the semantic aspects of inforination. According to the four organisational 
principles, the channels are concerned with flow of bits (in the computer sense) and the 
flow of variety, both of which are syntactic information flows. Variety is defined as the 
number of possible states of a system. The semantic aspects of the information 
transmitted by the channels are the entire variety of the fire safety information in the 
form of plans and reports. These aspects of communication are made explicit in the 
FSMS model, as described in chapter five. 
The 'Human Factors Paradigm'and Human Aspects of the FSMS Prototype 
Table 4.3 maps the 'human factors paradigm' of the FPM to the human aspects of the 
FSMS prototype. There is no single human factors paradigm as such. Fortune and 
Peters, for example, refer to many principles, studies, etc. which would be expected to 
be of value. With this caveat in mind one might think of a 'human factors paradigm' as 
generally stressing that having the technology in place is no guarantee of safety unless 
the human discipline required to follow prescribed procedures and good operating 
practices is understood. 
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Table 4.3 The 'Human Factors Paradigm' and the FSMS Prototype 
'Human Factors Paradigm' Human Aspects of the FSMS Prototype 
Organisational level e not explicit 
" safety culture paradigm 
Grouplevel * not explicit 
" anomic reactive paradigm 
" team cult paradigm 
" team primacy paradigm 
individual level not explicit 
As can be seen in Table 4.3, human factors are not dealt with explicitly in the FSMS 
prototype. The human aspects, such as decisions and activities, must be central in the 
FSMS prototype if the system is to be capable of operating effectively. Clearly, the 
developed FSMS prototype does not take into account explicitly human aspects, such as 
the values and beliefs and circumstances of the people who make decisions, 
communicate and accomplish activities. Human aspects in teams, groups, individual, 
inter-departmental links and intra-departmental links should be integrated into the final 
FSMS model. 
4.4.3 Improvements in the FSMS prototype 
The FSMS prototype described in section 4.3 is a conceptual model that is intended to 
maintain an acceptable fire risk in an oil and gas organisation's operations. A typical oil 
and gas offshore production platform has been used to construct the FSMS. The 
systemic approach taken to formulate the FSMS builds on the VSM proposed by 
Beer 81,82,83 ; the VSM has been described in some detail in chapter three. Vulnerabilities 
and strengths of the FSMS prototype have been investigated in order to develop further 
the FSMS. The Formal System Model (FSM), which has been described in chapter 
three, was mapped to the FSMS prototype. Major discrepancies between the FSM 
paradigms and the FSMS prototype were discussed in section 4.4.2. From these 
discrepancies, some feasible and desirable changes to the FSMS prototype are listed in 
Table 4.4 in order to construct a FSMS model. 
According to Table 4.4, the FSM suggests that the FSMS prototype requires a 
46 performance monitoring subsystem". However, the structural organisation of the FSMS 
prototype does not require a specific subsystem for monitoring its fire safety 
performance. The main reason is that, as discussed above, the fire safety performance 
monitoring is spread throughout the structural organisation of the FSMS prototype 
rather than localised into a specific subsystem. 
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Table 4.4 Summary of Improvements in the FSMS Prototype 
Failure Paradigm Method FSMS Prototype 
" formal system model (FSM) 0 performance monitoring subsystem not necessary 
0 consider next higher level of recursion 
" control paradigm * incorporate a fire safety measurement system 
" communication paradigm 0 no significant changes 
" "human factors paradigm" * make explicit the involvement and participation 
of individuals within teams, groups, departments, 
inter-departments that form an organisation 
* incorporate a fire safety reporting system into the 
FSMS structural organisation 
As described in section 4.3.2, a typical offshore production platfonn, as shown in Figure 
4.5, was used to construct the FSMS prototype. It seems that a desirable change to the 
structural organisation of the FSMS prototype could be to consider higher levels of 
recursion. This is, extend the structural organisation of the FSMS prototype to address 
other platfonns as well and, indeed, the whole oil and gas organisation, which operates 
not only offshore production facilities but also exploration, oil and gas treatment 
operations. 
It seems that there are no major discrepancies between the "control paradigm" and the 
regulatory system of the FSMS prototype, as illustrated in Table 4.2. However, the FSM 
requires the FSMS prototype to have a separate subsystem to monitor its fire safety 
performance. This is not a feasible change for the reasons exposed in the preceding 
paragraph. A system that can help to quantify the FSMS fire safety performance needs 
to be developed instead. This involves suggesting a system that may help to define fire 
safety levels, to develop fire safety plans and to measure the fire safety performance of 
the FSMS. 
As can be seen in Table 4.4, the communication model of the FSMS prototype does not 
require significant changes. Both the communication paradigm and the communication 
model of the FSMS prototype are based on the same principles. Table 4.3 shows the 
discrepancies between the 'human factors paradigm' and the human aspects of the 
FSMS prototype. The 'human factors paradigm' of the FPM has shed light on important 
aspects of human behaviour, either individually, within teams or groups, or within an 
organisation as a whole, to prevent possible failures. However, it must be emphasised 
that safety culture and human factors regarding safety have been a subject of a large 
amount of research and publication in the literature. Detailed aspects of safety and fire 
safety culture, and human factors are not dealt with here. 
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An important lesson that has been drawn from the 'human factors paradigm' of the 
FPM, is that people who manage and operate a system or organisation need to have an 
understanding about the interaction of the human, technological, structural organisation, 
and envirom-nental factors that determine the safety of the system or organisation as a 
whole. According to these, two major changes need to be made in the FSMS prototype 
regarding human aspects. First, there is a need to replace the emphasis on purely 
technical explanations of goal-directed systems. This means that the FSMS should not 
only enable the effectiveness and efficiency of people or machines to accomplish an 
external motive or objective, but enable the involvement and commitment of humans 
regarding their fire safety purposes. This has led on to the concepts of the Internally 
Committed systems (ICS) and Externally Committed Systems (ECS); described in 
greater detail in chapter 5, section 5.3.2. Second, another important lesson that has been 
learnt from the 'human factors paradigm' is that an organisation needs to take a positive 
attitude and encourage people to report their errors, near misses, or provide essential 
safety related information. A special subsystem that deals with special reports should be 
incorporated into the structural organisation of the FSMS. This subsystem needs to 
ensure confidentiality for the person doing the reporting (see chapter 5, section 5.3.3). 
A Fire Safety Management System (FSMS) model has been the result of all these 
changes. This model is presented in the synthesis stage of the inquiry process, as shown 
in Figure 4.8 and it is described in chapter five. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed fire safety in the context of oil and gas offshore platforms. It 
described the developed FSMS prototype for a typical oil and gas production platform. 
The chapter proceeded by describing a process used to identify strengths and 
vulnerabilities of the FSMS prototype. It continued by discussing the main discrepancies 
between the FSMS prototype and its counterpart of the FPM. Finally, the chapter 
discusses some major improvements that required to be accomplished in order to 
construct a FSMS model, which is the subject of chapter five. 
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ChaDter Five 
Synthesis: A Fire Safety 
Management System Model 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter one emphasised the need for a systemic approach to fire safety that may help 
organisations to manage fire safety more effectively. Chapters two and three have 
established the theoretical basis for constructing a robust FSMS model. Chapter four 
presented a prototypical FSMS, which was further developed as described in section 4.4 
of chapter four. The developed FSMS model is an intended to maintain fire risk within 
an acceptable region in an organisation's operations. This chapter presents an exposition 
of the FSMS model. Section 5.2 provides an overview of the FSMS model. A detailed 
description of the FSMS model is given in section 5.3. Section 5.4 describes a 
framework called 'fire safety configuration space', which is intended to help to 
characterise acceptable and unacceptable fire safety regions in which organisations can 
"navigate". Finally, section 5.5 summarises chapter five. 
5.2 Overview of the FSMS Model 
The approach taken to formulate the FSMS builds on the Viable System Model (VSM) 
and the Failure Paradigm Method (FPM), which were described in chapter 3, sections 
3.2 and 3.3 respectively. The VSM facilitated an understanding to help fonnulate the 
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structural organisation of the FSMS. The FPM, inter alia, provided some paradigms that 
helped to understand some human aspects. 
In essence, the FSMS is a systemic set of five inter-related subsystems, as shown in 
Figure 5.1. The FSMS needs to achieve five functions associated with systems I to 5. 
System 1, fire safety policy implementation, implements the organisation's fire safety 
policy. System 2, fire safety co-ordination, involves co-ordinating the various operations 
of system 1. System 3, fire safety functional, involves ensuring that the organisation's 
fire safety policy is implemented, as well as ensuring that the fire risk is maintained 
within an acceptable region. System 3 *, fire safety audit, conducts sporadic audits into 
the operations of system 1. System 4, fire safety development, is responsible for the 
future fire safety development for the whole organisation. System 4*, fire safety 
confidential reporting, deals with the confidential fire safety concerns of the 
organisation's employees. Finally, system 5, fire safety policy, is responsible for 
establishing fire safety policies for the whole organisation. 
The FSMS model developed and presented in this research project not only addresses 
both technical and human factors, but also immediate and latent factors. It proposes a 
system that is intended to measure an organisation's fire safety perforinance. These 
measures of fire safety performance provide decision makers with the means to define 
fire safety levels, plan fire safety, and measure fire safety perfonnance. Moreover, a fire 
safety configuration space has been devised to help to characterise acceptable and 
unacceptable regions of fire safety in which organisations can "navigate" (see section 
5.4). A detailed description of the FSMS is given in the next section. 
5.3 Description of the FSMS Model 
This section presents detailed aspects of the developed FSMS model. It begins by 
discussing the structural organisation of the FSMS model. It continues by describing the 
channels of communication and control of the FSMS model. The case of an oil and gas 
organisation has been used to describe the FSMS, though the model is general. 
5.3.1 Recursive FSMS Structural Organisation 
The FSMS needs to achieve five functions associated with systems 1 to 5. System I 
consists of various operations within an organisation that deal directly with the 
organisation's production activities. 
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Figure 5.1 A Fire Safety Management System Model 
A typical organisation's operations, for example, power generation, transport, oil and 
gas exploration, production, and treatment could form part of system 1, as shown in 
Figure 5.1. It should be noted that each operation performs five functions namely fire 
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safety policy, development, functional, co-ordination, and implementation. This means 
that the FSMS as a whole is replicated in each operation of system 1. Systems 2 to 5 
facilitate the function of system 1, as well as ensuring the continuous adaptation of the 
whole organisation. System 2, fire safety co-ordination, co-ordinates the activities of the 
operations of system 1. System 2 along with system 1 implements the fire safety plans 
received from system 3. It informs system 3 about routine information on the 
performance of the operations of system 1. To achieve system 3 plans and the needs of 
system 1, system 2 gathers and manages the fire safety information of the system I 
operations. System 3, fire safety functional, is not only responsible for maintaining an 
acceptable level of fire safety in system 1, but also ensures that system I implements the 
organisation's fire safety policy. It achieves its function on a day-to-day basis according 
to the fire safety plans received from system 4. Detailed aspects of fire safety plans are 
given below. System 3 requests from systems 1,2, and 3* information about the fire 
safety performance of system 1 to formulate its fire safety plans and to communicate 
future needs to system 4. It is also responsible for allocating the necessary resources to 
system I to accomplish the organisation's fire safety plans. System 3 *, fire safety audit, 
is part of system 3 and its function is to conduct audits sporadically into the operations 
of system 1. System 3* intervenes in the operations of system 1 according to the fire 
safety plans received from system 3. System 3 needs to ensure that the accountability 
reports received from system 1 reflect not only the current status of the system I 
operations, but are also aligned with the overall objectives of the organisation. The audit 
activities should be sporadic (i. e. unannounced) and they should be implemented under 
common agreement between system 3* and system 1. 
System 4, fire safety development, is concerned with fire safety research and 
development (R&D) for the continual adaptation of the organisation. By considering 
strengths, weaknesses, threats, and opportunities, system 4 can suggest changes to the 
organisation's fire safety policies. This function may be regarded as a part of effective 
fire safety planning. System 4 first deals with the fire safety policy received from system 
5. Second, it senses all relevant threats and opportunities from the wider physical and 
socio-economic infrastructure of the organisation, including the fire safety future 
environment. Third, system 4 deals with all relevant needs of system 1 performance, and 
its potential future. Finally, it deals with the confidential or special infori-nation 
communicated by system 4*. System 4*, fire safety confidential reporting, is part of 
system 4 and it is concerned with confidential reports or causes of concern that may 
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require the direct and immediate intervention of system 5. Finally, system 5, fire safety 
policy, is responsible for deliberating fire safety policies and to making normative 
decisions. According to alternative fire safety plans received from system 4, system 5 
considers and chooses feasible alternatives, which aim to maintain an acceptable level 
of fire safety throughout the organisation's operations. It also monitors the interaction of 
system 3 and system 4, as represented by the lines that connect the loop between 
systems 3 and 4 as shown in Figure 5.1. 
The FSMS and Its Environment 
The FSMS relies on five functional imperatives and the extent to which the FSMS 
structural organisation accommodates contextual constraints determines its ability to 
adapt. The organisational. structure of the FSMS is shown as interacting in a defined way 
with its environment through system I operations, and through system 4, as illustrated in 
Figure 5.1. Environment, both socio-economic and physical is understood as being those 
circumstances to which the FSMS response is necessary. The FSMS also needs to 
respond to necessary internal matters, e. g., inadequate training. System 4 deals with the 
FSMS's total or wider socio-economic and physical environment into which an 
organisation is embedded. The broken line elliptic symbol represents the FSMS total 
environment, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. System 4 deals also with the fire safety 'future 
envirom-nent', which is also embedded into the FSMS total envirom-nent. The fire safety 
future envirom-nent is concerned with threats and opportunities for the future 
development of fire safety. On the other hand, system 1 operations deal with local 
envirom-nents or institutionalised environments with which the organisation's operations 
must deal. These local environments are embedded into the total environment of the 
FSMS as illustrated in Figure 5.1. For example, organisations are embedded within a 
wider socio-economic and physical structure that will constrain the way they can 
develop. There are various important socio-economic and physical characteristics that 
need to be taken into account. These characteristics can be segregated thus; first physical 
characteristics, such as the geography of the area, for example the North Sea oil and gas 
fields, weather conditions and public utilities. Second, economic characteristics such as 
oil and gas markets, level of employment, other oil and gas operators and other types of 
industry and commerce, and finally, socio-political characteristics, such as regulators, 
and social organisations. The demands and needs inherent in these characteristics will 
suggest and condition patterns of structural organisation of the FSMS. Organisations 
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need to pay more attention not only to these characteristics, but also to the complexity, 
stability or uncertainty of changing technologies. 
Apart from confronting demands for its products, an organisation faces an environment 
upon which it is dependent for finance, work-force and materials, that is, for its 
resources. The organisation's total environment has a certain pattern of resource 
availability to which the organisation has to relate. The supply of resources to the 
organisation changes over time forcing it to make organisational adaptations. These 
adaptations may involve merging departments, changing the location of decision 
making, introducing new procedures, and so on. These changes may have significant 
impacts on the fire safety performance of the whole organisation. Similarly, local or 
institutionalised environments also are characterised by the socio-economic and physical 
characteristics of the organisation's total environment. These characteristics can be 
segregated into a) physical characteristics, for example a specific oil and gas production 
field, local weather conditions; b) economic characteristics, for example other oil and 
gas field operations, and c) socio-political characteristics, such as government 
regulations, for example, the safety case regulations. 
Whenever a line appears in the figure representing the FSMS model, it represents a 
channel of communication, except for the lines that connect the balancing loop that 
connects systems 4 and 3. The zigzag lines connecting the operations of system I 
indicate an inter-dependency, which may be strong or weak according to the degree of 
interdependence amongst the operations. There is a particular concern in the FSMS 
about the nature of these channels and the information which flows in the 
communication channels. These channels of communication obey four organisational 
principles. These organisational principles are understood as responding appropriately to 
the weaknesses and strengths, and threats and opportunities as presented in the wider 
and local environment of the FSMS; the channels of communication, and the necessary 
transducers translating infonnation when it crosses boundaries of systems must be 
designed according to the requirements of Ashby's law of requisite variet 2,83,84,152 ; and 
these principles must be put into effect without time-lags. The bi-directional arrows 
represented in the FSMS total environment indicate the interactions among the local 
environments, as well as the interaction of these local environments with the total 
environment. 
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Recursive Structure and Autonomy 
According to Beer 82 , in a recursive organisational structure any viable system contains, 
and is contained in a viable system. This means that the organisational structure of the 
FSMS for the organisation as a whole is replicated in each operation of system 1. That 
means that the FSMS model is intended to manage fire safety of an organisation in three 
levels of recursion, as shown in Figure 5.1 (The three levels should be seen in the 
context of Figure 4.2). The top right hand side broken line square box is the 
management unit of system I of the next higher level of recursion. The operations of 
system 1, on the other hand represent the FSMS for the level of recursion next below, 
depicted at 45 degrees in Figure 5.1. The FSMS for the organisation as a whole is 
replicated for every operation of system 1. 
Very little attention has been given by both academe and practitioners to understanding 
the appropriate degree of interdependence amongst the parts that constitute an 
organisation in order to design an effective SMS. In addition, the impact of the 
organisational structure on the effectiveness of the SMS, as well as on the subsystems of 
the SMS, is not well understood. The FSMS is organised in recursive levels, which may 
have a significant impact not only in designing a more effective FSMS, but also a SMS, 
including health, safety and environment. The FSMS for the whole organisation is 
replicated in each operation of system 1, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. The FSMS is 
intended to be able to maintain an acceptable level of fire safety at each level of 
recursion, but this fire safety achievement, at each level, is conditional on the 
cohesiveness of the whole organisation. The FSMS contains a structure that favours 
autonomy and the local fire safety problem-solving capacity. Autonomy means that each 
operation of system I of the FSMS is responsible for its own activity with minimal 
intervention of systems 2,3,4, and 5. The organisational structure of the FSMS allows 
decisions to be made at the local level. Decision making is distributed throughout the 
whole organisation. This means that distributed decision making involves a set of 
decision makers in each operation of system 1 and at each level of recursion. These 
decision makers should be autonomous in their own right and act independently based 
on their own understanding of fire safety and their specific tasks. However, it should be 
recognised that they have interdependence with other decision makers of other 
operations of system 1. Therefore, each operation of system I should be endowed with 
autonomy so that the organisational fire safety policy can be achieved more effectively. 
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These aspects of organisational structure, which have a role in making organisations 
more rather than less effective, are poorly understood in safety and fire safety literature. 
5.3.2 Communication and Control in the FSMS Model 
Pro-active Commitment to Fire Safety 
An organisation's safety approach can be reactive or pro-active and less or more 
committed to safety. Additionally, organisations may focus on technical aspects of 
incidents or accidents. For example, passive and active fire fighting systems have been 
developed with the purpose of controlling and mitigating fire incidents or accidents. 
However, the degree of safety in an organisation or system is an emergent property 
resulting from the interrelated activities of people who design it, manage it, and operate 
it. Humans, individually, in teams and in organisations decide the technical aspects. 
People who are involved in the product, service, or process life cycle, such as product 
and plant designers, constructors or manufacturers, operators or users and maintainers 
make decisions which effectively determine the risk. Furthermore, there is the need to 
look at the people responsible for designing and managing the organisation or system 
itself These factors, which are the potential, but not obvious or explicit causes of fire 
incidents or accidents, are known here as latentfactors. It is claimed elsewhere 152 that 
these common causal failures form part of an "incubation process" in a sequence of 
disaster development. Moreover, latent factors accumulate unnoticed until a 
precipitation event or trigger leads to the onset of the incident, accident or 
7,11,16,17,18,19 disaster 
Traditionally, organisations may not be aware of latent factors, but they look for 
immediate causes of fire incidents or accidents after they have taken place. Both 
academe and practitioners tend to divide them into separate objects and events. This 
division is, of course, useful and necessary to cope with risk, but is not a fundamental 
feature of a real fire safety situation. Immediate causes of fire incidents or accidents as 
readily observed or understood are known here as immediate factors. The "incubation" 
period of a "latent failure" before the immediate failure appears is known as the "latent 
period". It is contended here that all parts that constitute an organisation can be seen as 
interdependent and inseparable parts of the organisation as a whole. Moreover, these 
constituents are all interconnected, interrelated and interdependent in that they cannot be 
understood as isolated entities, but only as integrated parts of the organisation as a 
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whole. Fire loss is therefore seen as a systemic failure, not a result of a single cause. 
Clearly, addressing latent failures is as important as focusing on apparent failures of fire 
incidents or accidents. 
In addition to latent and immediate factors, the distinction between technical and human 
factors should be emphasised so that realistic fire safety objectives, plans and measures 
of performance can be set. This distinction should replace the emphasis on unique 
causes and isolated technical explanations of failure of systems. This will require 
knowledge about the degree to which the technical and human factors are committed to 
fire safety and linked together into a coherent whole. Moreover, the way in which they 
are implemented into a particular organisation's operations should be clearly 
understood. These two aspects are known here as Internally Committed Systems (ICS) 
and Externally Committed Systems (ECS). The distinction between these two aspects 
may be a source of insight into the ways fire safety can be approached, as well as the 
ways in which these two aspects differ from each other. Table 5.1 illustrates some 
characteristics of ICS and ECS. 
Table 5.1 Internally and Externally Committed Systems 
External Commitment Internal commitment 
Tasks in the organisation are defined by others Employees participate in defining tasks 
The behaviour required to perform tasks with an Employees participate in defining the 
acceptable degree of risk is defined by others behaviour required to perform tasks with 
an acceptable degree of risk 
Fire safety performance goals are defined by the Organisation's management and 
organisation management or others employees Jointly define fire safety 
performance goals 
Others define the importance of the fire safety Employees participate in defining the 
performance goals. importance of the goals 
ECS refers to the fire safety performance of systems that are committed to a particular 
purpose, function, or objective based on external reasons or motivation. This definition 
addresses both technical aspects and humans. For example, production installations are 
designed to accomplish a well-defined objective, whilst the production operations' 
procedures are formulated by process designers to be followed by production personnel. 
Here, the performance of production machines satisfy the purpose of product designers 
and the production personnel satisfy production process designer's purpose. 
Traditionally, organisations tend to address fire safety by seeking the direct or 
immediate causes of fire incidents or accidents after they have taken place. An inquiry 
or assessment process is conducted to determine the immediate causes so that the 
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existing understanding is adjusted to fit the newly gained understanding of fire safety. 
Goals for improvement are defined to address the newly found failure so that the same 
failure will not occur again. Moreover, very often it is assumed by organisations that the 
absence of incidents or accidents or other negative outcomes is an indication of good 
safety management. For example, some oil and gas organisations, like many others, use 
traditionally lost time injuries (LTI) and deaths as the basis to measure the effectiveness 
of their safety management. 
More recently, organisations have tended to address fire safety pro-actively, but they 
still tend to comply with external fire safety objectives, that is, existing regulations, 
standards or procedures. It is generally accepted that safety is better assessed and 
managed by addressing in advance the hazards of the organisation's operations. This is 
usually done through i) a systematic identification of hazards, ii) assessment of the 
significance of hazards, and iii) hazard management by prevention, control, and 
mitigation. However, organisations are often still only committed to complying with 
existing regulations, standards or procedures and this is basically reactive mentality. 
Only complying with externally imposed regulations or existing standards does not 
necessarily mean that an organisation's operations are 'acceptably safe'. Moreover, 
organisations still tend to focus on immediate factors and have very little understanding 
of latent factors and ICS. 
The idea of ECS may produce important insights into the ways fire safety can be 
addressed, but it is fundamentally incomplete. There is growing evidence that human 
factors have quite dramatic safety and fire safety consequences; this requires a 
fundamentally different approach. It seems that there is a substantial gap between fire 
safety objectives as defined by regulators, standards or procedures, or the organisation's 
management and what may be achieved in a real fire safety situation. It is necessary to 
introduce the idea of ICS. An ICS is a system that is committed to a particular purpose 
or objective based on its own reasons or motivation. In other words, an ICS refers to the 
critical awareness of self-reflective human beings regarding their purposes and the 
implications of their actions for all those who might be affected by the consequences. 
This means that all those involved in the life cycle of the organisation's operations 
should be committed to address fire safety pro-actively and anticipate fire incidents or 
accidents, motivated by their own objectives or purposes. This freedom to achieve fire 
safety objectives is, however, limited by the organisation's fire safety policy, plans, 
standards and procedures. Individuals, teams, groups, and departments that perforrn an 
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organisation's operations should not only be assigned tasks but they should have both 
authority and responsibility by their understanding of fire safety and their specific tasks. 
They should be endowed with authority in their daily tasks by their knowledge to 
perform their tasks properly and in an acceptable way with regard to risk. This 
knowledge involves their knowledge of fire safety itself and the skills required to 
perforrn a specific activity. In other words, individuals, teams, groups and departments 
that constitute an organisation should have more involvement with fire safety in their 
daily tasks. Top and line management should encourage the development of ICS. The 
more the organisation's management wants internal commitment from its employees, 
teams, and departments the more it must try to involve employees in defining fire safety 
objectives, specifying what these are and how to achieve them, and setting fire safety 
targets. There is no fire safety vision, strategy or policy that can be achieved without 
able and committed employees. However, it is unrealistic to expect the management of 
an organisation to allow total autonomy to employees. The degree to which internal 
commitment is plausible is certainly limited. 
Measuring Fire Safety Performance 
This section presents a systemic model that intends to provide a means to quantify an 
organisation's fire safety performance. This system is built on the measures of 
81,82,106 
performance proposed by Beer . It provides 
decision makers with a means to 
define fire safety levels, fire safety plans, and measure fire safety perfon-nance. This 
system consists of four levels of fire safety, four kinds of fire safety plans, and four 
kinds of fire safety indices, as illustrated in Figure 5.2. These measures of fire safety 
performance may be used as a comprehensive system to measure an organisation's fire 
safety performance for all types of resources throughout the organisation. Moreover, the 
measures of fire safety perfon-nance presented here not only contain both ECS and ICS, 
but also incorporate latent and immediate factors., as described below. 
Levels of Fire Safety Achievement 
Four different levels of fire risk can be specified to plan and measure an organisation's 
fire safety performance, as shown in Figure 5.2. The first, current, fire risk level is a 
continuous fluctuating value. The second, without extra investment, fire risk level is a 
relatively static value. On the other hand, the minor extra investment and the major extra 
investment fire risk levels are static values until the organisation's operations, or the 
organisation itself has structurally changed. It should be stressed that when defining 
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these fire risk levels, it is necessary to consider both ICS and ECS for immediate factors 
and latent factors. It should also be emphasised that immediate factors are directly 
related with fire risk, whilst latent factors do not directly relate to risk. A detailed 
description of these fire risk levels is given below. 
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5.2 Measures of Fire Safety Performance 
Current Achievement Level 
Current achievement level (CAL) is the fire risk level an organisation is managing now 
with existing resources and under existing constraints. CAL expresses the day-to-day 
fire risk level in the organisation's operations. It expresses a continuous fluctuating 
value of risk levels. The continuous variation of fire risk level requires organisations to 
have up-to-date fire safety information. If fire safety information is out of date, then the 
decision of the organisations may be irrelevant. Moreover, organisations need to manage 
fire safety continuously. 
Without Significant Extra Investment Level 
Without significant extra investment level (WEIL) of achievement can be defined as the 
fire risk level an organisation. could achieve, right now, with existing resources and 
under existing constraints, if resources and technology were better organised. This is a 
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fire risk level that an organisation is capable of achieving in each operation, given the 
limitations imposed on any operation or activity by other operations or activities of the 
organisation. The WEIL seems to reflect reality for the concerned organisation's 
operations or whole organisation, but may be restricted by some other parts of the 
organisation. Sometimes these restrictions may be called bottlenecks, and these 
bottlenecks may have to do with low operations capacities, or have to do with 
technological constraints. These considerations define two more levels of fire safety as 
described below. 
Minor Extra-Investment Level 
Minor extra investment level of achievement (MINEIL) can be defined as the fire risk 
level an organisation ought to be achieving, if a minor investment were made to 
eliminate some shortcomings in capacity or technology. This is a medium-term and 
relatively static level of achievement. 
Major Extra-Investment Level 
Major extra investment level of achievement (MAJEIL) can be defined as the fire safety 
level an organisation would be capable of achieving, if some major investment in new 
equipment, or new technology were made to eliminate current constraints. The MAJEIL 
is a long term and static level of achievement until the organisation's operations, or the 
organisation itself, has structurally changed. 
The MAJEIL and the MINEIL of fire risk levels are better than the WEIL, and the 
WEIL in turn is better than the current fire risk level. The fire safety performance of an 
organisation cannot rise to its desirable level without some kind of investment. It cannot 
even rise to the WEIL unless resources and technology are well organised. The current 
fire safety performance is a continuous fluctuating value, since it represents risk arising 
from the continuous activities of an organisation's operations. 
Fire Safety Plans 
Fire safety can be planned according to the four risk levels of achievement as described 
above. This planning process is illustrated in Figure 5.2. Planning is understood here as 
a continuous process of decision-taking, whereby resource allocations are made, so that 
the organisation's future fire safety perforinance may be better. Fire safety should be 
planned to address both ICS and ECS for apparent and latent factors. Four kinds of fire 
safety plans are identified as below. 
103 
Operative Planning 
Planning fire safety from the CAL is referred to here to as operative fire safety planning. 
In this kind of planning, there is no fire safety performance improvement or change, but 
it accepts the existing status of fire safety as it is in the organisation's operations. 
Programmatic Planning 
Planning fire safety from the WEIL is called here programmatic planning. This kind of 
planning sets new short term objectives for improving the fire safety performance and 
tries to achieve them. However, these objectives can be achieved without significant 
extra investment; that is, they can be achieved with essentially existing resources and 
under existing constraints. 
Strategic Planning 
Planning fire safety from the MINEIL is referred to here as strategic fire safety 
planning. It sets new medium-term objectives for fire safety performance improvement, 
but they can only be achieved with some minor investment to eliminate current 
constraints. 
Normative Planning 
Planning fire safety from the MAJEIL is termed normative planning. This planning 
process involves setting long-term fire safety objectives. To accomplish these fire safety 
objectives, organisations will need to commit major investment to develop new 
technologies, new equipment or processes. These plans may incur major economic 
risks, but also may offer major benefits for the organisation. 
Fire Safety Indices of Performance 
It can be seen from Figure 5.2 that the four levels of fire safety achievement are 
combined as three ratios to form short, medium and long term indices of achievement. 
Moreover, Figure 5.2 shows how these three indices are combined to create an overall 
fire safety performance index of the whole organisation. It should also be emphasised 
that these fire safety indices involve deriving indices for both ICS and ECS for apparent 
and latent factors. A detailed description of these indices is given as follows. 
Short-term Index of Achievement 
The ratio of the WEIL to the CAL is called short-term index of achievement (SIA). The 
SIA is a continual state of change index, since the CAL is understood as a fluctuating 
value and the WEIL, on the other hand, is a relatively steadier value. 
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Medium-term Index of Achievement 
The ratio of MINEIL to the WEIL is referred to as the medium-term index of 
achievement (MIA). The MIA requires minor investment. This is a relatively static 
index, since the minor fire safety performance level is a medium-term fire safety goal. 
Long-term Index of Achievement 
The ratio of the MAJEIL to the MINEIL is called long-term index of achievement (LIA). 
This index involves major investment. The MINEIL and the MAJEIL fire safety levels 
are static measures. The resulting index will also be relatively static. 
Fire Safety Performance Index 
The overall fire safety performance index (FSPI) of an organisation can be obtained by 
the ratio of the MAJEIL to the CAL, or by the product of the SIA, MIA, and LIA 
indices. It should be noted that the FSPI is determined by the CAL and the MAJEIL 
level, as being two extremes. This means that the WEIL and MINEIL are floating 
between them, so they can be changed without affecting the CAL or the MAJEIL. 
Example: 
I Totally unacceptable region 
MRA 
CAL 
WEIL 
MINEIL 
MAJEIL 
Indices of Achievement 
SIA = WEIL / CAL = 10-'/ 10-'= 0.1 
MIA= MINEIL / WEIL = 10-5 / 10-4 = 0.1 
LIA = MAJEIL / MINEIL= 
10-6 / 10-5 = (). I 
Fire Safety Performance Index 
FSPI = SIA x MIA x LIA = 0.1 x 0.1 x 0.1 = 0.001 = o. 1 
1X 10-3/y 
1X 10-3/y 
IX 10-4/y 
IX 10-51Y 
1X 10-6/y 
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5.3.3 The Structural Organisation and its Communication and Control 
It has long been known that an organisation's communication system has a significant 
impact on the organisation's performance. Also, it has been discussed elsewhere 12 that 
multiple distributed decision making is impossible without communication. Good 
decision making relies on well designed networks of 'real-time' information systems. 
Moreover, good communication systems may serve as a means of instilling and 
sustaining an organisation's safety culture. A typical problem associated with poor 
communication is lack of truSt77,78,79 , and trust within organisations 
is a continuous 
process 80 . 
An organisational structure needs to be in place to ensure that this process is 
sustained throughout the organisation's life cycle. Organisations that require constant 
attention to safety should be characterised by an effective structural organisation in 
order to have a strong safety culture. 
The structural organisation of the FSMS may help organisations to reduce problems 
associated with communication and control. As mentioned above, the FSMS model 
intends to address fire safety in an organisation in three levels of recursion, as shown in 
Figure 5.1. In this section, fire safety in an oil and gas organisation is used to describe in 
detail the structural organisation of the FSMS and its communication and control model. 
Figures 5.3,5.4 and 5.5 show three levels of recursion of the structural organisation of 
the FSMS. Figure 5.6 shows the channels of communication and control of the FSMS. 
System 1: Fire Safety Policy Implementation 
The function of system I is to implement a fire safety policy. System 1 contains a set of 
subsystems or operations that deal directly with an organisation's business activities. 
These various operations or subsystems of system 1 are also responsible for 
implementing the organisation's fire safety policy. The number of operations that fonn 
part of system 1 will depend on the specific organisation being modelled. In this 
particular case, for example, an oil and gas field of three subsystems or operations called 
1-BA, I-BB, and 1-BC, form part of system 1. A particular operation, for example, 1- 
BA operation, could be an integrated production, drilling, and accommodation platform. 
It should be noted that each operation performs five functions, namely fire safety policy, 
development, functional, co-ordination, and implementation. This means that the FSMS 
for the oil and gas production system is replicated in each operation of system 1. An 
FSMS for a specific oil and gas offshore installation is illustrated in Figure 5.4. 
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Each operation of system I has a degree of interdependence with the other operations, as 
represented by the zigzag lines illustrated in Figure 5.3. Oil and gas production 
processes are represented in the circles, as well as the accomplishment of the 
organisation's fire safety plans. Each operation of system I is responsible for its own 
activities. The square box represents the fire safety management unit for every offshore 
installation operation. This management unit includes, for example, the Offshore 
Installation Manager (OIN4), field unit manager, installation safety officers, maintenance 
superintendent. The sub-systems represented by the circles and the square boxes are 
surrounded by the local environment, which is represented by small ellipses embedded 
within a large ellipse, as shown in Figure 5.4. These local environments can be 
categorised by geographical area, for example, the North Sea itself and its weather 
conditions, other North Sea offshore oil and gas operators, market, materials and 
equipment suppliers, safety case regulations, and environmentalist organisations. 
System I must know not only the fire safety policies and plans of systems 2 to 5, but 
also its own fire safety commitment. Individuals, teams, groups, and departments that 
implement the organisation's fire safety policy and plans should have both authority and 
responsibility because of their understanding of fire safety and their specific tasks. They 
should be given authority in their day-to-day activities because of their knowledge of 
fire safety. This knowledge involves their understanding of fire safety itself and the 
skills required to perform a specific activity, communication, and decision making. 
Figure 5.6 illustrates the channels of communication and control of the FSMS for the oil 
and gas production system. System 1 is interrelated with system 2 and system 3 (3*). 
The main characteristics of these channels of communication and control are described 
below. 
System 1 to System 2 Channel 
According to fire safety plans received from system 2, the various offshore installation 
management units of system I inform system 2 about conflicting aspects among 
themselves. The fire safety perfon-nance of each offshore installation operation involves 
both externally and internally committed systems for apparent and latent factors. 
Externally Committed Systems 
Externally committed systems involve the performance of the physical offshore 
installations. This performance may include, for example, production processes, 
communication systems, such as telecommunication facilities, an increase in oil and gas 
ill 
production, oil and gas import and export changes, process changes, maintenance 
programmes, and emergency shutdown systems (ESD). 
Internally Committed Systems 
Internally committed systems involve the employees who perform the offshore 
installation operations or activities. They include for example, the 01M, maintenance 
superintendent, installation safety officer, maintenance personnel, drilling, construction, 
production, operations, and support. 
System 1 to System 3* Channel 
To comply with the fire safety plans received from system 3*, the various offshore 
installation operations of system 1 inform system 3* about their performance. System I 
operations should report their performance with both externally and internally 
committed systems for apparent and latent factors. 
Externally Committed Systems 
Each offshore installation operation of system I should respond to the system 3*'s 
inquiry about the state of fire safety performance for apparent and latent factors of the 
physical offshore installation. This performance should include, for example, oil and 
gas-water separation systems, gas compression system, emergency shutdown systems 
(ESD), well control systems, communication systems, such as telecommunication 
facilities, fire and gas detection systems, active fire protection systems, and passive fire 
protection. 
Internally Committed Systems 
The offshore installation operations of system I should inform system 3* about the state 
of the performance of the employees who perform the activities in the offshore 
installation operations. This includes for example, maintenance personnel, operations 
supervisors, safety officers, inspectors, as well as suppliers. 
System 1 to System 3 Channel 
All fire safety plans received from system 3 by system I aim to maintain the fire risk 
substantially below the MRA in the subsystems or operations. The offshore installation 
management units of system I are responsible for meeting these fire safety objectives, 
and for informing system 3 whether the plans are being accomplished or not. System I 
accountability to system 3 should cover both externally and internally committed 
systems for apparent and latent factors. 
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LE IX E ternally Committed Systems 
The responsibilities of the offshore management units of system 1 are threefold. First, 
they are responsible for the performance of their physical offshore installation. This 
includes for example the performance of oil and gas-water separation systems, gas 
compression system, emergency shutdown systems (ESD), well control systems, 
communication systems, such as telecommunication facilities, fire and gas detection 
systems, active fire protection systems, passive fire protection, and the temporary refuge 
(TR). Second, they inform system 3 whether the planned fire safety performance of the 
physical offshore installation is being achieved or not. Finally, they infonn system 4 of 
any fire safety issues of every offshore installation that arise in the offshore installation's 
local environment. 
Internally Committed Systems 
The offshore management units of system 1 should first be responsible for the 
performance of the employees who perform the activities in the offshore installations. 
This includes for example, maintenance personnel, production process personnel, safety 
officers, inspectors, as well as materials and equipment suppliers. Second, system 3 
should be informed of whether the planned performance associated with these 
employees is being achieved or not. Finally, system 4 should be informed about both 
apparent and latent factors concerned with employees, suppliers, personnel from other 
oil and gas production installations, that arise in every offshore installation local 
envirom-nent. 
System 1 to System 4* Channel 
All fire safety concerns of the various operations of system I should be communicated 
to the independent system 4*. System I confidential reports should be enabled to cover 
both externally and internally committed systems for apparent and latent factors. These 
confidential reports are shifted by system 3 to system 4*. 
Externally Committed Systems 
System I operations should communicate fire safety concerns regarding the 
performance of their physical offshore installations. This includes for example the 
perfon-nance of oil and gas-water separation systems, gas compression system, 
emergency shutdown systems (ESD), well control systems, communication systems, 
such as telecommunication facilities, fire and gas detection systems, active fire 
protection systems, passive fire protection, and the temporary refuge (TR). 
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Internally Committed Systems 
System I operations should also communicate fire safety concerns regarding the 
performance of the people who perform the activities in the offshore installations. This 
includes for example, maintenance personnel, production process personnel, safety 
officers, inspectors, as well as materials and equipment suppliers. 
System 2: Fire Safety Co-ordination 
The function of system 2 is to co-ordinate the activities needed to be implemented in the 
subsystems or operations of system 1, as illustrated in Figure 5.3. System 2 along with 
system I management units implements the programmatic fire safety plans received 
from system 3. System 2 is also in charge of developing operative fire safety plans and 
helps system I to implement them. Furthennore, it informs system 3 about routine 
information on the performance of the offshore installation operations. To accomplish 
the plans of system 3 and the needs of system 1, system 2 gathers and manages the fire 
safety information of the system I operations. 
To achieve its function, System 2 must know not only the commitment of system 1, 
externally and internally, and system 3 fire safety plans, but also its own fire safety 
commitment. Individuals, teams, groups, and departments that contribute to performing 
the function of system 2, should have both authority and responsibility because of their 
understanding of fire safety. They should be given authority in their day-to-day activities 
by virtue of their knowledge of fire safety. This knowledge involves their knowledge of 
fire safety itself and the skills required to perform co-ordinated activities, 
communication, and to make decisions. 
As illustrated in Figure 5.5, system 2 is interrelated with system 1 and system 3. The 
main characteristics of these channels of communication and control are described 
below. 
System 2 to System 1 Channel 
System 2, along with the various management units of system 1, develops, 
communicates, and co-ordinates the activities required to implement the fire safety plans 
received from system 3. These activities should cover both externally and internally 
committed systems for apparent and latent factors. 
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Externally Committed Systems 
System 2 along with system I develops, communicates and co-ordinates the activities 
required to implement not only the fire safety plans for the physical offshore 
installations, but also oil and gas production plans. This includes for example, oil and 
gas production schedule, maintenance schedules, process changes, procedures for 
implementing a modification, and fire safety systems maintenance schedules. 
Internally Committed Systems 
System 2 and system I management units also develop, communicate and co-ordinate 
the activities required to implement the fire safety plans, received from system 3, for the 
offshore installation's employees. This should include the employees of every offshore 
installation operation. An example of such a fire safety plan could be the setting up of 
safety training programmes and schedules. 
System 2 to System 3 Channel 
System 2 complies with the fire safety plans received from system 3 by informing 
system 3 about all conflicting aspects arising from the activities of the operations of 
system 1. Routine information about the performance of all offshore installation 
operations should always be available from system 2. This information should involve 
both internally and externally committed systems for apparent and latent factors, as 
follows. 
Externally Committed Systems 
System 2 should inform system 3, according to system 3 plans, about all possible 
conflicting aspects among the various physical offshore installations of system 1. This 
includes, for example, conflicting aspects of exporting and importing of oil and gas 
from one operation to another operation of system 1. An example of this could be risers, 
gas and oil pipe lines that connect the system 1 operations. 
Internally Committed Systems 
System 2 should also inform system 3 about all possible conflicting aspects directly 
associated with the employees of the various offshore installation operations of system 
1. An example of a conflicting aspect could be the lack of fire safety training, conditions 
of employment, or communication failures that may compromise the safety amongst the 
offshore installation operations of system 1. 
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System 3*: Fire Safety Audit 
The function of system 3* is to conduct audits sporadically into the offshore installation 
operations of system 1. System 3* intervenes in the offshore installation operations of 
system 1 according to the fire safety plans received from system 3. System 3 needs to 
ensure that the accountability reports received from system 1 reflect not only the current 
status of the system I subsystems, but are also aligned with the overall objectives of the 
organisation. The audit activities should be sporadic. They may be less effective if they 
are conducted regularly or if they are anticipated. Audit activities should not be 
conducted too frequently or they may undermine the authority and trust of the 
management units of system 1. Therefore, they should be implemented under common 
agreement between system 3* and the management units of system 1. 
System 3* must know the offshore installation operation's perfon-nance and the system 
3 fire safety plans, as well as its own fire safety commitment. Therefore, individuals, 
teams, groups, and departments within system 3* should have both authority and 
responsibility by virtue of their understanding of fire safety. They should have authority 
in their activities by their knowledge of fire safety auditing. This knowledge involves 
that of fire safety itself and the skills required to perform effectively a specific audit 
activity, communication, and decision making. 
As illustrated in Figure 5.5, system 3* is interrelated with systems 1 and 3. The main 
characteristics of these channels of communication and control are described below. 
System 3* to System 1 Channel 
System 3* identifies and inhibits the performance that does not conform with the 
planned fire safety objectives for the offshore installation's operations. It conducts its 
activities according to the fire safety plans received from system 3. System 3* should 
cover both externally and internally committed systems for apparent and latent factors. 
Externally Committed Systems 
System 3* should be able to identify and inhibit all possible performances that do not 
confonn with the planned fire safety objectives for the physical offshore installations of 
system 1. This includes, for example, the state of oil and gas-water separation systems, 
gas compression systems, communication systems, such as telecommunication facilities, 
emergency shutdown systems (ESD), well control systems, communication systems, 
such as telecommunication facilities, fire and gas detection systems, active fire 
protection systems, and passive fire protection. 
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Internall Committed Systems y 
System 3* should also identify and inhibit all possible perfon-nances that do not agree 
with the planned fire safety objective associated with the offshore installation 
operation's employees. This includes for example, maintenance personnel, production 
and construction personnel, safety officer, inspectors, as well as suppliers. 
System 3* to System 3 Channel 
According to the fire safety plans received from system 3, system 3* informs system 3 
about all possible perfon-nances that do not agree with the planned fire safety objectives 
for system 1. This report should include both internally and externally committed 
systems for apparent and latent factors, as follows. 
Externally Committed Systems 
System 3* informs system 3 about all performances that do not conform with the 
planned fire safety objectives for the physical offshore installations of system 1. This 
should include, for example, the state of oil and gas-water separation systems, gas 
compression systems, communications systems, such as telecommunication facilities, 
emergency shutdown systems (ESD), well control systems, fire and gas detection 
systems, active fire protection systems, passive fire protection. 
Internall Committed Systems y 
System 3* should also inform system 3 about the performance that does not meet the 
planned fire safety objectives associated with the system 1 operations' work-force. It 
should be emphasised that this should include all activities and the employees 
themselves. For example, maintenance personnel, production processes personnel, 
safety officers, inspectors, as well as suppliers' performances should be audited. 
System 3: Fire Safety Functional 
System 3 is responsible for sustaining fire safety within an acceptable range in the 
subsystems or offshore installation operations of system 1. It achieves its function on a 
day-to-day basis according to its own plans and the strategic and normative fire safety 
plans received from system 4. The purpose of these plans is to anticipate and act 
proactively to maintain fire risk arising from the offshore installation operations of 
system I well below the MRA. System 3 requests from systems 1,2, and 3* infon-nation 
directly related and not directly related to the fire safety performance of system I to 
formulate its programmatic fire safety plans. These plans are then communicated to 
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systems 1,2, and 3*. it is also responsible for allocating the necessary resources to 
system I to accomplish its fire safety plans. 
System 3 has to know the performance of system 1 and the fire safety plans of system 4, 
as well as its own fire safety commitment to achieve its function. Individuals, teams, 
groups, and divisions that integrate to form system 3 should have both authority and 
responsibility because of their understanding of fire safety and their specific tasks. They 
should have authority in their day-to-day activities because of the knowledge of their 
specific activity and commitment to fire safety. This knowledge involves their 
knowledge of fire safety itself and the skills required to perform a specific activity, 
communication, and decision making. 
As illustrated in Figure 5.5, system 3 has a direct relationship with its sub-system 3*, 
system 2, system 1, and system 4. The main characteristics of these channels of 
communication and control are given below. 
System 3 to System 3* Channel 
To comply with the fire safety plans of system 4, system 3 should communicate its fire 
safety plans to enable system 3* to conduct fire safety audits into the offshore 
installation operations of system 1. System 3 fire safety audit plans should address both 
externally and internally committed systems for apparent and latent factors. 
Externally Committed Systems 
System 3 should communicate to system 3* its fire safety plans to enable system 3* to 
conduct audits to know the current state of the physical offshore installations that 
integrate to form system 1. This includes, for example, the state of oil and gas-water 
separation systems, gas compression systems, emergency shutdown systems (ESD), well 
control systems, communication systems, fire and gas detection systems, active fire 
protection systems, and passive fire protection. 
Internally Committed Systems 
System 3 also communicates its fire safety plans to system 3* to enable it to conduct fire 
safety audits to know the current state of the knowledge of specific tasks and the 
commitment to fire safety of system I employees. This may include, for example, the 
employees' fire safety culture, competence, etc. 
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System 3 to System 2 Channel 
System 3 requires system 2 to gather performance infon-nation from system I to set new 
plans, or communicate to system 4 about system I needs. It should be emphasised that 
the information gathered by system 2 is mainly concerned with routine infon-nation 
about the fire safety directly related and not directly related performances of the offshore 
installation operations of system 1. This routine information should include both 
internally and externally committed systems for apparent and latent factors. 
Externally Committed Systems 
System 3 requests from system 2 critical information that may compromise the fire 
safety of the physical offshore installations of system 1. This includes, for example, oil 
and gas pipeline systems, communication systems amongst the offshore installations, 
production process systems, fire fighting systems, fire and gas detection systems, etc. 
Internally Committed Systems 
Apart from the physical aspects of the offshore installations, system 3 requests from 
system 2 information related to each offshore installation's employees that may 
compromise the safety of the offshore installation operations. This should include, for 
example, the offshore installation operation's employees' decisions and their 
interactions with employees in other offshore installations. 
System 3 to System I Channel 
To accomplish the organisation's fire safety policy, system 3 communicates this policy 
as programmatic fire safety plans to system 1. System 3 should allocate the necessary 
resources to system I in order to implement its plans. This channel of communication 
and control should include both externally and internally motivated systems for apparent 
and latent factors. 
Externally Committed Systems 
System 3 should communicate the programmatic fire safety plans to system 1 to 
maintain an acceptable level of fire safety in the physical offshore Installations. It also 
needs to allocate the necessary resources for the implementation of these plans. For 
example, these plans should address both the facilities of the production processes and 
the fire fighting systems. 
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Internally Committed Systems 
Programmatic fire safety plans directed to maintain an acceptable level of fire risk 
concerning human aspects have to be communicated by system 3. System 3 also will 
have to allocate resources to accomplish these plans. For example, these plans should 
address those individuals dedicated to both the production processes and to fire safety. 
System 3 to System 4 Channel 
According to system 4 fire safety plans and the information received from systems 1,2, 
and 3*, system 3 informs system 4 about the needs of system 1. This might be, for 
example, possible fire safety implications of process changes, or any need that requires 
new technology development. System 3 should communicate to system 4 the needs of 
system I in terms of internally and externally committed systems for apparent and latent 
factors. 
Externally Committed Systems 
System 3 communicates the needs of the physical offshore installations of system 1 so 
that system 4 can satisfy them. These needs may imply the development of new 
technologies, reassessment of process changes, new development of means of escape, 
development of fire safety models, etc. 
Internally Committed Systems 
All human aspects that need to be addressed will have to be communicated by system 3. 
This may include, for example, the development of new fire safety training aspects. 
System 3 to System 4* Channel 
Additionally, system 3 deals with special information flowing through the special 
channel, from system I to system 4*. System 3 must establish criteria to ensure that the 
confidentiality of ascending special reports from system 1 to system 4*, is maintained. 
System 3 shifts confidential reports, from system I to system 4* by including both 
internally and externally committed systems for both apparent and latent factors. 
Externally Committed Systems 
System 3 should establish criteria that ensure the confidentiality of the reports related to 
the physical offshore installation. System 3 must shift these confidential reports into 
system 4* so that system 4* can assess these reports and communicate them to system 4. 
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Internally Committed Systems 
System 3 should also establish criteria to maintain the confidentiality and shift special 
reports that deal with human aspects in the operations of system 1. 
System 4*: Fire Safety Confidential Reporting 
The function of system 4* is concerned with confidential reports from system I or 
causes of concern that may or may not require direct and immediate intervention of 
system 5 into system 1. System 4* enables system 1 to report any cause of concern to 
system 4* in absolute confidentiality. These reports would be expected to be less 
effective if they are not conducted on a confidential basis. System 4* is part of system 4, 
but it must be as independent as possible in order to achieve its function effectively; it 
would be desirable for 4* to be outside the organisation altogether. 
System 4* must know the operations of system 1 performance and the system 4 fire 
safety plans, as well as its own confidential reporting commitment. Individuals, teams, 
groups, and departments within system 4* should have both authority and responsibility 
because of their understanding of confidential reporting. They should have authority in 
their activities by their knowledge of confidentiality; this knowledge involves fire safety 
itself and the skills required to perform effectively a specific confidential report 
assessment. 
As illustrated in Figure 5.3, system 4* is interrelated with system 1, through system 3, 
and system 4. These channels of communication have the characteristics below. 
System 4* to System I Channel 
System 4* should provide the necessary means to enable the operations of system 1 to 
report any cause of concern by guaranteeing total confidentiality to the report and 
reporter. System 4* activities should include the gathering of confidential information 
related to both externally and internally committed systems for apparent and latent 
factors. 
Externally Committed Systems 
System 4* should gather all possible infortnation related to the fire safety performance 
of the physical offshore installations of system 1. This includes for example, the fire 
safety concern of the oil and gas-water separation systems, gas compression systems, 
communication systems, such as telecommunication facilities, emergency shutdown 
systems (ESD), well control systems, communication systems, such as 
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telecommunication facilities, fire and gas detection systems, active fire protection 
systems, and passive fire protection. 
Internally Committed Systems 
System 4* should also gather all possible information related to the fire safety 
perfon-nance of the employees of the offshore installation operation. This includes, for 
example, maintenance personnel, production and construction personnel, safety officers, 
inspectors, as well as suppliers. 
System 4* to System 3 Channel 
System 4* in agreement with system 3 develops criteria to ensure the confidentiality of 
special reports communicated from system I operations. System 4* requests system 3 to 
shift confidential reports, which should include both internally and externally committed 
systems for apparent and latent factors, as follows. 
Externally Committed Systems 
System 4* should request system 3 to facilitate system 1 to report all fire safety concerns 
related to the physical offshore installations. This should include, for example, the fire 
safety performance, the oil and gas-water separation systems, gas compression systems, 
communications systems, emergency shutdown systems (ESD), well control systems, 
fire and gas detection systems, active fire protection systems, passive fire protection. 
Internally Committed Systems 
System 4* should also request system 3 to facilitate system I to communicate all fire 
safety concerns associated with the system 1 operations' work-force. For example, 
maintenance personnel, production processes' personnel, safety officers, inspectors, as 
well as suppliers' performances should be addressed. 
System 4* to System 4 Channel 
System 4* communicates the results of the assessment of the confidential reports 
received from system 1. These results must be communicated whilst preserving the 
confidentiality of the reports. These recommendations should include both internally 
and externally committed systems for both apparent and latent factors. 
Externally Committed Systems 
System 4* should communicate to system 4 the results of the assessment of the 
confidential reports related to the physical installations of the operations of system 1. 
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Internally Committed Systems 
System 4* should also communicate to system 4 the results of the assessment of the 
confidential reports related to the people involved in the activities of the operations of 
system 1. 
System 4: Fire Safety Development 
Systems 1,2, and 3 are dedicated to the process of sustaining an acceptable fire risk in 
the various offshore installation operations that integrate to form system I on a day-to- 
day basis. They adjust the fire safety performance of the offshore installation operations 
within an accepted framework and under established key fire safety performance 
variables. Nevertheless, the successful functioning of systems 1,2, and 3 depends on the 
appropriate fire safety plans, strategic and normative, as developed by system 4. The 
FSMS for the oil and gas production system has a function concerned with research and 
development (R&D). 
The function of system 4 is concerned with fire safety development. This function may 
be regarded as a part of effective oil and gas offshore production fire safety planning. 
System 4 achieves its function according to the fire safety policy of system 5. This 
means the ability of the FSMS to maintain an acceptable level of fire safety in the oil 
and gas production system. System 4 deals with strengths and weaknesses, opportunities 
and threats to the whole oil and gas offshore production system, as shown in Figure 5.3. 
System 4 should sense and respond appropriately to the various threats and 
opportunities identified in the oil and gas production system's total environment. There 
are two main fire safety issues which system 4 has to deal with regarding the total 
environment. First, the large broken line elliptic symbol represents the environment of 
the oil and gas production system, which also includes the collection of system I local 
environments. The total environment is characterised by the physical and socio- 
economic infrastructure into which an oil and gas offshore production system is 
embedded. There are various important characteristics that system 4 needs to consider 
from this infrastructure. This infrastructure can be segregated into physical, economic, 
and socio-political characteristics. Physical characteristics may be, for example, a 
specific oil and gas field in the North Sea or Gulf of Mexico, and weather conditions. 
Economic characteristics may include, for example, the North Sea oil and gas operators' 
market, other oil and gas operators, suppliers and contractors. Finally, socio-political 
characteristics may include, for example, regulations such as the Safety Case 
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Regulations, and environmental organisations. System 4 needs to pay attention not only 
to these characteristics, but also to changing technologies. 
Second, system 4 should deal with the fire safety 'future environment'. The fire safety 
future environment is concerned with threats and opportunities for future development 
affecting fire safety that may be relevant for the oil and gas production offshore system. 
Therefore, the FSMS deals not only with current fire safety problems, but also 
anticipates or prevents possible fire related accidents. All relevant needs or requirements 
of the organisation's environment are dealt with in system 4 and communicated to 
system 5. System 4 also deals with current system 1 needs and its potential future 
requirements as reflected in the system I local environments. System 3 communicates to 
system 4 all relevant needs of the existing performance of system I operations. 
Furthermore, system 3 should make clear the difficulties with which the existing 
performance of system I will be faced in trying to assimilate new fire safety 
developments that do not conform to the existing fire safety technology and the 
established fire safety culture. Finally, System 4 communicates confidential information, 
received from system 4*, to system 5. This information may require system 5 to 
intervene directly into system I operations. 
In summary, system 4 first deals with the fire safety policy received from system 5. 
Second, it senses all relevant threats and opportunities from the total FSMS 
environment, including the fire safety future environment. Third, system 4 deals with all 
relevant needs of system I perfon-nance, and its potential future. Finally, it deals with 
the 'alarming' or special fire safety inforination communicated by system 4*. It has long 
been known that complex systems, such as an oil and gas organisation, may become 
disordered and disorganised 153 with time. System 4 activities are vital to the prevention 
or anticipation of these retrograde changes. 
System 4 must understand the fire safety commitments of systems 1,2,3,4* and 5, as 
well as its own commitment to fire safety. Individuals, teams, groups, and departments 
within system 4 should have both authority and responsibility because of their 
understanding of fire safety and their specific activities. They should be given authority 
in their day-to-day activities by their knowledge of fire safety and its future potential. 
This knowledge involves their knowledge of fire safety itself and the skills required to 
develop new technology, communication and decision making. It has been discussed 
elsewhere 154 , for example, that 
fire safety models in a decision-making process must 
have the potential to assist decision makers in gaining a better understanding of a fire 
124 
situation. Moreover, fire safety models should be employed in a responsible and 
acceptable way, and decision makers must be knowledgeable about the models and fire 
behaviour. 
As illustrated in Figure 5.3, system 4 interacts with the total environment, system 4*, 
system 5, and system 3. The main characteristics of these channels of communication 
and control are described below. 
Fire Safety Production Environment to System 4 Channel 
System 4 deals with both the fire safety production environment and the fire safety 
future of the oil and gas production system. It senses all possible threats and 
opportunities arising from these two environments and communicates them to system 5. 
System 4 should address both internally and externally committed systems for apparent 
and latent factors in this channel of communication and control. 
Externally Committed Systems 
According to the organisation's fire safety policy received from system 5, system 4 
identifies threats and opportunities regarding the physical oil and gas offshore 
production system. For example, system 4 should identify current and possible new 
regulations, such as the Safety Case regulations. It should understand the trends in new 
technology regarding the design of offshore platforms. This new technology may 
include an inherently safer design, which addresses fire safety in an early design phase 
of an offshore platform. 
Internally Committed Systems 
System 4 should also identify threats and opportunities regarding the employees of the 
whole oil and gas production system to satisfy the organisation's fire safety policy. 
Ergonomics in the offshore installation platforrn design, regulations related to human 
aspects, liability, insurance, contractors and suppliers may be some factors that need to 
be addressed in this channel of communication. 
System 4 to Fire Safety Production Environment Channel 
System 4 responds not only proactively to the threats and opportunities presented by the 
total oil and gas production system environment, but also has to influence its 
environment by attempting to allow for both foreseen and unforeseen threats and 
opportunities. By doing so, system 4 should include both internally and externally 
committed systems for apparent and latent factors. 
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E-vernally Committed Systems 
To accomplish the organisation's fire safety policy, system 4 should respond proactively 
to the threats and opportunities regarding the physical oil and gas offshore production 
system. This may include the design or redesign of offshore platforms through 
inherently safer design principles, life cycle engineering principles, or by designing an 
effective fire safety management at the very earliest phase of the design process. 
Internally Committed Systems 
System 4 should respond proactively to the identified threats and opportunities 
regarding the employees of the whole oil and gas production system. This could include, 
for example, the continuous improvement of the organisation's safety culture, such as 
on- or off- site fire safety training. 
System 4 to System 5 Channel 
According to the fire safety policies of system 5, system 4 presents to system 5 the 
strategic and normative fire safety plans that characterise strengths and weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats to the organisation. These fire safety plans are then deliberated 
by system 5. According to system 4* recommendations, system 4 also presents to 
system 5 special fire safety plans that may need a direct intervention of system 5 into 
system 1. System 4 should take into consideration both internally and externally 
committed systems for apparent and latent factors when developing fire safety plans. 
Externally Committed Systems 
System 4 communicates strengths, weaknesses, threats, and opportunities to system 5 
regarding the physical oil and gas production system. System 4 could, for example, 
communicate to system 5 whether the fire safety policy has been achieved or not and 
whether this policy responded to or complied with the identified needs and requirements 
of the organisation's environment. 
Internally Committed Systems 
System 4 communicates to system 5 the strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities 
regarding the employees of the whole oil and gas production system. System 4 could, 
for example, communicate to system 5 whether the fire safety culture policy has been 
achieved or not and whether this policy responded to needs identified in the 
organisation's environment. 
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System 4 to System 4* Channel 
System 4 communicates to system 4* the organisation's commitment to the 
confidentiality of the special reports received from system 4*. This commitment should 
include both internally and externally committed systems for apparent and latent factors. 
Externally Committed Systems 
System 4 should communicate to system 4* the organisation's commitment to deal with 
confidential information related to physical installations of system I operations. 
Internally Committed Systems 
System 4 also should communicate to system 4* the organisation's commitment to deal 
with confidential information related to people who carry out system I operations' 
activities. 
System 4 to System 3 Channel 
System 4 communicates the fire safety policy received from system 5 to system 3. This 
elucidates future fire safety prospects, which the whole oil and gas production system is 
expected to confront. Moreover, system 4 should elucidate the threats and opportunities 
which it considers that the whole FSMS will face. This fire safety policy should address 
both internally and externally committed systems for apparent and latent factors, as 
follows. 
Externally Committed Systems 
System 4 communicates the fire safety policy to system 3 which will elucidate future 
fire safety prospects that the physical oil and gas production system is expected to 
confront. This fire safety policy should particularly elucidate future prospects about the 
strengths, weaknesses, threats, and opportunities about the existing fire safety 
performance, which involve both apparent and latent factors of the oil and gas 
production system. 
Internally Committed Systems 
System 4 also communicates the fire safety policy to system 3 that will elucidate future 
prospects that the employees of the oil and gas production system are expected to 
confront. Furthermore,, the organisation's fire safety policy should elucidate future 
prospects concerning the strengths, weaknesses, threats, and opportunities, which it 
considers that the existing employees will have to face. 
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System 5: Fire Safety Policy 
The function of system 5 is to deliberate fire safety policies and to make normative 
decisions. According to alternative fire safety plans, strategic, normative and special, 
received from system 4, system 5 deliberates and chooses feasible alternatives, which 
aim to sustain the viability of the whole oil and gas offshore production system. The 
purpose of these fire safety policies is to maintain an acceptable level of fire safety in 
the whole oil and gas production system. Furthermore, these fire safety policies reflect 
the fire safety values and beliefs of the whole oil and gas production system. System 5 
also monitors the interaction, as depicted by the balancing loop connecting systems 4 
and 3 shown in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.6. 
The people involved in system 5 must know not only the fire safety commitment of the 
people involved in systems 1,2,3 and 4, but also their own fire safety commitment. 
Therefore, individuals, teams, groups, and departments within system 5 should have 
both authority and responsibility because of their understanding of fire safety culture. 
They should be given authority in their day-to-day activities by their knowledge of fire 
safety. This knowledge involves their knowledge of fire safety itself and the skills 
required to deliberate policies, communicate effectively, and to make decisions 
regarding internally and externally committed systems for apparent and latent factors. 
Externally Committed Systems 
The fire safety policies that are considered and decided by system 5 for implementation 
should address the anticipation of fire accidents in physical oil and gas offshore 
production installations. These policies should also address principles of fire protection 
in the existing or new offshore oil and gas production systems. 
Internally Committed Systems 
The fire safety policies deliberated and decided by system 5 for implementation should 
reflect the needs of the employees of the whole offshore oil and gas production system 
about directly related and not directly related fire safety issues. It should also promote 
fire safety culture throughout the organisation. 
The FSMS presented in this section is intended to help an organisation to manage fire 
safety in a coherent way. This means the various operations of the organisation can be 
treated as both vertically and horizontally interdependent. For example, a typical oil and 
gas company consists of exploration, production, and oil and gas treatment divisions, 
and these in turn consist of more specific operations and departments. As can be seen 
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from Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.6, the various operations of system I are viable systems 
themselves; they consist of five subsystems labelled as systems I to 5. The organisation 
being focused on is an operational element of system I of a next higher level of 
recursion. For example, as can be seen in Figure 5.4, the FSMS for an oil and gas 
production sub-system is an operational element of system I of the FSMS for the oil and 
gas organisation as a whole. Similarly, the level of recursion next below can be 
modelled. Figure 5.5 depicts an FSMS for an oil and gas offshore installation that is 
embedded in the FSMS for oil and gas production offshore. 
The various operations of system 1, subsystems 1A, IB and IC, as illustrated in Figure 
5.3 and Figure 5.6, are horizontally interrelated. These operations are integrated and 
guided by systems 2 to 5. The interrelationship amongst the operations of system I may 
be strong or weak. However, the operations of system I should be given as much 
autonomy as possible in order to achieve fire safety policies more effectively. Systems 2 
to 5 will intervene in system 1 operations only to ensure the achievement of the 
organisation's fire safety policies. 
Fire safety commitment and responsibilities are distributed throughout the whole 
organisation. System 5, fire safety policy, is committed and responsible for establishing 
fire safety policies for the whole organisation. System 5 is aided by system 4, which is 
responsible for fire safety development. System 4, considering strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats, suggests changes to the existing fire safety policies. It should 
be emphasised again that the operations of system I should possess as much autonomy 
as possible in order to implement fire safety policies more effectively. Fire safety 
commitment should be emphasised at the operations of system 1, so that systems 2 to 5 
can concentrate on their own functions. Fire safety information flow is also emphasised 
in the FSMS for more effective fire safety planning. Finally, the FSMS incorporates a 
system which may facilitate the measurement of the organisation's fire safety 
performance. This fire safety measurement system consists of four kinds of fire safety 
achievement levels, four kinds of fire safety plans, and four kinds of fire safety 
achievement indices. 
5.4 A Fire Safety Configuration Space 
Figure 5.7 shows a framework called a 'fire safety configuration space' onto which 
organisations can be mapped to describe their safety performance. It suggests two 
regions, namely acceptable and unacceptable regions. The dividing line between these 
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two regions is at the level of the Maximum Risk Acceptable (MRA). However, to be 
below the MRA, whilst nominally 'acceptable', would not be regarded as 'very 
acceptable'. An organisation should aim to be well below the MRA. The totally 
unacceptable region is characterised by those organisations or individuals that have very 
poor fire safety perforinance; this is a region of high vulnerability to fire incidents or 
accidents. ECS can be said to be typical systems that pertain to this region. To locate an 
organisation in the configuration space, it should be possible to identify a group of 
situations, for example, at A, specifying in each case the parameters which locate A in 
the space. If these parameters can be gathered, then one should be able to devise a 
measure of perfon-nance in A. Looking at it as a whole, the organisation has a very poor 
fire safety performance at A in the fire safety configuration space, as illustrated in 
Figure 5.7. Organisations located in this region may be said to be highly "vulnerable" to 
fire incidents. The acceptable region in contrast suggests that individuals, organisations 
or systems located in this region are very committed to fire safety and address fire safety 
pro-actively. To move to and remain in the acceptable region, organisations must take 
into consideration the ICS and ECS for both immediate and latent factors. Furthen-nore, 
they will need to adopt a systemic approach to manage their fire safety, as well as a 
systemic approach to quantify their fire safety performance as discussed in sections 
5.3.2 and 5.3.3. 
MRA 
Figure 5.7 A Fire Safety Configuration Space 
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As an example, an organisation's state or situation at A can be understood as a set of 
parameters or variables that will need to be improved. According to Figure 5.7, the 
organisation's state at A must be changed to state B, which is defined as a less 
unacceptable state. It can hardly be said to be a very acceptable state, because its fire 
safety performance is still very poor. Then the organisation might move to states C and 
D. An organisation's fire safety performance could probably not be improved 
dramatically from one instant to another. As can be seen in Figure 5.7, organisations can 
reach an acceptable fire safety performance by state D. Organisations should aim to 
66navigate" 7 well below the MRA in the configuration space. 
155 The fire safety configuration space might be thought of in terrns of Fuzzy Set Theory 
This is because, e. g., whilst the state B is in the 'acceptable' region, it is not 'very 
acceptable'. One might envisage a graph of the kind in Figure 5.8, which shows a 
membership function, Vt, for the set of 'Acceptable Risk Levels'. This indicates a 
possible area of further research. 
1.0 
-0 
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0 
Figure 5.8 Representation of the Configuration Space in terms of ýt and risk 
level 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the developed FSMS model. It began by giving an overview 
of the FSMS model. Then it continued by describing in detail the main aspects, such as 
the recursive structural organisation, the structure and its enviromnent, and the 
communication and control aspects of the FSMS model. Then it proceeded by 
describing a space called the 'fire safety configuration space' that is intended to help 
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organisations to map their fire safety performance. 
evaluation in relation to the FSMS model. 
Finally, chapter 6 describes 
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Chapter Six 
Evaluation And the FSMS 
Model 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter five presented a FSMS model which has been developed and proposed in this 
research project. This chapter discusses the evaluation of the FSMS model. Section 6.2 
discusses some problematic aspects that prevented a full evaluation of the FSMS model. 
It also suggests some alternative ways to partially evaluate the FSMS. The FSMS has 
been compared with some existing SMSs. The results of this comparison are presented 
in section 6.3. Finally, the conclusion of this chapter is given in section 6.4. 
6.2 Evaluation and the FSMS Model 
This section discusses some major problematic aspects that prevented the researcher 
being able to fully evaluate the FSMS model. The Chambers Encyclopedic English 
Dictionary' 57 defines Evaluation as: 
g4an estimate of value or worth" 
Evaluation is understood here as an estimate of value or worth of the FSMS model for 
maintaining an acceptable fire risk in an organisation's operations life cycle. According 
to Checkland and Holwell' 
04 
"The scientific method can be expressed as being based on three fundamental principles 
which characterised it and give it its power: reductionism, repeatability, and refutation. 
Scientists select a portion of the world to investigate and carry out disciplined 
observations in experiments. If the results of the experiments are repeatable, they count 
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as part of the body of knowledge; and progress can be made in sequences or 
experiments through the testing to destruction of hypotheses. Scientific knowledge is 
then the accumulation of hypotheses which have not (yet) been refuted. " 
However, as emphasised by Checkland and Holwell: 
"things are more volatile in the investigation of human and social phenomena. There it 
is still necessary to argue about the underlying assumptions, the modes of inquiry, and 
their validity. " 
Given this context, it has not been possible to show fully the validity of the FSMS 
model. The traditional hypothesis -testing process was not adopted to conduct the 
research project, because this research addressed human and socio-technical 
phenomena. A research problem and questions process was adopted instead of the 
hypothesis-testing process as discussed in chapter one. Furthermore, it has not been 
possible to evaluate fully the effectiveness of the FSMS model, because the FSMS is the 
result of a systemic approach. The FSMS is highly complex, probabilistic and self- 
regulated. The FSMS has five interrelated and interactive subsystems which interact 
with its local and wider environments. These subsystems are arranged in a recursive 
structure that enables communication and control. The interaction of the subsystems and 
the behaviour of each subsystem are probabilistic; thus the behaviour of the FSMS as a 
dynamic whole is highly probabilistic. Moreover, the subsystems and the organisational 
structure of the FSMS have the purpose of maintaining risk within an acceptable range. 
Regarding the interrelated and interactive subsystems, the recursive structural 
organisations, the degree of autonomy, the interaction of this structure with its local and 
wider environments,, and the channels of communication and control, any attempt to 
evaluate the FSMS model as dynamic whole would be impossible. The only way that it 
could be fully evaluated is through its implementation in real life. However, these 
characteristics of the FSMS model are themselves the basic criteria that define not only 
the FSMS, but also its effectiveness in maintaining an acceptable level of fire safety. 
Regarding the research problem and questions, as discussed in section 1.2 from chapter 
one, it is possible to show the value and worth of the FSMS, though this may count as 
partial. If the FSMS model contains the basic criteria that define it and its effectiveness, 
then the ways below can be used to elucidate some of the characteristics of the FSMS 
model. 
* compare with existing SMSs, 
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probabilistic computer simulation, 
expert opinion, and 
0 take part in a real situation. 
Comparing with existing SMSs and conducting a probability computer simulation are 
reported in sections 6.3 and 6.4 respectively. The FSMS model may be partially 
evaluated through the opinion of experts, which may include HSE, European Process 
Safety Centre (EPSC), practitioners, and renown researchers in the field. Another 
possible way of evaluating partially the FSMS could be for the researcher to participate 
in a specific real situation to assess the organisation's existing SMS and to try to shed 
light on the FSMS model. More detail of possible future work is given in section 7.7 in 
chapter seven. 
6.3 Comparison with Existing SMSs 
The FSMS was mapped to well-known and well-established safety management 
standards and SMSs. These mappings worked well because the FSMS describes a 
logically consistent and effective means for managing fire safety. This assessment 
process drew examples of SMS from the oil and gas industry to show the value of the 
FSMS model. Two main domains have been selected to accomplish the assessment 
process. First, a systemic approach, such as the Failure Paradigm Method (FPM) 
discussed in chapter three, was mapped to the FSMS prototype to identify strengths and 
vulnerabilities. This initial process is reported in chapter four. Second, well- established 
SMSs and standards in the oil and gas industry were selected to be mapped onto the 
final FSMS model to complete the process. The results of these mappings are reported 
in section 6.3. The 'Successful Health and Safety Management' HS(G)65119, the British 
Standard 8000 (BS 8800)58 'Occupational Health, Safety and Environmental 
Management System', the 'European Safety Process Centre (ESPQ Management 
System' 116 , were selected as three relevant standards to 
be mapped onto the FSMS 
model. Additionally, two North Sea Operators SMSs, namely Total Oil Marine 
(TOM) 158 and Conoco Limited (CUKL) 159 Safety, Health and Environmental (SH&E) 
Management Systems, were also mapped to the FSMS model. 
In these mappings, the words and formats used in the original books and papers were 
used. Sometimes these words made the mapping obvious. However, at other times, 
these words made the mapping difficult because different people think, perceive and use 
135 
words differently. The mappings presented here were based on the researcher's 
interpretation of the original author's intentions. The following paragraphs present some 
relevant results of these mappings. 
6.3.1 The "Successful Health And Safety Management" 
Table 6.1 maps the FSMS model to the "Successful Health Safety Management", 
9 HS(G)65, proposed by the Health and Safety Executive" . The HS(G)65 has six key 
functions, namely policy, organising, planning and implementing, measuring and 
reviewing performance, and auditing, that are linked to form a closed loop, as shown in 
Figure 6.1. Industry 'best practice' is suggested in the HS(G)65 to achieve each function 
successfully. 
'Policy' involves communicating throughout an organisation the intentions, approach 
and objectives, and the criteria and principles on which the organisation's actions and 
responses are based. Health and safety policies should be comprehensive in order to 
contribute to the organisation's business performance, while complying with 
regulations, as well as meeting people's and environmental needs. Moreover, these 
policies should be effectively implemented and considered in all business practice and 
decision making. 'Organising' involves 'designing and establishing responsibilities and 
relationships' between individuals who achieve the organisation's activities. This should 
lead organisations to establish, operate and maintain structures and systems which aim 
at ensuring control, encouraging co-operation of employees and safety representatives, 
ensuring effective communication, and encouraging competence. This is helped by the 
creation of a safety culture that ensures motivation, involvement and participation of 
people at all levels. 'Planning' involves establishing objectives and methods of 
implementing the organisation's health and safety policy. It is concerned with allocating 
resources and deciding priorities and setting objectives with the aim of eliminating and 
controlling risks. 
Performance standards should be established and performance is measured against them. 
'Measuring performance', which involves a variety of checking and monitoring 
activities, is concerned with the collection of information about the implementation and 
effectiveness of the organisation's plans and standards. 
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Figure 6.1 The Successful Health And Safety Management" 9 
Organisations should assess their performance against pre-determined plans and 
standards; this can help them to establish, operate and maintain systems which ensure 
that their performance is assessed "objectively". 'Measuring performance' includes 
"active" monitoring systems to assess the success of plans, and failures of control are 
assessed by "reactive" monitoring systems, which require investigation systems, and 
reporting and response systems. 'Auditing' involves collecting independent information 
on the efficiency, effectiveness and reliability of the organisation's total SMS and 
developing plans for corrective action. 'Reviewing' describes activities that an 
organisation can use to judge its performance, and make decisions about improving 
performance, and to further develop its health and safety policies. Organisations need to 
review regularly their performance based on data from both monitoring activities and 
from auditing activities. It is stressed in the HS(G)65 that this function forms the basis 
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for self-regulation and commitment to continuous improvement, which involves 
developing Policies, approaches to implementation and techniques of risk control. 
Table 6.1 The FSMS Model and the HS(G)65 
The FSMS Model The HS(G)65119 
" system 5: fire safety policy 0 policy 
" system 4: fire safety development * planning and implementation 
" system 4*: fire safety confidential reporting 
" system 3: fire safety functional 9 organising 
" system 3 *: fire safety audit * auditing 
" system 2: fire safety co-ordination. 
" system 1: fire safety policy implementation 
" recursive structure and its environment 
" communication and control 9 measuring and reviewing performance 
The mapping in table 6.1 shows that the FSMS model and the HS(G)65 are not exactly 
alike. First, the FSMS model is a viable system that achieves five interrelated functions 
associated with systems I to 5. It should be stressed that system is understood as an 
interaction of a number of entities called parts; the system's parts and their relationships 
constitute its structure and this structure serves a purpose. Systems I to 5 and their 
relationships constitute the structural organisation of the FSMS model. The FSMS is 
intended to help organisations to maintain an acceptable level of fire safety throughout 
the organisation's life cycle. The HS(G)65, on the other hand, achieves six key 
functions, but it does not achieve explicitly the functions of system 4*, system 2, and 
system 1. Also, although the HS(G)65 has some parallel functions with the FSMS 
subsystems, the functions of these subsystems are fundamentally distinct. System 5 
deliberates and makes normative decisions about fire safety policies, as well as 
monitoring the internal and external demands, as represented by the needs of system 3 
and system 4 respectively. On the other hand, the HS(G)65 policy is used to 
communicate the organisation's commitment to health and safety throughout the 
organisation. System 4 continuously develops fire safety plans for the whole 
organisation. By considering strengths, weaknesses, threats., and opportunities, system 4 
can suggest changes to the organisation's fire safety policies to adapt to the needs of the 
local and wider socio-economic and physical environment. The planning and 
implementation function of the HS(G)65 does not deal explicitly with an organisation's 
local and wider socio-economic and physical environment. Moreover, the HS(G)65 has 
no function that deals with confidential and special reports, though these aspects are 
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discussed in measuring the performance function. The confidential reporting function 
can be achieved through system 4* of the FSMS model. System 4* is concerned with 
confidential fire safety reports, received from systems 1,2 and 3, that may require direct 
intervention of the corporate management. The organising and the auditing function of 
the HS(G)65 follow closely the system 3 and system 3* functions of the FSMS model. 
The organising function designates responsibilities to achieve the organisation's 
objectives. The auditing function checks the effectiveness of the SMS by collecting 
independent information. System 3, on the other hand, ensures that system I implements 
the organisation's fire safety policies, as well as ensuring that fire safety is maintained at 
an acceptable level. System 3* is concerned with the fire safety sporadic audit. The 
HS(G)65 does not explicitly describe a co-ordination function either, hence it lacks a 
fire safety policy implementation function. As mentioned above, system 2 achieves a 
vital function in the FSMS that ensures that the various operations of system 1 operate 
in agreement. System 1 consists of the various operations of an organisation that deal 
directly with the organisation's production activities on which the organisation's fire 
safety policy must be implemented. 
Second, organisations are embedded within a wider socio-economic and physical 
environment that continuously constrain development. There are various important 
characteristics or circumstances, such as physical, economic and socio-political 
characteristics, to which an organisational response is necessary. It seems, however, that 
the HS(G)65 does not provide an adequate structural organisation that can help not only 
to give coherence to the HS(G)65 key functions, but also to understand the interaction 
between the organisation and its envirom-nent. Moreover, the HS(G)65 seems to lack an 
effective structure that may help organisations to structure decision making and 
communication, and instil their safety culture. The FSMS model discussed above is 
intended to help an organisation to manage fire safety in a coherent way. The various 
operations that form part of system 1 can be treated as both vertically and horizontally 
interdependent. The notion of recursion of the VSM enables the FSMS to deal with 
vertical interdependence. This means that the organisational structure of the FSMS for 
the organisation as a whole is replicated in each operation of system 1. The FSMS 
model is intended to manage fire safety at three levels of recursion and at each level of 
recursion the FSMS aims to maintain an acceptable level of fire safety, and to favour 
autonomy and local decision making. The various operations of system I are 
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horizontally interrelated as shown in Figure 5.3 of chapter five. These operations are 
integrated and guided by systems 2 to 5. The interrelationship amongst the operations of 
system I may be strong or weak. However, the operations of system I should be given 
as much autonomy as possible to achieve fire safety policies more effectively. Systems 2 
to 5 will intervene in system I operations only to ensure the achievement of the 
organisation's fire safety policies. Apart from the vertical and horizontal 
interdependence aspects, the structural organisation of the FSMS interacts in a defined 
way with its wider and local socio-economic and physical environment. This may enable 
an organisation to adapt continuously according to its weaknesses and strengths, and 
threats and opportunities as presented in its local and wider environment. 
The last point to emphasise is that the measuring and reviewing performance function of 
the HS(G)65 has some similarities with the communication and control aspects of the 
FSMS model. However, it should be stressed that the lines that connect the FSMS 
subsystems and the local and wider environment with the FSMS represent channels of 
communication, which comply with the four organisational principles of Appendix A. 
These channels of communication carry fire safety information as plans, reports and 
special information. These aspects of effective organisation are not dealt explicitly in the 
HS(G)65, though it suggests some best practices to achieve each function successfully. 
Additionally, the FSMS suggests a system and a framework called 'fire safety 
configuration space' that can help when measuring an organisation's fire safety 
performance. This system consists of four kinds of fire safety levels and these levels can 
be combined to give four indices expressed in single figures. Moreover, these levels can 
be used to develop four different fire safety plans. These fire safety levels, plans and 
indices can be defined for both ICS and ECS for apparent and latent factors. 
6.3.2 The "Occupational Health and Safety Management System" 
Table 6.2 shows the FSMS model mapped to the "Occupational Health and Safety 
(OH&S) Management System" based on the BS EN ISO 14001 approach 58 . The OH&S 
management system elements are associated with the concept of continuous 
improvement, which involves initial status review, OH&S policy, planning, 
implementation and operation, checking and corrective action, and management review. 
Figure 6.2 shows the OH&S Management System. 
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Figure 6.2 The OH&S Management SysteM58 
Organisations should conduct an 'initial review' of their current safety status to check 
their existing arrangements with existing regulations, existing OH&S management 
guidelines, and best practice and performance. This will help them to define the scope, 
adequacy and implementation of the OH&S management system, as well as measuring 
progress. The OH&S 'policy' involves documenting and endorsing the organisation's 
OH&S policy. This policy should reflect a commitment to a number of aspects, such as 
recognising the OH&S management system as an integral part of the organisation's 
business, achieving high levels of OH&S performance, allocating resources, setting and 
publishing OH&S objectives, responsibility of top and line management to managing 
OH&S, implementing the OH&S policy at all levels, employee involvement and 
participation, periodic review of the policy, and ensuring that appropriate training is 
provided for employees at all levels. 'Planning' involves identifying OH&S 
requirements, setting performance criteria, defining what is to be achieved, delegating 
responsibilities, defining time scales and setting desired outcomes. The organisation 
should conduct risk assessment, as well as identifying legal requirements and any other 
requirements applicable to it. Moreover, the organisation should make arrangements to 
set overall plans and objectives, develop an understanding of OH&S, set operational 
plans to implement arrangements, plan for operational control activities, plan for 
performance measurement, and implement corrective actions. 
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'Implementation and operation' involve considering structure and responsibility of top 
and line management and people from all levels of the organisation in order to improve 
the OH&S perfon-nance continually. The organisation should establish and maintain 
arrangements to develop and establish training, awareness and competence, 
communications, OH&S management system documentation, document control, 
operational control, and emergency preparedness and response. 'Checking and 
corrective action' involves conducting performance monitoring and measurement, 
which is regarded as a key way of checking the effectiveness of the OH&S management 
system. It is suggested that both proactive and reactive measures of perfon-nance should 
be conducted in order to check whether the policy and objectives are being met. 
Organisations should identify root causes and corrective actions should be taken, as well 
as maintaining any records to demonstrate compliance with regulations. Besides routine 
monitoring, periodic audits that enable a critical assessment of all elements of the 
OH&S management system should be carried out. Finally, organisations should define 
the frequency and scope of 'reviews' of their OH&S management system. The 
management review should consider the overall performance and the performance of the 
individual elements of the OH&S management system. It should also consider the 
results of audits and internal and external factors, such as changes in organisational 
structure, new regulations and technology. The OH&S management system should be 
designed to accommodate or adapt to internal and external factors. 
The mapping, as given in table 6.2, shows that the OH&S management system has some 
parallel elements with the FSMS model subsystems. Nevertheless, the functions of the 
FSMS subsystems are fundamentally different. Furthermore, the OH&S management 
system does not achieve explicitly the functions of system 4*, system 2 and system 1. 
Table 6.2 The FSMS Model and the OH&S Management System 
The FSMS Model The OH&S Management SysteM58 
" system 5: fire safety policy * OHS policy 
" system 4: fire safety development * Planning 
system 4*: fire safety confidential reporting 
system 3: fire safety functional * implementation and operation 
system 3 *: fire safety audit * checking and corrective action 
system 2: fire safety co-ordination 
system 1: fire safety policy implementation 
" recursive structure and its environment 
" communication and control initial state review and management 
review 
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The OH&S management system does not have either an appropriate structure that can 
help an organisation not only to accommodate the needs presented in its envirom-nent, 
but also to instil its safety culture, to have an effective communication and decision 
making in a coherent way. The OH&S management system guidelines emphasise that 
the OH&S management system should be designed to adapt to internal and external 
needs. But it is not clear how this can be achieved without an appropriate structural 
organisation. The OH&S management system also lacks an appropriate communication 
and decision-making model, though it suggests a review of the OH&S management 
system and the performance of its elements in a defined period. The FSMS model, on 
the other hand, is a systemic approach that has five necessary and sufficient interrelated 
subsystems, and that aims to maintain fire risk within an acceptable range throughout an 
organisation's life cycle. The FSMS has a structural organisation that interacts in a 
defined way with its local and wider socio-economic and physical environment. This 
structural organisation helps to adapt continuously to foreseen and unforeseen threats 
and opportunities, and weaknesses and strengths as presented in the organisation's local 
and wider environment. Moreover, the structural organisation of the FSMS is intended 
to manage fire safety in a coherent way by treating an organisation as both vertically and 
horizontally interdependent. Vertical interdependence deals with the recursive structural 
organisation of the FSMS. This favours autonomy, so it helps to maintain an acceptable 
level of fire safety at each level of recursion. The horizontal interdependence deals with 
the interrelationships amongst the various operations that form part of system 1. The 
channels that connect the different subsystems of the FSMS are channels of 
communication and control. These channels should be designed to comply with the four 
principles of organisation. Additionally, the FSMS suggests a system for measuring the 
organisation's fire safety performance continuously. The structural organisation, which 
consists of the five subsystems and the lines that connect them, of the FSMS, its 
environment, and its channels of communication and control make the FSMS an 
effective system to manage not only fire safety, but also safety, health and the 
environment. 
6.3.3 The Management System of the European Process Safety Centre 
The European Process Safety Centre (EPSC)l 16 has developed SMS guidelines. The key 
elements of the EPSC can be distinguished as policy, organisation, management 
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practices and procedures, monitoring and auditing, and management review, as shown 
in Figure 6.3. 
Policy and objectives 
Organisation, 
responsibilities 
and resources 
Improvement 
Practices and I I- 
Correction procedures I-I --] 
implementation and Control 
Drnpliance monitoring 
Verification / 
Assessment auditing 
Management review 
Figure 6.3 The EPSC Management System' 16 
An organisation should have a clear and meaningful statement of its safety policy, which 
reflects the organisation's safety culture, including the ultimate goal of 'zero' accidents 
and safety objectives as established by the public authorities. "Organisation" involves 
establishing adequate organisation, assigning responsibilities, and allocating sufficient 
resources to implement the organisation's safety policy. "Management practices and 
procedures" are concerned with practices that cover the operations of a facility's life 
cycle, including inception, planning, hazard identification, assessment and controls, 
construction, operations, maintenance and repairs, abandonment and disposal. They also 
include change management, organisational change, reporting, investigation and follow- 
up of accidents, emergency preparedness, education, training and personnel. 
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"Monitoring and auditing" involve monitoring the organisation's SMS perfon-nance. 
Monitoring is concerned with measuring the performance of the SMS and the level of 
SMS policy implementation, measuring the level to which desirable practices are met, 
and "auditing and verifying" these activities. The independent audit of the monitoring 
activities may provide the assurance that systems are in place, and checks for 
compliance with the organisation's policies and guidelines. "Management review" is 
concerned with corrective actions to the organisation's policies, organisation and 
resources according to the findings and the results of monitoring and auditing activities. 
The SMS needs to be documented in detail and cover objectives and scope, tools and 
procedures, resources and responsibilities, plans and measurements in order to be 
practical, effective and successful. The SMS should be flexible to achieve widespread 
applicability to all types of hazards involved in the process or plant. Moreover, 
continuous self-monitoring is essential to achieve continuous improvement for both 
effectiveness and efficiency of the SMS. 
Table 6.3 The FSMS Model and the EPSC Management System 
The FSMS Model The EPSC Management System' 16 
" system 5: fire safety policy 0 policy 
" system 4: fire safety development * management practices and procedures 
" system 4*: fire safety confidential reporting 
" system 3: fire safety functional o organisation 
" system 3 *: fire safety audit 9 monitoring and auditing 
" system 2: fire safety co-ordination 
" system 1: fire safety implementation 
" recursive structure and its environment 
" communication and control management review 
Table 6.3 maps the FSMS model to the SMS suggested by the EPSC. This maps shows, 
first, that some elements of the EPSC are equivalent to some subsystems of the FSMS 
model. Although these are similar, the functions of the FSMS subsystems are very 
different from those of the EPSC elements. The EPSC safety management does not 
explicitly have equivalent functions of system 4*, and system 2 and system 1. Second, 
the elements of the EPSC management system are arranged in a systematic structure. 
Moreover, it does not exhibit explicitly the interaction of an organisation with its 
environment. Finally, the EPSC safety management system does not suggest appropriate 
communication and control mechanisms, though its management review deals with 
developing corrective actions according to the monitoring and auditing function. 
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By contrast, the FsmS model is a systemic approach that has five necessary and 
sufficient interrelated subsystems, which are arranged in an effective structural 
organisation that aims to maintain an acceptable level of fire safety in an organisation's 
operation life cycle. The FSMS addresses fire safety in a coherent way by treating an 
organisation as both vertically and horizontally interdependent. The vertical 
interdependence deals with the recursive property of the structural organisation of the 
FSMS and the horizontal interdependence deals with interrelationships amongst the 
various operations of system 1. Moreover, this structural organisation interacts with its 
local and wider environment in a defined way. The FSMS also contains a 
communication and control model. The structural organisation and the communication 
and control model are the basic criteria of effectiveness of the FSMS. 
6.3.4 Total Oil Marine 'Safety and Environmental Management System' 
Table 6.4 maps the FSMS to the Total Oil Marine's (TOM) Safety and Environmental 
Management System (SEMS). TOM plc is a UK North Sea producer of oil and gas. 
TOM p1c, like many other UK North Sea oil and gas operators, has to comply with 
safety and environmental regulations, especially the safety case regulations. TOM plc 
has developed and established a SEMS to comply with existing safety and 
environmental regulations. Similarly, the SEMS consists of policy, organisation, 
planning and implementation, performance measurement, performance review, and 
auditing, as shown in Figure 6.4. 
TOM's safety, health and environment policy is concerned with the organisation's 
commitment in order to "minimise" the safety and health risks to all those in its sites 
and to reduce the impact of its operations on the environment. This policy influences all 
areas and activities of the organisation. In the organisation, effective communications 
and the safety committee structure in place are intended to ensure that all levels of the 
organisation are involved in decisions to improve its safety or environmental 
performance. TOM personnel are assigned responsibilities to undertake their work 
"safely" and to be fully aware of their responsibilities to themselves, to others and to the 
envirom-nent. Through 'planning', TOM eliminates or "minimises" (their word) and 
controls risks to people, the environment and facilities. Planning is also concerned with 
setting objectives and monitoring them. Safety meetings, pre-job meetings and handover 
procedures ensure tasks are sufficiently analysed. 
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Figure 6.4 TOM ple SEMS 
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Emergency response procedures and training are in place and regularly tested to be used 
in the event when prevention fails. TOM conducts "active" and "reactive" performance 
measurement. "Active performance measurement" involves monitoring its performance 
against pre-defined standards to identify weaknesses. This monitoring ranges from 
normal, independent audits to site or module inspections, and individual staff appraisals. 
"Reactive performance measurement" involves monitoring failures of control through 
incident reporting and investigation procedures to identify the underlying causes of 
accidents. According to the results of the performance measurement stage, TOM 
conducts perfon-nance reviews throughout all areas of the company. Action is taken to 
improve any weaknesses or to prevent incident recurrence. It also regularly 'reviews' its 
policy, as well as reviewing both company key performance indicators and individual 
objectives. TOM's safety case is reviewed annually to update. Systems and 
modifications with high risks are reviewed to update current procedures or designs and 
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to further "reduce" risks. Finally, TOM conducts a systematic audit and monitoring of 
its safety, health and environmental performance. 
Table 6.4 The FSMS and the TOM plc SEMS 
The FSMS Model TOM pIc SEMS 
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" system 5: fire safety policy 0 policy 
" system 4: fire safety development 9 planning and implementation 
" system 4*: fire safety confidential report 
" system 3: fire safety functional 9 organisation 
" system 3 *: fire safety audit * auditing 
" system 2: fire safety co-ordination 
" system 1: fire safety implementation 
" recursive structure and its environment 
" communication and control 9 performance measurement, & review 
From the structural organisation point of view, this map shows that there are some 
parallel elements and some missing elements. The functions of system 4*, system 2 and 
system I are not explicitly addressed in the SEMS, as shown in the right hand column of 
Table 6.4. The elements of the SEMS are arranged in a systematic procedure rather than 
in an appropriate structural organisation that can provide coherence to these elements. It 
seems that the elements of the SEMS do not explicitly interact with its local and wider 
socio-economic and physical enviromnent. The lack of an appropriate structural 
organisation, including its local and wider environment, may not help TOM plc to 
manage safety, health and the environment effectively. Moreover, this deficiency may 
not help to implement a communication and decision-making process effectively. By 
contrast, the FSMS has five necessary and sufficient interrelated subsystems, which are 
arranged in a recursive structural organisation that are intended to help it to manage fire 
safety in a coherent way. The structural organisation of the FSMS interacts in a defined 
way with its local and wider environment. It also contains a communication and control 
model that is intended to ensure the effectiveness of the FSMS. Moreover, it is believed 
by the author that the FSMS can help not only to manage fire safety in a coherent way, 
but also to manage safety, health and the envirom-nent and for any organisation. 
6.3.5 Conoco UK Ltd (CUKL)'Safety, Health and Environmental 
Management System' 
Table 6.5 maps the FSMS to the CUKL Safety, Health and Environmental Management 
System (SHEMS). CUKL is a UK North Sea based producer of oil and gas. The CUKL 
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SHEMS is based on the "Successful Health and Safety Management" (HS(G)65) 
fon-nat, as shown in Figure 6.5. 
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The SHEMS key elements, which are also associated with control loops, include policy, 
organisation, planning and implementation, performance measurement, performance 
review, and auditing. "Policy" describes CUKL's intentions and commitment to safety, 
health and the environment (SH&E), and the established organisational responsibilities 
and arrangements, which are intended to ensure the successful implementation of the 
organisation's policies. The SH&E policies, which are a statement of the standards by 
which CUKL operates, support and contribute to business objectives and state the 
company's commitment to meet existing regulations. The primary objective of the 
SHEMS is to implement these policies. "Organisation" describes the organisational 
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structure, roles and responsibilities, accountability and resources, established to ensure 
the implementation of the HSE policies. CUKL states that it implements its SHE 
policies through involvement and participation, top and line management commitment, 
effective communication and the co-operation of its workforce. Besides this, the 
established controls, which are intended to ensure "safe" working conditions, the 
promotion of competence and envirom-nental responsibility are also intended to enable 
the company's SH&E performance to improve. 
"Planning and implementation" describe a systematic process for implementing the 
organisation's policy. It involves preparing safety cases and, through hazard 
identification and risk assessment, to decide priorities and set objectives for hazards 
removal and risk "reduction" whenever possible. Performance standards are established 
in line with the requirements of the CUKL and relevant legislation and performance is 
monitored. Actions that promote SH&E culture and eliminate, "reduce" and control 
risks are identified. All personnel within the CUKL "develop plans, procedures and 
conduct meetings to ensure that activities are carried out safely". The overall 
effectiveness of the SHEMS is measured by the annual safety performance results 
compared with legislation, SH&E policies, objectives and standards in the 'performance 
measurement' activity. The effectiveness of the SHEMS is evaluated through "active" 
and "reactive" monitoring activities. Active monitoring involves monitoring the 
achievement of objectives and compliance with standards. Reactive monitoring on the 
other hand involves investigating incidents or accidents and the failure to achieve the 
required standards. The "audit" element of the SHEMS is used to implement systematic, 
independent, and cross-functional audits to determine the effectiveness of the SHEMS 
and identify opportunities for improvement. SHEMS audits are carried out annually on 
CUKL production locations to identify corrective actions raised from previous audits or 
the annual management safety and environmental review, or as a result of any changes 
implemented in the organisation. The review of performance against agreed goals and 
objectives and standards takes place at varying intervals. CUKL reviews annually the 
SHEMS to ensure that its policies are being implemented and to assess the adequacy of 
the audit programme in place. The review includes "making value judgements about 
performance and initiating actions for improvements. " 
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Table 6.5 The FSMS Model and the CUKL SHEMS 
The FSMS Model CUKLSHEMS 
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" system 5: fire safety policy 0 policy 
" system 4: fire safety development * planning and implementation 
" system 4*: fire safety confidential report 
" system 3: fire safety functional 9 organisation 
" system 3*: fire safety audit 9 audit 
" system 2: fire safety co-ordination 
" system 1: fire safety implementation 
" recursive structure and its environment 
" communication and control measuring and reviewing performance 
The mapping in table 6.5 shows some missing elements. The functions of system 4*, 
system 2 and system I are not explicitly listed in the right hand column of Table 6.5. 
This mapping also shows some parallel elements between the FSMS and the SHEMS. 
The SHEMS itself lacks an appropriate organisational structure that can help CUKL to 
manage SH&E in a coherent way. The traditional hierarchical organisational structure is 
described in the organising element of the SHEMS. Moreover, the organisational 
structure described in the organising element of the SHEMS does not include the 
interaction of CUKL with its local and wider socio-economic and physical enviroinment. 
Hence, this deficiency militates against the implementation of an effective 
communication and decision making process. The primary objective of the SHEMS is 
"the implementation of the HS&E policies". By contrast, the FSMS is intended to help 
an organisation to maintain risk within an acceptable range throughout the life cycle of 
the organisation's operations. The FSMS has five necessary and sufficient interrelated 
subsystems, which are arranged in a recursive structural organisation that interacts in a 
defined way with an organisation's local and wider enviroinment. Besides this, the 
FSMS also contains a communication and control model that ensures the effectiveness 
of the FSMS in achieving its purpose. It is hoped that the FSMS can help not only to 
manage fire safety more effectively, but also to manage safety, health and the 
envirom-nent and for any organisation. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed a limited evaluation process for the FSMS model. It started 
by presenting some problematic aspects that were found during the evaluation process of 
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the FSMS model. The chapter continued by discussing the results of the assessment of 
some existing SMSs. 
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Chapter Seven 
An Assessment Case Study* 
of Britain's Railway Safety 
Management 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter six presented the evaluation process of the FSMS model. The researcher used 
this model to assess the safety management of Britain's railway. This chapter gives an 
account of this case study. Section 7.2 describes the safety management in the railway 
industry as it is currently practised. The commercial aspects of the railway industry and 
its safety considerations are treated in section 7.3. A systemic Railway Safety 
Management System is presented in section 7.4. Finally, some conclusions are given in 
section 7.5. 
7.2 Safety Management in the Railway Industry 
The British railway industry is a complex organisation that has various parts whose 
business activities deal with hazards. These hazards have the potential to create 
significant risks not only for the passengers, employees, contractors and the public, but 
also for the natural environment. Recent train accidents, such as the Paddington rail 
crash and the Hatfield train derailment, have highlighted this potential. It seems, 
therefore, that the current safety management of the railway industry is not sufficient to 
cope with the changing nature of the relationships amongst the various operating 
companies that form the railway industry. Prompted by the railway accidents, this case 
study is intended to highlight some weaknesses of the SMS of the railway industry. It 
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also suggests a systemic approach that could be adopted by the railway industry, which 
it is believed, will contribute to improve railway safety. 
There are five key and independent organisations in the British rail system 160 . These 
organisations are Railtrack p1c, train and freight operating companies, rolling stock 
companies or vehicle owners, contractors, and regulators. As shown in Figure 7.1, 
Railtrack plc is a subsidiary of Railtrack group p1c; Railtrack group plc sets out the 
Railtrack plc Safety Case. On the other hand, Railtrack owns and controls the majority 
of the rail infrastructure; that is, the track, signals, bridges, viaducts, tunnels, level 
crossings, major stations and so on. Contractors deal with the maintenance and renewal 
of the rail infrastructure; that is, they work for Railtrack p1c. The train operating 
companies (TOCs) and freight operating companies (FOCs) operate the trains and in 
many cases the stations. The rolling stock companies (ROSCOs) or vehicle owners 
lease rail vehicles to TOCs. 
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Under the Railway (Safety Case) Regulations' 61 (RSQ, Railtrack plc is the main 
controller of the rail infrastructure; its responsibility is to provide a RSC to HSE and to 
accept the Safety Case of TOCs and station operators. The role of the Group committee, 
which is an executive committee of Railtrack Group and Railtrack, is to deal with the 
day-to-day business, as well as to address safety, environment and health. The 
Executive Committee (ExCo) is a group formed by the Railtrack plc chief executive and 
Zone Directors and other key operational personnel whose responsibilities are to 
establish the means to meet business and operational safety objectives. 
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Figure 7.2 shows the structure of the Railtrack line. Through its head-quarter functions 
and seven zones, it deals with commercial and operational activities to maintain and 
develop the railway infrastructure. Railtrack has a commercial relationship with the 
TOCs, FOCs and station operating companies; Railtrack claims that it accepts and 
monitors TOCs (including FOCs) RSCs. This has the potential to create conflicting 
interests between business and safety issues. Safety is therefore considered as an 
integral function within the line management functions. However, there are some 
independent functions, such as the Assurance and Safety Directorate (A&SD) and the 
Safety and Standards Directorate (S&SD) that deals directly with safety issues. The 
A&SD deals with the Railtrack line safety and reports to the Operations Director. The 
S&SD deals exclusively with safety and provides service to the Railtrack line through 
providing advice, auditing and preparing the RSC. 
The primary railway regulation is contained in the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 
1974. This regulation requires the railway industry to conduct undertakings in such a 
way so as to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that their employees and any 
others who may be affected are not exposed to risks to their health and safety. The 
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992, which require, amongst 
other things, risk assessments to be undertaken, are also relevant to the railway industry. 
Besides these general laws, there are some specific regulations for the railway industry 
such as the RSC Regulation 1994. The RSC requires Railtrack, train or station operating 
companies to produce their Safety Case to demonstrate their safety policy, risk 
assessment, SMS, operational, maintenance and audit arrangements. HSE assesses and 
accepts the Safety Case of Railtrack p1c, whilst the Safety Cases of the train and station 
operating companies are assessed and accepted by Railtrack p1c. However, the new RSC 
regulations 2000 162 require TOCs, FOCs and station operating companies to pass their 
RSCs from Railtrack to the HSE. RSCs are reviewed, at least every three years, 
whenever appropriate by the operators. In addition to the RSCs there are other 
Regulations dealing with competence of employees performing safety critical functions; 
approvals by HSE for new engineering works undertaken by, or on behalf of, Railtrack; 
approvals by HSE for new traction and rolling stock; future prohibitions on train 
operating without train protection systems, or with certain types of rolling stock; and 
miscellaneous provisions dealing with access to the infrastructure, passenger 
communication, preventing collisions and derailments, providing and maintaining 
brakes, and accidents to people at work from moving vehicles. The Office of the Rail 
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Regulator (ORR), the office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF), and the Shadow 
Strategic Rail Authority (sSRA) have also an influence on Railtrack operations. The 
ORR grants a licence only with a condition that the operator has an accepted RSC. The 
OPRAF monitors and manages the passenger train franchises operating in the UK in 
order to promote the interests of passengers through improved quality of service. The 
sSRA will, inter alia, subsume the functions of OPRAF and the ORR. 
It is claimed by the HSE 160 that it undertakes reviews of management arrangements for 
health and safety within large organisations. The mission of HSE is to ensure that risks 
to people's health and safety from work activities are properly controlled 161 . 
Field Operations 
Directorate 
Director 
I 
Director General 
Deputy Director 
General 
Resource & Planning 
Directorate 
Director 
I 
HM Railway 
Inspectorate 
Operations Unit 
Head 
Nuclear Safety 
Directorate 
Director/Chief 
Hazardous Installations 
Directorate" 
Director 
Local Authority Unit 
Head 
Board Non-Board 
Member 
I 
Member 
** Reports to Director 
general as chief scientist 
Figure 7.3 The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 160 
Safety Policy 
Directorate 
I 
Director 
I 
Health Directorate 
Director 
Strategy & Analytical 
Support Directorate 
Director 
Solicitor's office 
Solicitor 
Health & Safety 
Laboratory 
Chief Executive 
Electrical Equipment 
Certification Service 
Director 
157 
Figure 7.3 shows the Divisions and Directorates that form the HSE. Three Directorates 
are of great interest here in order to manage safety in the Railway industry. They are the 
Field Operations Directorate (FOD), Hazardous Installations Directorate (HID) and 
Nuclear Safety Directorate (NSD). The FOD addresses many industrial sectors, which 
include HM Railway Inspectorate, construction, agriculture, manufacturing and so on. It 
inspects workplaces and investigates accidents and compliance, as well as providing 
advice and guidance on how to comply with the law. The function of HM Railway 
Inspectorate in particular is to ensure that risks to the health and safety of employees, 
passengers and others who might be affected by the Railway industry activities are 
"properly controlled". The HID's role is to ensure that risks to people's health and 
safety from work activities in major hazard industries are controlled more efficiently 
and effectively. The NSD on the other hand ensures that the standards of safety at 
nuclear installations and the protection of workers and the public from ionising radiation 
are maintained and improved. 
7.3 Commercial Aspects and Safety Considerations 
The FSMS model has been used to assess the safety management of the British railway 
industry. The analysis and results presented here are based on the previous 
understanding of the author's interpretation of the safety management of the British 
railway. The paragraphs below present this understanding. 
Figure 7.4 shows a diagrammatic representation of five levels of recursion of the British 
railway safety management as it exists currently. Recursion one represents the HSE, 
which has three main operations named FOD, HID, and NSD. The FOD in turn is being 
represented in the second recursion. As mentioned above, HM-Railway Inspectorate 
(HM-RI) is embedded into the FOD and it is being represented in the recursion three. 
The HM-RI inspects the Railtrack operations; thus Railtrack is located in the fourth 
recursion level below. As Railtrack assesses and accepts the TOCs, FOCs, and station 
operating companies' RSCs, then these organisations are embedded into the fifth 
recursion level. Each level of recursion has a connection with its local environment. 
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Figure 7.5 shows the structural organisation of the HM-RL recursion three, in the format 
of the FSMS model. Table 6.6 summarises some relevant deficiencies of the HM-Rl 
safety management according to Figure 7.5. As can be seen in Figure 7.5 and Table 6.6, 
the HM-RI safety management does not integrate TOCs, including FOCs, station 
operating companies, and ROSCOs in its system one operations. There is no clear 
evidence that these operating companies are integrated into a single structural 
organisation at the same level of recursion. Although these organisations are strongly 
interdependent with each other, they operate as independent organisations and at a 
different level of recursion, as shown in Figures 7.4 and 7.5. Therefore, HM-RI cannot 
intervene directly into the TOCs and ROSCOs operations through the system 3* audit 
channel. As mentioned above, there is a strong commercial relationship amongst the 
various operating companies of the Railway industry; however, there is no evidence that 
this interrelationship is being regarded in their safety management. This deficiency is 
clearly shown in Figure 7.5 and listed in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 The FSMS Model and HM-Railway Inspectorate SMS 
The FSMS Model I HM-Railway Inspectorate"' 
* system 5: safety policy 
e system 4: safety development 
system 4*: safety confidential reporting 
system 3: safety functional 
" system 3 *: safety audit 
" system 2: safety co-ordination 
" system 1: safety policy implementation 
Secure the proper control of risks to the 
health & safety of employees, passengers & 
others that might be affected by the 
railways. 
Investigation of accidents & monitor 
accidents trends, influencing the industry 
and others on all aspects of regulation & 
management. 
Inspect & approve proposals new or altered 
railway "hardware" (new works, 
equipment, rolling stock & level crossings), 
guidance & advice of new works. 
No audit on railway operating companies 
no interaction amongst the railway 
operating companies & Railtrack 
The co-ordination function amongst the Railway safety management does not exist, 
though in commercial terms all operating companies agree on train planning and 
timetables. Due to this lack of understanding of co-ordination function of safety 
management, the safety of the organisation as a whole can be seriously compromised. 
The Paddington train crash 163 of 5 October 1999, when 31 people die and 245 were 
injured, and the Hatfield train derailment 
164 on 17 October 2000, to mention two, are 
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examples of the consequences of the lack of co-ordination function. Unless this key co- 
ordination and other organisational functions are considered, train incidents and 
accidents will continue to happen. Therefore, there is a need for an approach that could 
help to integrate the railway operating companies into a coherent whole so that safety 
can be managed more effectively. Moreover, the HM-RI has no function that deals with 
confidential reports. The confidential reporting function can be achieved through system 
4* of the FSMS model. System 4* is concerned with confidential reports, received from 
system 1,2 and 3, that may require direct intervention of system 5. 
It seems that the HM-RI SMS does not provide an adequate structural organisation that 
can help not only to give coherence to the railway operating companies, but also to 
understand the interaction between these companies and their environment. Moreover, 
the HM-RI SMS has a very poor communication system and safety culture due to the 
lack of an effective structural organisation. For example, Railtrack does not know the 
safety performance of its commercial partners, such as the TOCs; the opposite is also 
true. The railway operating companies' safety perfonnance is an issue for the S&SD 
rather than sharing safety information amongst them. The most relevant deficiency of 
HM-RI SMS is the lack of an organisational structure that can help to manage safety in 
a coherent way; that is, concerning horizontal and vertical interdependence, as well as to 
structuring decision making, communication systems and inculcating the railway safety 
culture. 
It must be realised, though, that even if more vertical links were in place on Figure 7.5, 
appropriate action would not necessarily be guaranteed. For example, even if there were 
vertical links between "Railtrack operations" and "ROSCOs operations" in Figure 7.5, 
suitable action might be deferred in a given case because of commercial interests. A 
specific case might be a lack of incentive for the ROSCOs to conduct "wheel turning" 
on their rolling stock because of commercial interests and the fact that they do not have 
a responsibility to maintaining the track. ("Wheel turning" refers to periodically 
grinding wheel surfaces to smooth them and reduce wear on the track). 
Regarding commercial aspects, the various railway operating companies are grouped 
according to Figure 7.6. Railtrack plc serves TOCS and FOCs. As can be seen in Figure 
7.6, there is co-ordination between these two operations of system 1. It is in this 
function where the access to the rail network, allocation of train paths, planning and co- 
ordination of train movements, and production of timetables takes place. It can be seen 
also that TOCs have strong relationship with ROSCOs who owns the train vehicles. 
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This close co-operation is achieved through the co-ordination function of system 2. It 
should be emphasised that safety is not embedded into this commercial management 
system, though Railtrack 160 claims that there is "no evidence of commercial interests 
outweighing safety considerations". A clear evidence of the split between commercial 
considerations and safety is that the S&SD became a separate unit within Railtrack on I 
April 2000. The S&SD is the organisation that assesses the TOCs' Safety Cases and 
audits the operations of Railtrack plc and TOCs. According to the information available 
to the researcher, it is not clear how the audit channel is used to intervene in the 
operations of the key players of the railway industry. It should be emphasised that the 
arrangement shown in Figure 7.6 is the same as Figure 7.5, but the railway commercial 
management has a co-ordination function. Commercial requirements are all profit and 
customer service with no embodiment of safety. This is the pattern imposed by 
Government and used as safety management because there is no pressure and drive to 
be different. 
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7.4 A Railway Safety Management System 
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Figure 7.7 shows five possible levels of recursion of the British railway industry. Figure 
7.8 shows a Railway Safety management System (RSMS) that may help to maintain 
risks within an acceptable range in the Railway industry. The RSMS was modelled for 
the third level of recursion, as shown in Figure 7.7. The RSMS is a systemic set of five 
inter-related subsystems. The RSMS achieves five functions associated with systems I 
to 5. System I railway safety policy implementation, consists of Railtrack plc and 
contractors, TOCs (including FOCs and station operating companies), and ROSCOs' 
operations on which safety policy must be implemented. System 2, railway safety co- 
ordination, ensures that the various operating companies of system I operate in 
agreement. System 3, railway safety functional, ensures that system I implements the 
railway's safety policies, as well as ensuring that risks are maintained at acceptable 
levels. System 3*, railway safety audit, is concerned with safety sporadic audit. System 
4, railway safety development, is responsible for safety development for the railway 
industry as a whole. Considering strengths, weaknesses, threats, and opportunities, 
system 4 can suggest changes to the organisation's safety policies. System 4*, railway 
confidential report, is part of system 4 and it is concerned with confidential reports or 
causes of concern that may require direct and immediate intervention of the HM-RI 
management. Finally, system 5, railway safety policy, is responsible for establishing 
safety policies for the whole organisation, as well as monitoring the internal and 
external demands, as represented by the needs of system 3 and system 4 respectively. 
Figure 7.9 shows the structural organisation of Railtrack at the fifth recursion level in 
the format of the FSMS model. Similarly, the Railtrack operations at zone level have no 
interaction with contractors who are responsible for maintaining and renewing 
Railtrack's infrastructure. It is reported by HSE1 60 that Railtrack plc has problems 
controlling contractors, which has safety implications. This is clearly shown in Figure 
7.1 Oý the Railtrack plc operations has no direct interaction with contractors, nor is there 
an intervention of an audit system into contractors' operations. ExCo uses Key 
Indicators of Perfonnance (KIP) to monitor contractor's performance through separate 
reports. Because of the split between the Railtrack plc operations and contractors, there 
is no clear co-ordination function between these two operations 
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Figure 7.10 illustrates a possible structural organisation that addresses these 
deficiencies. This structural organisation provides coherence to the operation of these 
two operations. The Railtrack's executive management, or systems 2 to 5 in ternis of the 
FSMS model, can intervene into the operations of contractors through the audit channel. 
It is shown also that the Railtrack operations have a strong relationship with contractor's 
operations, as well as incorporating a co-ordination function, which may ensure that 
these two organisations act in harmony. The co-ordination function facilitates closer co- 
operation between these two organisations in order to set safety perforinance standards. 
Moreover, this structural organisation incorporates a confidential reporting system, 
which may contribute to meet the Railtrack safety objectives. 
In summary, the case study presented in this section demonstrates the practical 
applicability of the FSMS model developed in this research project. As described above, 
the model has highlighted some relevant deficiencies of the existing safety management 
of the British railway industry. It should be emphasised that the researcher did not carry 
out a detailed analysis of the railway industry safety management due to the lack of 
information and the remaining time of the research project. Clearly, there is a need to 
conduct a detailed analysis of the railway industry to find out the effectiveness of the 
organisation's communication and control aspects. The case study has also 
demonstrated that the FSMS model can easily extended to address safety for any 
organisation. It has shown that the model could be used to understand not only a system 
that has failed, but also a system that has not failed yet. Moreover, the model can be 
used to address commercial aspects and safety considerations in a coherent way; that is, 
horizontal and vertical interdependence of the various operations that form part of any 
organisation. 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has described a case study: that of the British railway industry's safety 
management. It first discussed the current state of the railway industry's safety 
management. It went on by presenting some relevant deficiencies of the existing railway 
industry's safety management in comparison with the FSMS model. Finally, it 
suggested an alternative systemic safety management system for the railway industry. 
Conclusions and implications are presented in chapter eight. 
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ChaiDter EiLyht 
Conclusions and 
Implications 
8.1 Introduction 
Chapter one has described the motivation for this research project. It presented the 
research problem and put forward the research questions. The research methodology 
that was used to conduct and manage the research project was also described. Chapter 
two highlighted the need for an understanding of the systemic nature of fire safety in 
order to manage it in a coherent way. Chapter three described two systemic approaches, 
which have been used in the project. Chapters two and three concentrated on the 
theoretical foundations for approaching the research problem. These foundations helped 
to construct a prototype of the FSMS. The FSMS prototype was presented in chapter 
four. Chapter five presented the developed FSMS model. Chapter six discussed 
evaluation in relation to the FSMS model. A case study was conducted in order to 
assess the British railway safety management and it is presented in chapter seven. This 
final chapter gives an account of the leaming experiences gained throughout the 
research project. Section 8.2 summarises the conclusions about the research questions. 
Conclusions about the research problem are presented in section 8.3. Possible 
implications of the FSMS model for Health, Safety and Environment Management 
systems and on Safety Management Systems are discussed in section 8.4. Conclusions 
about the FSMS model itself are presented in section 8.5. Section 8.6 highlights some 
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possible implications of the research project for policy makers and practitioners. Section 
8.7 discusses possible implications for future research. Finally, section 8.8 summarises 
this chapter. 
8.2 Conclusions About the Research Questions 
Three research questions were developed in the literature review of the research project, 
as discussed in chapter two, as a way of approaching the research problem, which was 
presented in section 1.2 of chapter one. This section presents findings in relation to 
these research questions. 
For clarity, the research questions are presented again here: 
"at is a Fire Safety Management System? 
"at defines an effective Fire Safety Management System so that it is capable of 
maintaining the operational safety of an organisation within an acceptable range? 
How can the fire safety performance of the Fire Safety Management System be 
measured? 
8.2.1 Defining the Fire Safety Management System 
This section summarises the findings in relation to the research question: what is a Fire 
Safety Management System? Systems thinkers and practitioners have recognised that 
organisations are systems embedded within a broad context that cannot be treated in 
isolation. As discussed elsewhere' 01,102,103,104 , systemic thinking is holistic, involving 
seeing relationships amongst the parts that constitute an organisation, as well as the 
interaction between the organisation and its wider environment. It was argued in section 
2.2 in chapter two that the distinction between systemic and reductionistic thinking is 
vital to the argument behind this research project. It seems that existing SMSs address 
fire safety within carefully set boundaries, which are assumed to isolate it from the 
wider or external environment. Both academe and practitioners tend to isolate fire safety 
events. This reductionistic view of fire safety is useful and necessary to understand fire 
risk, but isolating fire safety events may be insufficient to understand complex and 
unforeseen real-world fire safety situations. It is contended here that the degree of safety 
in an organisation or system is an emergent property resulting from the interrelated 
activities of people who design it, manage it, and operate it. All parts that constitute an 
organisation should be seen as interdependent and inseparable parts of the organisation 
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as a whole. Moreover, these constituents are all interconnected, interrelated and 
interdependent so that they cannot be understood as isolated entities, but only as 
integrated parts of the Organisation as a whole. Fire loss is therefore seen as a systemic 
failure, not a result of a single cause. 
An FSMS can be defined as a systemic set of interrelated parts, which are arranged in a 
structured Organisation; this arrangement of relationships serves a well-defined purpose. 
Additionally, a FSMS may be seen as complex, probabilistic, and self-regulated. The 
Fire Safety Management System, developed and proposed in this research project, is 
defined as a systemic set of five inter-related subsystems, called systems I to 5. These 
five subsystems are arranged in a structured Organisation, which interacts in a defined 
way with its local and wider environment; both influencing it and being influenced by 
it. The Organisation and the five subsystems of the FSMS are intended to maintain fire 
risk within an acceptable range in an Organisation's operations life cycle. System 1, fire 
safety policy implementation, implements the Organisation's fire safety policy. System 
2, fire safety co-ordination, involves co-ordinating the various operations of system 1. 
System 3, fire safety functional, involves ensuring that the Organisation's fire safety 
policy is implemented, as well as ensuring that the fire risk is maintained within an 
acceptable range. System 3*, fire safety audit, conducts sporadic audits into the 
operations of system 1. System 4, fire safety development, is responsible for the future 
fire safety development for the whole Organisation. System 4*, fire safety confidential 
reporting, deals with the confidential fire safety information arising from system 1. 
Finally, system 5, fire safety policy, is responsible for establishing fire safety policies 
for the whole Organisation. 
By contrast, this definition does not agree with those presented in section 2.2 in chapter 
two. For example, in the Safety Case RegulationS42 ,a SMS 
is defined as those elements 
concerned with safety performance. Other researchers, such as Burkhardt 96 , and 
Kandola 98 , define a 
SMS in ternis of hazard management, which includes hazard 
identification, risk assessment and control. SMSs are sometimes defined in terms of key 
elements, which are arranged in a systematic procedure rather than in a systemic 
structured Organisation. Such definitions include those presented by the CCpSI13' 
HSE 119 , Ming94 , and 
Mitchison and Papadakisloo. Moreover, these SMSs are built on 
George 89 and Druker's9o ideas of a management system. George defines key elements of 
management, namely planning, organising, commanding, co-ordinating, and controlling 
which are linked systematically to form a closed loop. Similarly, Druker contends that 
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management involves setting objectives, organising, communicating, establishing 
yardsticks, and developing people. The FSMS model developed in this research project 
has some parallel elements with existing SMSs, as shown in the evaluation 
consideration of the FSMS model in section 6.3 in chapter six. The FSMS model is 
intended to be a viable system that achieves five interrelated functions associated with 
systems I to 5. Systems I to 5 and their relationships constitute the organisation of the 
FSMS model. Although existing SMSs have some parallel functions with the FSMS 
subsystems, the functions of these subsystems are fundamentally distinct. It seems that 
existing SMSs lack appropriate structured organisation that can help not only to give 
coherence to the SMS's key functions, but also to understand the interaction between 
the organisation and its environment. Moreover, existing SMSs, including the British 
railway safety management presented in chapter seven, seem to lack an effective 
structure that may help organisations to conduct decision making and communication, 
and instil an adequate safety culture. The FSMS contains a communication and control 
model that obeys the organisational principles of appendix A. 
8.2.2 An Effective Fire Safety Management System 
This section discusses the findings for the research question: what defines an effective 
Fire Safety Management System so that it is capable of maintaining the operational 
safety of an organisation? As has been discussed in section 2.2 in chapter two, there are 
no well-accepted criteria to define an effective SMS. It has been discussed by 
Grabowski and Roberts 12 that structure, safety culture, decision making, 
communication, and man-machine interface are key factors that have a significant 
impact on an organisation's safety performance. It has been recognised by researchers 
that a good communication system may help to instil and maintain an organisation's 
safety culture. It is also recognised elsewhere 77,78,79 that poor communication may be the 
result of lack of trust, and trust within organisations is a continuous process. 
Organisations should have a well-designed structure and strong safety culture to help to 
manage risk more effectively. Other researchers, such as Whittingham and HollyweI195 , 
also recognise that effective safety management results from the combination of an 
SMS structure and the organisation's safety culture. Similarly the British Standard 
Institute (BSI)58 emphasises that occupational health and safety policy, planning, 
implementation and operation, checking and corrective action, and management review 
are all essential for an effective OH&S management system. Travers 
97 contends that the 
Successful Health and Safety Management (HS(G)65), provides the basic criteria for an 
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effective management system. Reason 7 contends that an effective safety management 
means actively "navigating the safety space" in order to reach and then remain within 
the zone of "maximum resistance. " 
The comparison process presented in section 6.3 from chapter six, suggests that the 
FSMS model is an effective approach to managing fire safety. The structured 
organisation of the FSMS interacts in a defined way with its local and wider socio- 
economic and physical envirom-nent. This organisation may help to adapt continuously 
to foreseen and unforeseen threats and opportunities, and weaknesses and strengths as 
presented in the organisation's local and wider environment. Moreover, the organisation 
of the FSMS is intended to manage fire safety in a coherent way by treating an 
organisation as both vertically and horizontally interdependent. Vertical 
interdependence is dealt with through the recursive structural organisation of the FSMS. 
This favours autonomy, hence it helps to maintain an acceptable level of fire safety at 
each level of recursion more effectively. The horizontal interdependence is dealt with 
through the interrelationships amongst the various operations of the system. The 
channels that connect the different subsystems of the FSMS are channels of 
communication and control. These channels should be designed according to the four 
principles of organisation given in Appendix A. Additionally, the FSMS suggests a 
system for measuring continuously the organisation's fire safety performance. The 
structure of the FSMS, its relationship with its environment, and its channels of 
communication and control are the basic criteria that make the FSMS model an 
effective system in managing fire safety. 
Besides this comparison process, a case study was conducted to assess the British 
railway safety management. The FSMS model highlighted some relevant deficiencies of 
the current practice. This case study also demonstrated that the FSMS model can also be 
adopted to address safety for any organisation. 
Some relevant comments about the concept of a viable system and the principles of 
recursion should be made. Stafford Beer 81,82 defines viable as "able to maintain a 
separate existence". The principle of recursion states that any viable system contains, 
and is contained in, a viable system. Regarding human activity systems as viable 
systems, then it may be possible to construct a viable system with recursions at the level 
of an individual, family, company, country, and international level. Ostensibly, a viable 
system at the international level will be viable only if the next higher level of recursion 
is viable. However, there can be no human activity system 'above' the international 
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community and therefore, it might be concluded that the principle of recursion must be 
violated and a FSMS could not, in principle, be viable. It may be the case, though, that a 
closed system may be viable and not need to be within a viable system. Such may be 
perhaps the case for the international community, given adequate material resources 
from outside the earth, e. g., the warmth of the sun. However, a hypothetical example 
could be if for any reason the sun ceased radiating heat, then the whole system at the 
level of the planet could no longer be viable in principle. These general considerations 
are open to further thought and discussion. 
8.2.3 Measuring Fire Safety Performance 
This section presents the findings for the last research question: how can the fire safety 
performance of the Fire Safety Management System be measured? Traditionally, 
measures of safety perfonnance have tended to be reactive rather than pro-active. 
Organisations have tended to focus on technical aspects and look for the immediate 
causes of fire incidents or accidents after they have taken place. As discussed in section 
2.5.1 from chapter two, organisations use reactive indicators, such as fatal accident rate, 
lost time injury rate, loss of contaimnent rates, and other negative outcome indicators to 
measure the effectiveness of their safety management system 64,143,144 . The 
recommendations following an inquiry are seen as a readjustment process of the 
organisation's safety perfonnance to fit the newly gained understanding. This allows the 
immediate causes that led to the failure to be learnt so that they are not repeated in 
future situations. More recently, various approaches have been suggested by both 
academe and practitioners to measuring safety performance pro-actively. Such 
approaches include the development of performance standards as discussed by 
Finucane 135 and the LTKOOA44 ; the development of indicators for latent errors as 
proposed by Hudson et al. 19, and Reason 7. Organisations have conducted safety 
audits, 137,100 guidelines 138,139 , performance review and management review to 
'validate' 
the effectiveness of their SMSs. 
However, both academe and practitioners seem to pay very little attention to the 
underlying factors, such as latent and human factors. They have emphasised technical 
factors, and immediate causes of fire incidents or accidents. Furthermore, organisations 
may not address the revision of fire safety plans considering process changes, new 
technologies, and unforeseen causes of fire incidents during the life cycle of the 
organisation's operations. All these changes potentially invalidate prior fire safety plans. 
There is a need for an understanding of the systemic nature of fire safety so that both 
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technical and human factors and the immediate and the underlying causes of fire 
incidents or accidents can be addressed in a coherent way. Moreover, an understanding 
of continuous decision making is needed to respond to unexpected changes or events to 
anticipate undesirable consequences for both fire safety and cost. This thesis presents 
an alternative system that may help to manage an organisation's fire safety 
performance. This approach may facilitate both understanding the systemic nature of 
fire safety and the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable fire risk levels. 
Furthermore,, this understanding may enable organisations to commit to and address fire 
safety pro-actively. 
As can be seen in Figure 5.2 from chapter 5, this system consists of four levels of fire 
safety, four kinds of fire safety plans, and four kinds of fire safety indices. These 
measures of fire safety performance can be used as a comprehensive system to measure 
an organisation's fire safety performance for all types of resources throughout the 
organisation. Moreover, the indices of fire safety performance presented in section 5.3.2 
of chapter five are intended to contain both ECS and ICS, and to incorporate latent and 
immediate factors,, as described in 5.3.2 in chapter five. The organisation's top and line 
management role in defining the fire safety levels, plans, and indices is threefold. First, 
they should define, in agreement with the organisation workforce, expected fire safety 
performance levels, develop fire safety plans and derive indices of performance. 
Second, top and line management should detect and if possible anticipate unacceptable 
fire safety performance before it becomes problematic. The current fire risk indices are 
compared with the planned indices. This process must be carried out continuously. 
Finally, they should devise actions to achieve agreed fire safety performance; that is, 
take actions that maintain fire safety performance within acceptable limits. A detailed 
description on how to carry out these three functions is given in section 5.3.2 from 
chapter five. 
8.3 Conclusions About the Research Problem 
This section summarises the findings of this research project for the research problem: 
what does an organisation need to do to anticipate fire risks so that fire risk can be 
maintained within an acceptable range throughout the organisation's operational life 
cycle? This research project contends that a systemic approach needs to be adopted to 
address fire safety in a coherent way. The FSMS model is a systemic set of five 
necessary and sufficient subsystems associated with systems 1 to 5, which are arranged 
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in a structured organisation. The organisation of the FSMS model interacts with its local 
and wider socio-economic and physical environment. Moreover, this organisation is 
intended to help to manage fire safety effectively through the vertical and horizontal 
cohesiveness of the FSMS. The vertical interdependence deals with the recursive 
property of the structural organisation of the FSMS, whilst the horizontal 
interdependence deals with the interrelationship amongst the various operations that 
form part of system 1. An organisation should be endowed with as much autonomy as 
possible in order to accomplish the fire safety objectives more effectively. The principle 
of recursion should be adhere to. 
Also, the channels of communication and control of the FSMS model should be 
designed according to the four organisational principles, which help to make the FSMS 
an effective approach to managing fire safety. Furthermore, the FSMS model contains a 
system that is intended to measure the fire safety performance of the FSMS; this system 
considers both ICS and ECS for both apparent and latent factors. Additionally, a fire 
safety configuration space is suggested in chapter five. This framework may help to 
distinguish the notion of acceptable and unacceptable levels of fire safety. The FSMS 
model is an effective approach, because it embodies the idea of a viable system, a 
structural organisation, which is formed by the subsystems and their relationships, 
vertical and horizontal cohesiveness of the organisation, the principle of autonomy, and 
the organisational principles to design channels of communication and control. As 
shown in the evaluation considerations in section 6.3 from chapter six, the existing 
SMSs, including the case study presented in chapter seven, are systematic procedures 
rather than systemic structural organisations. It is hoped that this approach will lead not 
only to more effective management of fire safety in organisations, but also to more 
effective management of safety, health and the environment for any organisation. 
8.4 Implications for Health, Safety and the Environment 
This section summarises the findings of this research project that may have some 
implications for Health, Safety and the Environment. As can be seen in tables 6.1,6.2, 
6.3,6.4,6.5 and 7.1, the existing systems for managing health and safety and 
environmental impacts approach matters in isolation. It is contended in this thesis that 
the degree of health and safety and environmental degradation are all emergent 
properties of an organisation as a whole that emerge throughout the organisation's life 
cycle. There is a need to adopt a systemic approach that can help organisations to 
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manage health, safety and environmental issues effectively. Because of the scope and 
limitations of this research project, the FSMS model reported in this thesis was 
developed to address fire safety. However, this model was used to address safety in the 
British railway industry as described in chapter seven. Similarly, this model may be 
extended to address health, safety and environmental concerns. Clearly, this will require 
further research, as discussed in section 8.7. 
8.5 Conclusions About the Use of the FSMS 
The development of the FSMS model has been a continuous process, as illustrated in 
Figure 8.1. A first prototype of the FSMS was established initially; chapter four gives 
an account of the development of this prototype. The FSMS prototype was mapped to 
the Fortune and Peters paradigms as discussed in section 4.4 from chapter four. A final 
FSMS model resulted from this mapping process. The FSMS model was presented in 
chapter five and its evaluation process described in chapter six. According to the 
mappings discussed in section 6.3 from chapter six and the case study presented in 
chapter seven, the FSMS may help to manage not only fire safety more effectively, but 
also to manage health, safety and the environment and for any organisation. Clearly, this 
requires the FSMS to be further developed; these requirements are discussed in section 
8.7. 
VSM & FPM 
hence 
learn from 
evaluation 
construct 
FSMS 
hence 
hence evaluate 
FSMS 
Figure 8.1 A Continuous Development Process of the FSMS Model 
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8.6 Implications for Policy and Practice 
This section presents possible implications of this research project for policy makers 
and practitioners. The FSMS model has a recursive structural organisation, which 
favours autonomy at each level of recursion. But this autonomy is conditional on the 
cohesiveness of the whole organisation. Autonomy means that each operation of system 
I or each level of recursion of the FSMS is responsible for its own activity with 
minimal intervention of systems 2,3,4, and 5. Similarly, if higher recursions are 
considered, policy makers should endow organisations with as much autonomy as 
possible to make them more effective. Organisations should be autonomous in their own 
right and act independently based on their own understanding of fire safety and their 
specific operations. It should, however, be recognised that policy makers should 
intervene in an organisation to ensure that their safety objectives are being met. 
However, a system will not be viable unless it is embedded within a viable system and 
contains viable systems. As discussed in the evaluation consideration in section 6.3 
from chapter six and the case study presented in chapter seven, the FSMS is a systemic 
model that can be adopted by both practitioners and policy makers to assess existing 
SMSs. Moreover, this model can be used to develop effective SH&E Management 
Systems. 
8.7 Implications for Future Research 
Future research is categorised into three major activities: 
(i) Extension of the FSMS model to address safety, health and the environment and 
ultimately to sustainable development. This new model should be sufficiently 
general to be used in any kind of organisation. The process should also involve 
mapping the new model to existing HS&E Management Systems. 
Calculation of the viability of the FSMS model as a whole, as discussed in section 
6.4 from chapter six. 
(iii) Ultimately, real-world uptake of the FSMS model should enable testing of the 
model 'in the field'. 
(iv) The "fire safety configuration space" may be thought of in terms of fuzzy set 
theory, which will need further research to consolidate the idea. 
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8.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has summarised the conclusions about the research questions and the 
research problem. It has proceeded by presenting the implications of the research 
project for health, safety and the envirom-nent. Conclusions about the use of the FSMS 
model have been presented. Possible implications for policy-makers and practitioners 
have also been presented. Finally, this chapter has concluded by giving some 
implications for future research. The remaining sections of this thesis are concerned 
with appendices and references. 
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Appendix A 
Principles of Organisation (from Beer 
82) 
The first Principle of Organisation (from Ashby Law, see chapter 3, page 
51) 
"Managerial, operational and envirom-nental varieties, diffusing through an institutional 
system, tend to equate; they should be designed to do so with minimum damage to 
people and to cost. " (i. e., for a viable system). 
An example could be an evacuation system designed to save lives in the case of a fire or 
explosion on an offshore platfonn; then the number of life boat spaces must be at least 
as great as the number of possible evacuees. 
The Second Principle of Organisation (derived from Shannon) 
"The four directional channels carrying inforination between the management unit, the 
operation, and the environment must each have higher capacity to transmit a given 
amount of information relevant to variety selection in a given time than the originating 
subsystem has to generate it in that time. " (As shown in Figure Al). 
Example, the channels carrying procedures of evacuation must have enough specificity 
so as to reduce ambiguities or eliminate unclear instructions. 
The third Principle of organisation 
"Wherever the information carried on a channel capable of distinguishing a given 
variety crosses a boundary, it undergoes transduction; and the variety of the transducer 
must be at least equivalent to the variety of the channel. " 
Example, in the case of means of escape for offshore employees, a transducer might be a 
fire instruction notice. This would 'transduce' between the person making up the 
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evacuation rules and the workers the rules are aimed; then the notice must be 
comprehensive and clear. 
The Fourth Principle of Organisation 
"The operation of the first three principles must be cyclically maintained through time, 
and without hiatus or lags. " (That is, they must be adhered to continuously). 
Figure Al. The Basic Elements of a Viable System, Illustrating the 4 Key 
Information Channels. 
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Infonnation channels 
Appendix B 
This appendix presents the research articles produced during this work. 
Refereed journal papers: 
1. Beard A. N. and Santos-Reyes, J., "A Systemic Approach to Fire Safety in Offshore 
Facilities", Facilities, Volume 17, No. 9/10, September / October 1999,352-361. 
2. Santos-Reyes, J., Beard A. N. and Clark, P. J., "A Systemic Approach to Fire Safety 
Offshore", Journal ofApplied Fire Science, Volume 8, No. 12,1998-99. 
Conference papers presented: 
1. Santos-Reyes, J., Beard A. N. and Clark, P. J., "A Systemic Approach to Fire safety 
Offshore", Proceedings of the International Conference - Fire at Sea, Royal Inst. Of 
Naval Architects (RINA), London, 1997. 
2. Santos-Reyes, J., Beard A. N., "A Systemic Approach to Managing Fire Safety on 
Offshore Installations", Proceedings of the Offshore Technology Conference (OTQ- 
Where the World of Offshore Technology Meets, Vol. 1,2000,689-697. 
Refereed Journal paper accepted: 
1. Santos-Reyes, J., Beard, "A Systemic Approach to Fire Safety Management", Fire 
Safety Journal, (to be published). 
Newsletter: 
1. Santos-Reyes, J. and Beard, A. N., "A Systemic Approach to Offshore Fire Safety 
Management", FABIG (Fire and Blast Information Group) Newsletter, Issue No. 24, 
June 1999,11-14. 
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Papers in preparation: 
1. Santos-Reyes, J., Beard A. N., "A Systemic Approach to Measuring Fire Safety 
Performance", to be submitted to the Journal offire Science. 
2. Santos-Reyes, J., Beard A. N., "A FSMS Model: Assessing Safety Management 
Systems", to be submitted to the Journal ofLoss Prevention. 
3. Santos-Reyes, J., Beard A. N., "A Fire Safety Management System: A Viable 
System", to be submitted to the Journal of Systemic Practice and Action Research. 
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